ElmSt, 埃尔姆街
1) Regarding maintenace capex, there are a bunch of reasons why it appears so low (particularly for the utilities segment). I'd recommend you look at the 2016 investor day starting at slide 56 for more info and examples, but here's my summary. First, they revalue and mark up the value of their PP&E (rate base) annually using a DCF approach. So as rates have grown, discount rates have come down, and the rate base has expanded at high ROIC, PP&E values go up on the balance sheet a lot more than their actual replacement value. Second, when the purchase assets, they do the same thing. BIP allocates what would normally be called goodwill to PP&E. So again this inflates PP&E value above replacement cost. Third, most of their assets are steel or concrete structures that don't get much wear and tear. In the utilites business for example, BUUK is a big part of the rate base and has utility connections that are nearly indestructible underneath homes. Fourth, some major assets in the utilities segment like their Brazilian pipelines are on fixed concession agreements. So the Brazilian pipelines are assets with a 30yr life. Steel pipelines probably have close to no maintance capex over a 30yr life. I'm no expert on pipeline maintenace capex, but my guess is sometime in the next 100yrs those assets will need some major work. So if I was valuing that asset over a 100yr life, I'd want to know how long it lasts and then divide the cost of later in life repairs by the useful life to come up with some estimate of "average" maintenance capex. But BIP won't ever spend the maintenance capex because realistically it's probably 50+ years out when it's the Brazilian governments problem. The temporary (30yr) life of the asset is accounted for in BIPs AFFO calculations because they include a charge for return of capital which basically amortizes the cost of the asset over the life of their concession. And fifth, some of the businesses recover capex through their regulatory frameworks.
1) 关于维护资本支出，它看起来如此之低有很多原因（特别是对于公用事业部门）。我建议您查看从幻灯片 56 开始的 2016 年投资者日，了解更多信息和示例，但这是我的总结。首先，他们使用 DCF 方法每年重估和标记其 PP&E（费率基础）的价值。因此，随着利率上升、贴现率下降以及利率基数在高 ROIC 下扩大，资产负债表上的 PP&E 价值远高于其实际重置价值。其次，在购买资产时，他们做同样的事情。 BIP 将通常称为商誉的内容分配给 PP&E。因此，这再次使 PP&E 价值高于重置成本。第三，他们的大部分资产都是钢结构或混凝土结构，不会受到太多磨损。例如，在公用事业业务中，BUUK 是费率基数的重要组成部分，并且拥有在房屋下方几乎坚不可摧的公用事业连接。第四，公用事业领域的一些主要资产，如巴西管道，都签订了固定特许权协议。因此，巴西管道是具有 30 年寿命的资产。钢管在 30 年的使用寿命内可能几乎没有维护资本支出。我不是管道维护资本支出方面的专家，但我的猜测是在未来 100 年的某个时候，这些资产将需要一些重大工作。因此，如果我对 100 年寿命的资产进行估值，我想知道它能持续多久，然后将后期维修成本除以使用寿命，得出“平均”维护资本支出的一些估算值。但 BIP 永远不会花费维护资本支出，因为实际上这可能是 50 多年后巴西政府的问题。BIPs AFFO 计算中考虑了资产的临时（30 年）寿命，因为它们包括资本返还费用，这基本上是在其特许权寿命期间摊销资产成本。第五，一些企业通过监管框架收回资本支出。
2) I don't see a problem using the FFO of JVs that they control as part of the FFO of BIP. It's no different than Buffett saying he has "look-through earnings" of $X billion in Apple. To the extent the JVs have opportunities to deploy capital at 12-15% returns on capital, they should do that and it's a good reason for distributions to be lower than the JV's FFO. Also, AFFO doesn't exclude taxes, it excludes deferred taxes. The stated rationale is "we do not believe this item reflects the present value of the actual tax obligations that we expect to incur over our long-term investment horizon." This relates back to the revaluation of assets also. When you revalue them upwards, there is a deferred tax liability created that is only paid when the asset is sold which in most case is 10+ years away. This is probably on the aggressive side since deferred taxes at some point get paid, but if you use a 12-15% cost of capital and assume a 10yr hold for their assets, the PV of the deferred tax assets isn't that material.
2）我认为使用他们控制的合资企业的 FFO 作为 BIP FFO 的一部分没有问题。这与巴菲特说他在苹果公司拥有 X 亿美元的“透视收益”没有什么不同。就合资企业有机会以 12-15% 的资本回报率部署资本而言，他们应该这样做，这是分配低于合资企业 FFO 的一个很好的理由。此外，AFFO 不排除税款，它不包括递延税款。陈述的理由是“我们不认为该项目反映了我们预期在长期投资范围内产生的实际纳税义务的现值。”这也与资产重估有关。当您向上重估它们时，会产生递延所得税负债，只有在出售资产时才支付，这在大多数情况下是 10 年以上。这可能是激进的一面，因为递延税款在某个时候得到支付，但如果您使用 12-15% 的资本成本并假设其资产持有 10 年，则递延税款资产的现值并不重要。
3) On the articles in order:
3）关于文章顺序：
Rody Boyd: Main arguments (1) BAM & it’s listed partnerships are controlled by partners that don’t have skin in the game proportionate to their ownership. This is true, and I don’t care… It doesn’t bother me one bit that mgmt “only” owns ~7% of the equity in the listed partnerships yet controls them through the holding company structure. Incentives are aligned by the mgmt. fee and IDR structure and I’m quite happy that management has a substantial ownership stake. (2) The net income is inflated by revaluations of assets (usually up). Again, I don’t care as I’m looking at AFFO and distributions and BIP doesn't hide anything about it's revaluation policy. He also ignores the D&A >>>> maintenance capex point when comparing net income less revaluation gains to distributions. (3) They consolidate assets on the balance sheet so it looks like they have more assets than they do. Again, who cares? (4) There was a shady related party deal in BEP a while ago. I haven’t looked into this to know if it’s true, but based on the other arguments it’s probably not.
Rody Boyd：主要论点 (1) BAM 及其上市合作伙伴关系由合作伙伴控制，这些合作伙伴在游戏中的利益与其所有权不成比例。这是真的，我不在乎……管理层“仅”拥有上市合伙企业约 7% 的股权，但通过控股公司结构控制它们，这一点我一点也不在意。激励措施由 mgmt 调整。费用和 IDR 结构，我很高兴管理层拥有大量股权。 (2) 净收入因资产重估（通常上涨）而膨胀。同样，我不在乎，因为我正在查看 AFFO 和分配，而 BIP 没有隐藏任何关于其重估政策的信息。在将净收入减去重估收益与分配进行比较时，他还忽略了 D&A >>>> 维护资本支出点。 (3) 他们在资产负债表上合并资产，因此看起来他们拥有的资产比实际上多。再一次，谁在乎？ (4) 前段时间BEP有黑幕关联交易。我没有调查过这是否属实，但根据其他论点，它可能不是。
Barron’s: I don’t care about the asset valuations of BIP, I care about the cash flows and I can make my own judgements on what they’re worth. Based on that it’s not worth looking into further for me, but I would guess maybe there’s some tax reason the Spanish company with similar assets chose to put a lower mark on them, or BAM just wanted to show better performance in their private funds (irrelevant to me since I plan to earn my return through distributions over a long holding period, not through marking this to their stated asset value in my head). For what it’s worth, their stupidly high private value they apply to BPY in the SOTP is one reason I have never owned BAM.
《巴伦周刊》：我不关心 BIP 的资产估值，我关心的是现金流，我可以对它们的价值做出自己的判断。基于此，对我来说不值得进一步研究，但我想也许有一些税收原因，这家拥有类似资产的西班牙公司选择给他们打一个较低的分数，或者 BAM 只是想在他们的私人基金中表现出更好的表现（无关紧要）对我来说，因为我计划通过长期持有期间的分配来赚取回报，而不是通过将其标记为我头脑中的既定资产价值）。就其价值而言，他们在 SOTP 中应用于 BPY 的愚蠢的高私人价值是我从未拥有 BAM 的原因之一。
Grants: I think I recall his argument being that BPY has overleveraged assets of dubious value and BAM puts a ridiculously high mark on it in their SOTP valuation presented to investors. I generally agree with this and think at best its value is unknowable (to me at least) and in my opinion is worth much less than BAM says it is in the SOTP. This has nothing to do with BIP though. Please remind me if I’m missing another one of the arguments that might apply to BIP.
赠款：我想我记得他的论点是 BPY 过度杠杆化了价值可疑的资产，而 BAM 在向投资者展示的 SOTP 估值中对其给予了高得离谱的分数。我大体上同意这一点，并认为充其量它的价值是不可知的（至少对我而言），而且在我看来，它的价值远低于 BAM 在 SOTP 中所说的价值。不过，这与 BIP 无关。如果我遗漏了另一个可能适用于 BIP 的论点，请提醒我。
FT: This article is just plain dumb. If my subsidiaries have opportunities to redeploy capital at 15% IRRs, and they do so, therefore distributing no cash to me but increasing their market values, I can borrow against that to make distributions at the HoldCo level and I haven’t done anything crazy or manipulative…
FT：这篇文章简直是愚蠢。如果我的子公司有机会以 15% 的 IRR 重新部署资本，他们这样做了，因此没有向我分配现金但增加了他们的市场价值，我可以以此为抵押借款以在 HoldCo 级别进行分配而且我没有做任何疯狂的事情或操纵……
On reconciling cash flow statement to AFFO, they give 10 pages of reconciliations at the back of all the earnings decks to reconcile net income to AFFO. That's sufficient to me. There are so many puts and takes on the cash flow statement (timing of asset sales and purchases, timing of capital raises, distributions of capital rather than income to the private partnerships, etc) that it’s impossible to reconcile to the dollar without more info.
在将现金流量表与 AFFO 进行核对时，他们在所有收益表的背面提供了 10 页的对账，以将净收入与 AFFO 进行核对。这对我来说已经足够了。现金流量表中有如此多的看跌期权（资产出售和购买的时间、资本筹集的时间、资本分配而不是私人合伙企业的收入等），如果没有更多信息，就不可能与美元核对。
Wrangler - thank you for the detailed responses. I think we are going to have to agree to disagree here, but I appreciate your genuinely well-thought out counterarguments. If I may, before we leave this one and let time tell, the following questions still remain:
Wrangler - 感谢您的详细回复。我想我们将不得不同意在这里不同意，但我感谢你真正深思熟虑的反驳。如果可以的话，在我们离开这个并让时间告诉我们之前，以下问题仍然存在：
1. Maintenance capex: 1. 维护资本支出：
a. I went through the presentation you referenced and I see your points. But do you know of any other utility on Earth - whether it is power generation, distribution, water, or whatever - that has these characteristics? Why is the maintenance capex of every other utility so much higher or at least equal to depreciation, even when they also use IFRS accounting, when they do acquisition and when they operate under the same concessions? If you can show me one publicly traded utility with the same maintenance capex, I will concede I'm wrong here. I'm not convinced that their steel and concrete is as special as their accounting.
A。我仔细阅读了您引用的演示文稿，明白了您的观点。但是你知道地球上的任何其他公用事业——无论是发电、配电、供水还是其他——具有这些特征吗？为什么其他所有公用事业公司的维护资本支出都高得多或至少等于折旧，即使他们也使用 IFRS 会计，当他们进行收购并在相同的特许权下运营时？如果您能向我展示一个具有相同维护资本支出的公开交易公用事业，我会承认我在这里错了。我不相信他们的钢铁和混凝土与他们的会计一样特别。
b. If the rate base is valued on an DCF approach (and lower rates = higher rate base), how come a utility commission doesn't also lower the allowed cost of debt or return on equity? Why do elected officials let investor keep the benefits?
b.如果费率基数是根据 DCF 方法估值的（并且较低的费率 = 较高的费率基数），为什么公用事业佣金也不会降低允许的债务成本或股本回报率？为什么民选官员让投资者保留收益？
c. Again, I don't think we are going to convince each other here, but how do you get comfortable on the fact that the assets they acquired used to spend a lot on capex (and not grow) but they now have very little maintenance capex under BIP? I'm referring to GWR specifically, which routinely spent $200-$250 million on total capex while growing very little, yet BIP's Transportation segment (of which railroads are less than half) spends only $150 million on maintenance capex.
C。再一次，我认为我们不会在这里说服对方，但你如何对他们收购的资产过去在资本支出上花费很多（而不是增长）但他们现在的维护资本支出很少这一事实感到满意在 BIP 下？我指的是 GWR，它通常在总资本支出上花费 200 至 2.5 亿美元，而增长很少，但 BIP 的运输部门（其中铁路不到一半）仅在维护资本支出上花费 1.5 亿美元。
You may reply: "The shrewd accountants at Brookfield acquried only GWR but retained only a 9% economic interest while retaining voting control, so they will get all of the benefits somehow while someone else spends all of the capex" - which brings me to my next point:
你可能会回答：“布鲁克菲尔德精明的会计师只收购了 GWR，但只保留了 9% 的经济利益，同时保留了投票控制权，因此他们将以某种方式获得所有收益，而其他人则花费了所有资本支出”——这让我想到了我的观点下一点：
d. How comfortable are you with the "smartest accountants in the room" telling you what maintenance capex should be and what cash flow is? Has this ever worked out in prior historical examples? Jeff Skilling at Enron . . . Kinder Morgan . . . SunEdison / TerraForm Power (which is, of course, being acquired by Brookfield).
d.您对“房间里最聪明的会计师”告诉您维护资本支出应该是多少以及现金流量是多少感到满意吗？这在以前的历史例子中有过吗？安然公司的杰夫斯基林。 . .金德摩根。 . . SunEdison / TerraForm Power（当然，被 Brookfield 收购）。
2. FFO of JV's vs. distributions:
2. JV 与分配的 FFO：
a. I don't disagree with you that cash is cash whether it is retained or distributed. But it seems a bit contradictory and counter-intuitive for you to say: "The JV's have 12-15% ROIC projects so they should retain their capital" and at the same time suggest that the BIP distributions are fully funded by cash flow including JV FFO. You can't have it both ways. If the cash is being reployed at the JVs then the BIP dividend is being funded by something else (debt issuances, accounting).
A。我不同意你的观点，现金就是现金，无论是保留的还是分配的。但是你说：“合资企业有 12-15% 的 ROIC 项目，所以他们应该保留他们的资本”，同时暗示 BIP 分配完全由包括合资企业在内的现金流提供资金，这似乎有点矛盾和违反直觉FFO。你不能两者兼得。如果现金被重新部署在合资企业，那么 BIP 股息将由其他东西（债务发行、会计）提供资金。
b. I'm not sure I follow you on the taxes. It appears to me that the income statement has a $278 million book tax expense . . . which is added back to FFO . . . . despite $179 million of actual cash paid for taxes. Did they actually pay $179 million in cash for taxes in 2019 or no?
b.我不确定我在税收方面是否了解你。在我看来，损益表有 2.78 亿美元的账面税费。 . .它被添加回 FFO 。 . . .尽管有 1.79 亿美元的实际现金缴税。他们在 2019 年是否实际支付了 1.79 亿美元的现金税款？
3. BAM: 3. 巴马：
a. Roddy Boyd: so none of the related party issues or prior concerns about the GP that controls BIP worries you? OK.
A。 Roddy Boyd：所以您没有担心关联方问题或之前对控制 BIP 的 GP 的担忧吗？好的。
b. Barrons: None of this bothers you either? OK again. "I plan to earn my return through distributions over a long holding period" - fair enough. Let me ask you this: Would you own BIP (with all of its world class assets and 12-15% ROIC and blah blah blah) if it did NOT pay a dividend? If it is really a 5.5% dividend that grows at 6% maybe that is attractive to you, I would suggest you look at a whole host of other things that do not come with the above baggage: WLKP, WFC, AB, ABBV/AGN . . .
b. 《巴伦周刊》：这些都不困扰你吗？好的。 “我计划通过长期持有期间的分配来赚取回报”——这很公平。让我问你：如果不支付股息，你会拥有 BIP（拥有其所有世界级资产和 12-15% 的 ROIC 等等）吗？如果真的是 5.5% 的股息以 6% 的速度增长，这可能对您有吸引力，我建议您看看上述包袱中没有的一大堆其他东西：WLKP、WFC、AB、ABBV/AGN . . .
c. Grants: Why do you feel so comfortable that BAM only stuffed shitty assets into a levered yield play at BPY/BPYU and not at BIP, BBU, BEP, etc? Is there a reason that BAM's behavior only applies to Class B malls and not to opaque Latin America toll roads and Asian terminals?
C。赠款：为什么您对 BAM 只将劣质资产塞入 BPY/BPYU 而不是 BIP、BBU、BEP 等的杠杆收益游戏感到如此自在？ BAM 的行为只适用于 B 级商场而不适用于不透明的拉丁美洲收费公路和亚洲码头，这是有原因的吗？
d. Sorry, sent the wrong FT article. This is the one:
d.抱歉，发错了 FT 文章。这是一个：
网页链接
Brookfield: inside the $500bn secretive investment firm
布鲁克菲尔德：在 5000 亿美元的秘密投资公司内部
An FT investigation into the complex dealings of the group that helped out the Kushners by leasing 666 Fifth Avenue
英国《金融时报》调查了通过租赁第五大道 666 号帮助库什纳家族的集团的复杂交易
Like I said, we will probably agree to disagree, but appreciate your willingness to discuss. Good luck on this and at least we agree that Transdigm is a long (see, I don't hate all shady levered companies).
就像我说的，我们可能会同意不同意，但感谢您愿意讨论。祝你好运，至少我们同意 Transdigm 很长（看，我不讨厌所有阴暗的杠杆公司）。
Elm, I agree that we may need to agree to disagree, but I’ll give it one more shot and appreciate your pushback ;)
榆树，我同意我们可能需要同意不同意，但我会再试一次，感谢你的反对；）
1a. 1a.
The utilities business owns only a few assets so we can get granular regarding why this utility business is very different from most utilities businesses. Basically all the cash flow comes from four assets, (1) 2,000km of nat gas pipelines in Brazil that have ~10yr concessions, (2) 1,600km of NEW electrical transmission lines in Brazil with 30yr concessions, (3) BUUK (the U.K. regulated distribution business), and (4) to a much lesser extent, the coal terminal in Australia.
公用事业业务仅拥有少量资产，因此我们可以详细了解为什么该公用事业业务与大多数公用事业业务有很大不同。基本上所有的现金流都来自四项资产，(1) 巴西 2,000 公里的天然气管道，拥有约 10 年的特许权，(2) 巴西 1,600 公里的新输电线路，具有 30 年的特许权，(3) BUUK（英国受监管的分销业务），以及 (4) 在较小程度上，澳大利亚的煤炭码头。
If you owned a $2B pipeline that was 15 years old and you were only entitled to the cash flows over the next 10 years, what % of the asset value do you think you'd need to spend on maintenance capex to maximize your cash flows? My guess is close to $0, anything more. I agree with you, if they owned the asset forever, using the cash maintenance capex costs as they do would overstate the true economics because it wouldn’t leave a reserve to fund a large overhaul in 50-100 years. But in this case, reserving for larger capex down the road is Brazil's issue.
如果您拥有 15 年的 20 亿美元管道，并且您仅有权获得未来 10 年的现金流，您认为您需要将资产价值的多少百分比用于维护资本支出以最大化您的现金流？我的猜测是接近 0 美元，甚至更多。我同意你的看法，如果他们永远拥有资产，像他们那样使用现金维护资本支出成本会夸大真实的经济效益，因为它不会留下储备金来资助 50-100 年的大修。但在这种情况下，为未来更大的资本支出做准备是巴西的问题。
1,600km of new build electrical transmission in Brazil that have 30yr concessions. Same question as above? Do the comps you’re looking at have exclusively new electrical transmission that they are amortizing over a 30yr life?
巴西 1,600 公里的新建输电线路具有 30 年的特许权。和上面的问题一样吗？您正在查看的 comps 是否具有全新的电力传输，它们在 30 年的使用寿命内摊销？
BUUK is all last mile connections underneath homes with indestructible pipes. Where is the maintenance need short of an earthquake? Nobody has ever needed to dig under my home (or the home of anybody I know) to replace the gas line. Idk of any good comps for this business but if you have any in mind I’d be very interested in evidence that is contrary to my current point of view.
BUUK 是带有坚不可摧的管道的房屋地下的所有最后一英里连接。除了地震，哪里还需要维护？从来没有人需要在我家（或我认识的任何人的家）下面挖洞来更换煤气管线。我不知道这家公司有什么好的公司，但如果你有任何想法，我会对与我目前的观点相反的证据非常感兴趣。
And the coal terminal is a take-or-pay regulatory regime that includes a charge that is intended to be a complete pass through of the costs charged for operations “and maintenance.” I think they just net the cost pass through, but I'm not 100%. Even if they don't this is only ~10% of the utilities segment.
煤炭码头是一种照付不议的监管制度，其中包括一项旨在完全转嫁运营“和维护”费用的费用。我认为他们只是通过净成本转嫁，但我不是 100%。即使他们不这样做，这也只占公用事业部门的 10%。
What utility companies have those characteristics that I can compare to?
哪些公用事业公司具有我可以比较的那些特征？
1b. I don't think the rate base is DCF based, I meant the PP&E on the balance sheet is DCF based.
1b.我不认为利率基础是基于 DCF 的，我的意思是资产负债表上的 PP&E 是基于 DCF 的。
1c. I’m admittedly not a rail expert, so I appreciate you pointing that out and I’m going to do some research on the maintenance capex needs of GWR relative to the other BIP rails. But again, the railroads and toll roads that BIP owns are in many cases under fixed concessions agreements so BIP doesn’t need to reserve for major capex projects that will happen after the concession expires. That might explain a good chunk of the difference, and they’re also longer-haul so I don’t know if that makes a difference as well. If I find anything interesting, I’ll post an update.
1c.诚然，我不是铁路专家，所以我很感谢你指出这一点，我将对 GWR 相对于其他 BIP 铁路的维护资本支出需求进行一些研究。但同样，BIP 拥有的铁路和收费公路在许多情况下都处于固定特许权协议之下，因此 BIP 不需要为特许权到期后发生的大型资本支出项目预留资金。这可能解释了很大一部分差异，而且它们的距离也更长，所以我不知道这是否也会有所不同。如果我发现任何有趣的事情，我会发布更新。
1d. If they were underspending dramatically on maintenance capex, wouldn’t you see it in the asset sale prices? They’ve sold a # of assets and earned very high returns over their holding periods, which usually doesn't happen if you're starving businesses of capital. Of course, they had some help from low interest rates... Ultimately mgmt comp is tied to distribution growth and to their reputation via ownership in BAM, there is no incentive to underspend on maintenance capex. I'm comfortable that they aren't making up numbers and this is an easy business to audit; it's not that hard to determine what's maintenance and what's growth for a pipeline (did the pipeline get longer? if yes, growth)...
1d。如果他们在维护资本支出上的支出大幅不足，您不会在资产出售价格中看到它吗？他们已经出售了 # 的资产，并在持有期间获得了非常高的回报，如果你的企业资金匮乏，这通常不会发生。当然，他们从低利率中得到了一些帮助……最终，管理补偿与分销增长和他们在 BAM 中的所有权的声誉相关，没有动力在维护资本支出上支出不足。我很高兴他们没有编造数字，这是一项很容易审计的业务；确定管道的维护和增长并不难（管道变长了吗？如果是，则增长）...
2a. Since we both agree TDG is a long, does it worry you that they often pay dividends in excess of 200% of net income? It doesn’t bother me, because I know as the business grows, they can continue to do that by maintaining the same debt/EBITDA ratio. Why is this any different? The subsidiaries make the growth investments, but the holding company pays the dividends. Obviously, the only way to distribute out most of the AFFO while making large growth capex investments is through debt issuance or asset sales. But that is sustainable. If they stopped making growth investments, then they would be able to distribute all the FFO from the JVs. And if they keep making growth investments, then they can keep selling mature assets or borrowing money at the holding company level against the value created by the growth investments.
2a.既然我们都同意 TDG 很长，他们经常支付超过净收入 200% 的股息，您是否担心？这并不困扰我，因为我知道随着业务的增长，他们可以通过保持相同的债务/EBITDA 比率来继续这样做。为什么这有什么不同？子公司进行增长投资，但控股公司支付股息。显然，在进行大量增长资本支出投资的同时分配大部分 AFFO 的唯一方法是通过债券发行或资产出售。但这是可持续的。如果他们停止进行增长投资，那么他们将能够分配合资企业的所有 FFO。如果他们继续进行增长投资，那么他们可以继续出售成熟资产或在控股公司层面借入资金，以抵消增长投资创造的价值。
2b. Yes, BIP (on a consolidated basis) did actually pay $179 million in cash taxes for 2019. But only ~25-30% of that relates to BIP unit holders because it’s a Bermuda partnership with very low tax rates. The remainder is the consolidated tax obligations of JV partners paid for by JV partners. If you look at the definition of FFO it’s very clear that it only adds back deferred taxes, not current taxes. In the table you showed, yes they add back all taxes, and then the current income taxes attributable to BIP unit holders are deducted in the “other expense/income” add back netted against investment income / dividends.
2b.是的，BIP（在综合基础上）确实在 2019 年支付了 1.79 亿美元的现金税。但其中只有约 25-30% 与 BIP 单位持有人有关，因为它是百慕大合伙企业，税率非常低。其余部分是由合资伙伴支付的合资伙伴的合并纳税义务。如果你看一下 FFO 的定义，很明显它只加回递延税，而不是当期税。在您显示的表格中，是的，他们加回所有税款，然后在“其他费用/收入”中扣除 BIP 单位持有人应得的当前所得税加回投资收入/股息。
3a. What are the prior concerns you’re referring to, that the GP that controls BIP has a substantial ownership stake in the partnership, incentives to grow distributions over time, and a history of growing distributions by 10%/yr for a long time? Or that there was one related party deal in a different BAM partnership that Roddy thinks is shady? It doesn’t even seem that shady to me. The PPAs were amended as part of a combination of certain wholly owned assets with the Power Fund. What is Roddy even implying? That BAM, the mgmt co, raised the prices on power it bought from BEP by 40% to juice the returns at BEP? So I’m supposed to be concerned that BAM has at one time in its past stolen from itself to funnel money INTO its listed partnerships like the one I own?
3a.您指的是之前的担忧是什么，即控制 BIP 的普通合伙人在合伙企业中拥有大量所有权股份，随着时间的推移增加分配的激励措施，以及长期以每年 10% 的速度增长分配的历史？或者 Roddy 认为不同的 BAM 合伙企业中有一项关联方交易是不正当的？对我来说，它甚至都不那么阴暗。 PPA 作为某些全资资产与 Power Fund 合并的一部分进行了修订。罗迪到底在暗示什么？管理公司 BAM 将其从 BEP 购买的电力价格提高了 40%，以提高 BEP 的回报率？因此，我应该担心 BAM 过去曾一度从自身窃取资金，将资金注入其上市合作伙伴关系，就像我拥有的合作伙伴关系一样？
3b. If they did not pay a dividend, but redeployed the capital sensibly, then yes, I’d still be interested in owning it. I also own WFC, and if you think BIP comes with more baggage on this we are never going to be able to agree. BIP has the type of assets that in my opinion have a reasonable chance of seeing a huge multiple re-rating in a world with 1.2% 30yr treasury yields. Assets that you can reasonably project out stable growing cash flows for many decades with near certainty are rare and I think might be bid up to crazy prices in this world of low rates. I’m not banking on that, but what I like is I’m earning a reasonable return to sit around and see if it happens.
3b.如果他们不支付股息，而是明智地重新部署资本，那么是的，我仍然有兴趣拥有它。我也拥有 WFC，如果你认为 BIP 在这方面有更多的包袱，我们永远不会同意。在我看来，BIP 拥有的资产类型有合理的机会在 30 年期国债收益率为 1.2% 的世界中看到巨大的倍数重估。您可以合理地预测出未来几十年稳定增长的现金流的资产很少见，我认为在这个低利率的世界里，这些资产的价格可能会飙升至疯狂的水平。我不指望这一点，但我喜欢的是我正在赚取合理的回报，坐下来看看它是否会发生。
3c. Well I didn’t say BAM “stuffed shitty assets” into BPY, you said that. That implies malicious intent and yes would be concerning. I just think commercial real estate is a terrible pond to be fishing in long-term. BIP is entirely different. How is a Latin American toll road “opaque”? A certain # of cars drive on it, odds are that # will grow annually, and the price per car is certain. Where is the opacity? For Class B malls, I have no idea if they will exist in 10 years and if they do, what the rents will be. I’m 100% certain that cars will still be driving on toll roads in Lima in 10 years. That type of business lends itself much better to leverage so you don't end up in the shitty assets with leverage scenario. Also, infrastructure is where BAM has had its longest and most successful track record. There are other reasons I put in the write up on why I think that’s likely to persist.
3c.好吧，我没有说 BAM 将劣质资产“塞进 BPY”，你是这么说的。这意味着恶意，是的，这将是令人担忧的。我只是认为商业房地产是一个长期钓鱼的可怕池塘。 BIP 完全不同。拉丁美洲的收费公路如何“不透明”？一定数量的汽车在上面行驶，很可能 # 每年都会增长，并且每辆车的价格是确定的。不透明度在哪里？对于 B 级购物中心，我不知道它们是否会在 10 年内存在，如果存在，租金会是多少。我 100% 确定 10 年后汽车仍会在利马的收费公路上行驶。这种类型的业务更适合利用杠杆，因此您不会最终陷入低劣的资产杠杆场景。此外，基础设施是 BAM 拥有最长和最成功记录的领域。关于我认为这种情况可能会持续存在的原因，我在文章中提出了其他原因。
3d. Am I understanding correctly that as in the Roddy Boyd piece, my concern here is supposed to be that despite only owning stakes in BIP worth billions of dollars instead of tens of billions of dollars, two men who have been extraordinarily successful investors over a few decades have effective control over my investment? You can probably tell by the way I phrased the question, but I view this in a more positive light than Roddy or the Financial Times. The other concern is they paid a full price for 666 Fifth Ave? Again, I don’t like commercial real estate, so I didn’t look into the deal, but I suspect it’s probably right that they paid a full price and thankfully, I don’t need to invest in BPY to invest in BIP.
3d。我的理解是否正确，正如 Roddy Boyd 的那篇文章，我在这里的担忧应该是，尽管只拥有价值数十亿美元而不是数百亿美元的 BIP 股份，但两位在过去几十年中都非常成功的投资者对我的投资有有效的控制？你可能可以通过我表述问题的方式来判断，但我比罗迪或金融时报更积极地看待这个问题。另一个问题是他们为第五大道 666 号支付了全价？同样，我不喜欢商业地产，所以我没有调查这笔交易，但我怀疑他们支付全价可能是正确的，谢天谢地，我不需要投资 BPY 来投资 BIP。
Wrangler - yes, we will agree to disagree on BIP/BAM and agree to agree on TDG. I do want to thank you for your detailed replies though. Those were a lucid, well thought-out, intelligent replies . . . overruled.
Wrangler - 是的，我们将同意不同意 BIP/BAM 并同意同意 TDG。不过，我确实要感谢您的详细答复。这些是清晰的、深思熟虑的、聪明的回答。 . .否决了。
March 11, 2013
Roddy Boyd
The Paper World of Brookfield Asset Management
Enter the name of Toronto-based public company Brookfield Asset Management into a search engine and it delivers more than 1 million results. The global conglomerate, whose annual sales exceed $18 billion, controls ports in England, owns Manhattan’s prestigious World Financial Center and sells Chicago a fair measure of its electricity. Yet the massive enterprise is better known for what it owns than how it operates.
在搜索引擎中输入总部位于多伦多的上市公司 Brookfield Asset Management 的名称，它会提供超过 100 万条结果。这家全球企业集团年销售额超过 180 亿美元，控制着英格兰的港口，拥有曼哈顿著名的世界金融中心，并向芝加哥出售相当数量的电力。然而，这家大型企业以其拥有的产品而不是其运营方式而闻名。
The Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation began a full-time investigation into Brookfield’s far-flung operations in late fall. This reporting and research uncovered a series of earnings quality problems, the presence of a mostly hidden ownership group that effectively controls Brookfield’s governance and corporate structure, and a business model that involves heavy reliance on related-party transactions with its subsidiaries.
南方调查报道基金会于秋末开始对布鲁克菲尔德广泛的业务进行全职调查。该报告和研究揭示了一系列收益质量问题、有效控制 Brookfield 治理和公司结构的大部分隐藏的所有权集团的存在，以及严重依赖与其子公司的关联方交易的商业模式。
Few companies bear a structure as complex as Brookfield’s: Analyzing the company’s organizational tree and its web of entities, stakes, partnerships and operating companies is to behold the work of gifted accountants and lawyers. Similarly, Brookfield’s financial filings are mind-boggling in their complexity.
很少有公司拥有像布鲁克菲尔德这样复杂的结构：分析公司的组织树及其实体、股权、合伙企业和运营公司的网络是为了观察有天赋的会计师和律师的工作。同样，布鲁克菲尔德的财务文件复杂得令人难以置信。
A brief glance at a stock chart, which shows that Brookfield’s share price has been on a fairly steady climb from a low of $11 in 2009 to almost $40 in recent months, might give credence to the argument that the labyrinthine structure works.
简要浏览一下股票图表，它表明布鲁克菲尔德的股价从 2009 年的低点 11 美元稳步攀升至最近几个月的近 40 美元，可能会让人相信迷宫式结构有效的论点。
No one doubts that Brookfield’s share price performance has pleased investors, but how it is achieved should matter.
毫无疑问，Brookfield 的股价表现令投资者满意，但如何实现这一点应该很重要。
Control without risk 无风险控制Brookfield bears a pyramidal control structure, a design that U.S. regulators have frowned on since the 1930s. Simply stated, this type of structure lets a small group of shareholders exercise control of a business without putting a proportionate amount of capital at risk.
布鲁克菲尔德采用金字塔式控制结构，美国监管机构自 1930 年代以来一直反对这种设计。简而言之，这种类型的结构允许一小部分股东行使对企业的控制权，而无需将一定比例的资本置于风险之中。
(This kind of corporate structure is often depicted by a pyramid; hence the name. It is legal and to varying degrees common in Europe, Asia and Canada. But it should not be confused with a pyramid scheme.)
（这种公司结构通常用金字塔来描绘；因此得名。它在欧洲、亚洲和加拿大是合法的，并且在不同程度上很常见。但不应将其与金字塔计划相混淆。）
As has been deeply parsed in academic literature, pyramidal control structures are either tremendously efficient or very worrisome, depending on one’s vantage point. Indeed, legendary investor Benjamin Graham devoted an entire chapter of his still influential 1934 book “Security Analysis” to their risks.
正如学术文献中深入分析的那样，金字塔控制结构要么非常有效，要么非常令人担忧，这取决于一个人的有利位置。事实上，传奇投资者本杰明格雷厄姆在他 1934 年出版的仍然具有影响力的著作《证券分析》中用了整整一章来阐述他们的风险。
Those in the founding group can leverage their capital to effectively control a broad network of assets or investments; often members of this group do so by creating a holding company with the right to appoint half or more of the board of directors of the parent company.
创始团队成员可以利用他们的资本有效控制广泛的资产或投资网络；该集团的成员通常通过创建控股公司来实现这一目标，该控股公司有权任命母公司董事会的一半或更多成员。
In turn, these directors can oversee a series of acquisitions using the company’s capital, most of which belongs to other people.
反过来，这些董事可以监督一系列使用公司资本的收购，其中大部分属于其他人。
For the shareholders outside of the control group — even if their capital is doing most of the buying — their influence upon the board of directors is perpetually limited, no matter how much they have invested.
对于控制组之外的股东——即使他们的资本进行了大部分购买——他们对董事会的影响永远是有限的，无论他们投资了多少。
Brookfield’s formula 布鲁克菲尔德公式Here’s how Brookfield’s pyramidal control structure works: Partners Limited, a private holding company with 45 equity holders (a mix of current and former Brookfield officers, with just eight publicly named) owns slightly more than 20 percent of Brookfield’s Class A shares via a combination of trusts and direct holdings valued at more than $4.7 billion. Partners Limited also owns 100 percent of Brookfield’s 85,120 Class B shares, allowing it to elect 50 percent of Brookfield’s board of directors. Owning just 20 percent of the Class A shares but electing half of Brookfield’s board, those who run the almost invisible Partners Limited end up with effective control over all Brookfield’s operations and governance, and anyone else who happens to be a Brookfield shareholder with a gripe cannot do much but grin and bear it.
Brookfield 的金字塔控制结构是这样运作的：Partners Limited 是一家私人控股公司，拥有 45 名股东（包括现任和前任 Brookfield 管理人员，只有 8 名公开姓名）通过以下方式持有略高于 20% 的 Brookfield A 类股份：价值超过 47 亿美元的信托和直接持股。 Partners Limited 还拥有 Brookfield 100% 的 85,120 股 B 类股份，使其能够选举 Brookfield 50% 的董事会成员。仅拥有 20% 的 A 类股份，但选举了 Brookfield 一半的董事会成员，那些经营几乎隐形的 Partners Limited 的人最终有效控制了 Brookfield 的所有运营和治理，而任何其他恰好是 Brookfield 股东的人都不能抱怨做很多事情，但要笑着忍受。
Should an enterprising Brookfield shareholder summon the nerve to put forth a measure for a vote, its adoption requires approval from two-thirds of both the Class A and Class B shareholders alike. In other words, if the 45 Partners Limited shareholders who own Class B stakes believe a measure goes against their interests, the motion is dead even if 80 percent of the Class A holders approve it. Ultimately this creates a public-private hybrid: a corporation that has ready access to public capital but whose governance can be a private matter.
如果有进取心的 Brookfield 股东鼓起勇气提出一项投票措施，则其通过需要获得 A 类和 B 类股东三分之二的同意。换句话说，如果持有 B 类股份的 45 名 Partners Limited 股东认为某项措施违背了他们的利益，那么即使 80% 的 A 类股东同意，该动议也是无效的。最终，这创造了一个公私混合体：一个可以随时获得公共资本但其治理可以是私人事务的公司。
The use of A and B classes of shares is almost universally panned by governance advocates for its allegedly unfair treatment of minority shareholders. But Brookfield is hardly the only company with what is known as a dual-class share structure. The roster of companies with such a structure includes Google, Berkshire Hathaway and The New York Times Co. Whatever their merits, dual-class share structures are designed to keep the company’s operating assets in the hands of founders. When Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffett likes another company, he does not use his publicly traded corporation as a springboard to build a string of downstream corporate investments via minority stakes; he generally buys all of it.
使用 A 类和 B 类股票几乎普遍受到治理倡导者的批评，因为据称其对小股东的待遇不公平。但布鲁克菲尔德并不是唯一一家拥有所谓双层股权结构的公司。具有这种结构的公司名册包括谷歌、伯克希尔哈撒韦公司和纽约时报公司。无论其优点如何，双层股权结构旨在将公司的经营资产掌握在创始人手中。当伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的沃伦巴菲特喜欢另一家公司时，他不会以他的上市公司为跳板，通过少数股权建立一系列下游公司投资；他通常会全部买下。
Want to know more about Partners Limited, its history and how it goes about business? Apart from mentions in Brookfield’s management information circular (equivalent to a U.S. corporate proxy statement), the entity is rarely mentioned in the filings of Brookfield and its subsidiaries. Examining public filings, the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation came up with a list of 40 of the 45 current and former Partners Limited equity holders; a sizable number of them were instrumental to the rise and fall of Brookfield Asset Management’s high-profile predecessor, the Edper Group.
想更多地了解 Partners Limited、它的历史以及它是如何开展业务的？除了在 Brookfield 的管理信息通告（相当于美国公司委托书）中提及之外，Brookfield 及其子公司的文件中很少提及该实体。通过审查公开文件，南方调查报告基金会列出了 45 名现任和前任 Partners Limited 股权持有人中的 40 名；其中相当多的人对 Brookfield Asset Management 备受瞩目的前身 Edper Group 的兴衰起到了重要作用。
[module align=”left” width=”half” type=”aside”] See the Southern Investigative Reporting Foundation’s exclusive list identifying 40 Partners Limited equity holders — those who really call the shots at Brookfield Asset Management.[/module]
[module align=”left” width=”half” type=”aside”] 查看南方调查报告基金会的独家名单，确定了 40 名 Partners Limited 股权持有人——那些真正在 Brookfield Asset Management 做主的人。[/module]
In response to a U.S. Securities and Enforcement Commission comment, Brookfield recently came close to acknowledging that it has a pyramidal control structure in the “Risk Factors” section of a prelaunch filing for its Brookfield Property Partners unit: “The company at the top of the chain may control the company at the bottom of the chain even if its effective equity position in the bottom company is less than such controlling interest,” the document states.
为了回应美国证券和执法委员会的评论，Brookfield 最近几乎承认在其 Brookfield Property Partners 部门的启动前文件的“风险因素”部分中有一个金字塔控制结构：“该公司位于即使其在底层公司的有效股权地位低于该控制权益，链条也可能控制链条底部的公司，”该文件称。
(With its shares traded on the Toronto and New York exchanges, Canada-based Brookfield submits filings to the SEC but does so as a foreign issuer, which allows it to legally bypass some U.S. laws.)
（由于其股票在多伦多和纽约交易所交易，总部位于加拿大的 Brookfield 向美国证券交易委员会提交了文件，但作为外国发行人这样做，这使其能够合法地绕过一些美国法律。）
No matter how little Brookfield Asset Management controls economically of Brookfield Property Partners, Brookfield Asset Management will retain control of Brookfield Property Partners’ board.
无论 Brookfield Asset Management 在经济上对 Brookfield Property Partners 的控制有多么微弱，Brookfield Asset Management 仍将保留对 Brookfield Property Partners 董事会的控制权。
All this fine print has paid off handsomely for Partners Limited.
所有这些细则都为 Partners Limited 带来了丰厚的回报。
Consider just this one, commercial real estate branch of the Brookfield Asset Management ownership tree: Partners Limited, with a stake worth $4.7 billion, is able to control Brookfield Asset Management, whose market capitalization is $23.8 billion. One of Brookfield Asset Management’s investments is its 50 percent stake in Brookfield Office Properties, a commercial real estate developer with $8.5 billion in market capitalization, that in turn owns 73 percent of Australian real estate investment trust Brookfield Prime Property Fund. With what ultimately amounts to a 7.3 percent blended equity stake in these three entities, the 45 people in Partners Limited exert managerial control over many billions of dollars’ worth of commercial real estate around the world.
仅考虑 Brookfield Asset Management 所有权树的商业房地产分支：Partners Limited 拥有价值 47 亿美元的股份，能够控制市值 238 亿美元的 Brookfield Asset Management。 Brookfield Asset Management 的一项投资是持有 Brookfield Office Properties 50% 的股份，这是一家市值 85 亿美元的商业房地产开发商，后者拥有澳大利亚房地产投资信托 Brookfield Prime Property Fund 73% 的股份。 Partners Limited 的 45 名员工最终持有这三个实体 7.3% 的混合股权，对全球价值数十亿美元的商业地产实施管理控制。
Asked about the role Partners Limited plays in Brookfield Asset Management, Andy Willis, a company spokesman replied, in part, with the following:
当被问及 Partners Limited 在 Brookfield Asset Management 中扮演的角色时，公司发言人 Andy Willis 部分回答如下：
“We believe [Partners Limited] creates a significant alignment of interests with our shareholders that sets us apart from other companies and is valued by shareholders and our clients alike. We believe that Partners’ participation in the ownership of Brookfield will result in greater long‐term value creation for all shareholders.”
“我们相信 [Partners Limited] 与我们的股东建立了显着的利益一致性，这使我们有别于其他公司，并受到股东和我们客户的一致重视。我们相信 Partners 参与 Brookfield 的所有权将为所有股东创造更大的长期价值。”
The U.S. regulatory distaste for pyramidal control structures can be traced to the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Then Federal Trade Commission analysts fervently argued that a series of collapses in the 1930s by pyramidal control structure companies (primarily utilities) had deepened the Great Depression. The FTC analysts seized on three things: real and potential abuses by “minority” shareholders (resulting in investors who did not exert control over corporate affairs), the prospects for one-sided related-party transactions — and most important — weak accounting controls that led to the inflation of asset values.
美国监管机构对金字塔控制结构的厌恶可以追溯到富兰克林德拉诺罗斯福的总统任期。随后，联邦贸易委员会的分析师们激烈地争辩说，金字塔控制结构公司（主要是公用事业公司）在 1930 年代的一系列倒闭加剧了大萧条。 FTC 分析师抓住了三件事：“少数”股东实际和潜在的滥用行为（导致投资者无法控制公司事务）、单方关联方交易的前景——以及最重要的——薄弱的会计控制导致资产价值膨胀。
What the numbers really say 数字真正说明了什么Investors in Brookfield have remained loyal to the corporation despite such governance issues perhaps because it has grown assets and earned billions of dollars annually. With Brookfield’s shares widely held in Canada and finding increasing favor among American money managers over the past few years, members of Partners Limited and the rest of Brookfield’s senior management likely are optimistic about prospects.
尽管存在这些治理问题，布鲁克菲尔德的投资者仍然忠于公司，这可能是因为它的资产不断增长，每年赚取数十亿美元。由于布鲁克菲尔德的股票在加拿大广泛持有，并且在过去几年中越来越受到美国基金经理的青睐，Partners 的成员Limited 和 Brookfield 的其他高级管理人员可能对前景持乐观态度。
But a sunny outlook might not be what comes to mind after close scrutiny of Brookfield’s financial filings and an analysis of how the company interacts with several of its subsidiaries.
但是，在仔细审查了布鲁克菲尔德的财务文件并分析了该公司与其几家子公司的互动方式后，人们可能不会想到乐观的前景。
Despite its profits, Brookfield is not doing as well as investors might suppose.
尽管利润丰厚，但布鲁克菲尔德的表现并不像投资者想象的那样好。
Brookfield is a creature of the capital markets, relying on financing to fuel its growth and meet its commitments to investors, as the chart below shows. From the start of 2010 to the third quarter of 2012, Brookfield’s distributions — its dividend payments to investors — were $272 million greater than its cash flow from operations, according to filings. Fortunately for Brookfield, its investors are a truly generous bunch; they helped the company eliminate this deficit and raise almost $1.75 billion more than it paid back out, ensuring that its increasing dividend obligations were met — with cash to spare.
如下图所示，Brookfield 是资本市场的产物，依靠融资来推动其增长并履行对投资者的承诺。备案文件显示，从 2010 年初到 2012 年第三季度，Brookfield 的分红——支付给投资者的股息——比运营现金流多出 2.72 亿美元。对布鲁克菲尔德来说幸运的是，它的投资者是一群真正慷慨的人。他们帮助公司消除了这一赤字，筹集到的资金比收回的资金多出近 17.5 亿美元，确保其不断增加的股息义务得到履行——并有多余的现金。
But relying on a constant stream of investor capital has proved a substantial risk for many corporations — the 2008 credit crisis serves as an object lesson — since companies whose business models center on a constant stream of capital market funding hit trouble when the markets seize.
但事实证明，依赖源源不断的投资者资本对许多公司来说是一个巨大的风险——2008 年的信贷危机就是一个生动的教训——因为当市场失灵时，其商业模式以源源不断的资本市场资金为中心的公司就会遇到麻烦。
And U.S. tax policy toward dividends is a major stumbling block for companies with pyramidal control structures. The primary method a pyramidal control structure company has to sustain itself — using preferred stock dividends to shuttle cash from the subsidiaries through the structure to the publicly traded holding company — becomes impractical when both the dividend payer and recipient are being taxed.
美国的股息税收政策是金字塔控制结构公司的主要绊脚石。金字塔控制结构公司必须维持自身生存的主要方法——使用优先股股息通过该结构将现金从子公司转移到上市控股公司——当股息支付者和接受者都被征税时变得不切实际。
Postmodern accounting 后现代会计Generations of businesspeople have assessed the success of enterprises based on a set of simple criteria: Are they profitable? Do they sell enough goods or services in a given period so that after fixed and variable costs are subtracted and taxes paid, something is left to reinvest, retain for future use or even return to shareholders?
几代商人根据一套简单的标准来评估企业的成功：它们是否盈利？他们是否在特定时期内出售了足够的商品或服务，以便在扣除固定和可变成本并缴纳税款后，还有一些东西可以再投资、保留以备将来使用甚至返还给股东？
Using net income as a barometer of financial achievement is not without its flaws; any business that requires a substantial investment or a longer time frame for its assets to generate a return is likely to eke out a meager income in the short term. But net income is a rational and understandable measurement of where a business stands.
使用净收入作为财务成就的晴雨表并非没有缺陷。任何需要大量投资或需要较长时间才能使其资产产生回报的企业很可能在短期内勉强维持微薄的收入。但净收入是对企业状况的合理且可以理解的衡量标准。
Brookfield sees things very differently and suggests investors judge its success by relying, as the company does, on a measure called “total return” to accurately capture the growth in asset value and cash flow generation in its units. The company describes this view in its annual report as follows: “We define Total Return to include funds from operations plus the increase or decrease in the value of our assets over a period of time.” (“Funds from operations” consist of the cash flow from its businesses.)
Brookfield 的看法截然不同，并建议投资者像该公司一样，通过一种称为“总回报”的衡量标准来判断其成功与否，以准确捕捉其部门资产价值和现金流量产生的增长。该公司在其年报中对这一观点的描述如下：“我们将总回报定义为包括运营资金加上我们资产价值在一段时间内的增减。” （“运营资金”包括来自其业务的现金流量。）
Accordingly, Brookfield’s management says it is not the biggest fan of using net income to define profit because only “fair value” adjustments from its real estate and timber segments can be included but not any from its renewable power and energy businesses. (A company can make fair value adjustments if it decides that the market value of its assets has significantly changed from their book value.)
因此，Brookfield 的管理层表示，它不是最喜欢使用净收入来定义利润的人，因为只能包括来自其房地产和木材部门的“公允价值”调整，而不是来自其可再生能源和能源业务的任何调整。（一家公司可以如果它决定其资产的市场价值与其账面价值发生重大变化，则进行公允价值调整。）
Whatever the merits of “total return” as a measurement, Brookfield’s investors would need to determine net income to gauge the return on their invested capital in comparison to other investment possibilities.
无论“总回报”作为衡量标准的优点如何，Brookfield 的投资者都需要确定净收入，以衡量其投资资本回报与其他投资可能性的比较。
Management’s linguistic preferences are not the sum total of the drama surrounding Brookfield’s accounting, however. Its income statement has several line items that suggest flaws in the company’s earnings quality.
然而，管理层的语言偏好并不是围绕布鲁克菲尔德会计的戏剧性事件的总和。它的损益表有几个项目表明公司的盈利质量存在缺陷。
A frequently debated subject in the accounting community, earnings quality is usually defined to include, in part, how closely a company’s reported net income tracks its so-called true income (or what it can easily convert to cash).
作为会计界经常争论的话题，收益质量通常被定义为部分包括公司报告的净收入与其所谓的真实收入（或它可以轻松转换为现金的收入）的接近程度。
Those willing to put on the green eyeshade and examine Brookfield Asset Management’s 2011 Consolidated Statement of Operations can find $3.67 billion in net income. It’s an eye-opening number. More interesting, however, is discovering just how much of that figure is generated from accounting entries and not from profits related to business activity.
那些愿意戴上绿色眼罩并检查 Brookfield Asset Management 的 2011 年合并运营报表的人可以发现 36.7 亿美元的净收入。这是一个令人大开眼界的数字。然而，更有趣的是发现这个数字中有多少是从会计分录中产生的，而不是从与商业活动相关的利润中产生的。
The problem starts a few rows above the line for net income where one can view the various streams that comprise it. In 2011, almost $1.29 billion, or 35 percent, of Brookfield’s profits came from fair value gains. (This figure, however, is listed as $968 million in the 2012 earnings release; it is not clear why there is a difference between the two filings.) For 2012, according to Brookfield’s most recent earnings release, more than 43 percent — or $1.19 billion — of its net income of $2.74 billion came in fair value changes.
问题从净收入线上方几行开始，可以在其中查看构成它的各种流。 2011 年，Brookfield 近 12.9 亿美元（35%）的利润来自公允价值收益。 （然而，这个数字在 2012 年的收益发布中被列为 9.68 亿美元；目前尚不清楚为什么这两个文件之间存在差异。）根据 Brookfield 最近的收益发布，2012 年，超过 43% — 或 1.19 美元亿美元——其 27.4 亿美元的净收入来自公允价值变动。
Accounting standards allow for including fair value changes in net income. But any gimlet-eyed investor knows that they are nothing more than paper entries, and in Brookfield’s case, they represent its own assessment of its timber, commercial real estate and agricultural asset values; they have nothing to do with the cash typically associated with profits. Even though company executives may legally term a fair value change as profit, this sum cannot be used to pay dividends, build new plants or be readily tapped for a rainy day. All it represents is that the company thinks an asset has increased in value. As a key driver of the much larger net income figure, however, it certainly appears to have added some heft to Brookfield’s share price in recent times.
会计准则允许在净收入中包含公允价值变动。但任何眼尖的投资者都知道，它们只不过是纸质条目，在布鲁克菲尔德的案例中，它们代表了它自己对其木材、商业房地产和农业资产价值的评估；它们与通常与利润相关的现金无关。尽管公司高管可以合法地将公允价值变动称为利润，但这笔款项不能用于支付股息、建造新工厂或随时使用以备不时之需。它只代表公司认为资产增值了。然而，作为更大的净收入数字的关键驱动因素，它最近似乎肯定增加了布鲁克菲尔德股价的一些分量。
Consider a complex line item titled “equity accounted income” in the 2011 annual report’s Consolidated Statement of Operations, representing Brookfield’s share of income from its far-flung investments in entities it controls. Pegged at slightly more than $2.2 billion, this amounts to 60 percent of its total net income of $3.67 billion. Similar to fair value adjustments, equity accounted income is (mostly) noncash. For 2012, it totaled $1.24 billion and equaled more than 45 percent of earnings. (Brookfield released its 2012 earnings in mid-February but not its entire annual report, so details about the components of 2012 earnings are not yet available.)
考虑 2011 年年度报告的合并运营报表中名为“权益会计收入”的复杂项目，代表布鲁克菲尔德从其控制的实体的广泛投资中获得的收入份额。这略高于 22 亿美元，占其净收入总额 36.7 亿美元的 60%。与公允价值调整类似，权益会计收入（大部分）是非现金收入。 2012 年，总计 12.4 亿美元，占收益的 45% 以上。 （Brookfield 在 2 月中旬发布了其 2012 年的收益，但并未公布其整个年度报告，因此尚无法获得有关 2012 年收益组成部分的详细信息。）
The primary driver of the “equity accounted income” entry in 2011 was Brookfield’s high-profile 22 percent investment in General Growth Properties, a New York-based commercial real estate developer and manager. (Funds managed by Brookfield own another 18 percent of the stock.) Buried in the back of the annual report, this notation is easy enough to miss, but the carrying value — the value Brookfield assigns to the General Growth Properties position — was $1.17 billion more than its market value: Brookfield valued the highly liquid, New York Stock Exchange-traded shares of General Growth Properties at about 40 percent above the market’s valuation at the end of 2011. All told, about $1.4 billion from this one investment eventually wound up in equity accounted income, but it added only $204 million in cash to the till, according to the annual report. (In 2010, Brookfield reported equity accounted income of $765 million but its only source of actual cash from that input was $374 million in dividend payments from companies it had invested in.)
2011 年“股权收入”条目的主要驱动力是布鲁克菲尔德对总部位于纽约的商业房地产开发商和管理公司 General Growth Properties 的 22% 高调投资。 （由布鲁克菲尔德管理的基金拥有另外 18% 的股票。）隐藏在年度报告的后面，这个符号很容易被忽略，但账面价值——布鲁克菲尔德分配给 General Growth Properties 头寸的价值——为 11.7 亿美元超过其市值：Brookfield 对 General Growth Properties 在纽约证券交易所上市的流动性高的股票的估值比 2011 年底的市场估值高出约 40%。总而言之，这项投资最终获得了约 14 亿美元的收益根据年度报告，在权益会计收入中，它只增加了 2.04 亿美元的现金。 （2010 年，Brookfield 报告的权益会计收入为 7.65 亿美元，但该投入的唯一实际现金来源是其所投资公司支付的 3.74 亿美元股息。）
Thus, accounting entries are making Brookfield look really good. Without including fair value changes and equity accounted income, Brookfield’s earnings sharply decrease.
因此，会计分录使布鲁克菲尔德看起来非常好。不包括公允价值变动和权益会计收入，布鲁克菲尔德的收益急剧下降。
What does this situation look like numerically speaking? As shown in the chart below of Brookfield’s net income in the last couple of years, after adjusting for fair value changes and equity accounted income, the sum that might be called the “true profits” — the earnings from all the investments and assets Brookfield has the world over — is relatively low.
从数字上看，这种情况是什么样的？如下图所示，布鲁克菲尔德过去几年的净收入，在调整公允价值变动和权益会计收入后，可以称为“真实利润”的总和——布鲁克菲尔德所有投资和资产的收益世界各地——相对较低。
Investors may accept Brookfield’s desire to be analyzed this way but the SEC has publicly questioned how Brookfield used specific investment terms and its valuation methodology. In one instance in July 2011, the SEC noted its concern that Brookfield’s use of the phrase “cash flow from operations” was outside the standard definition. Despite the unambiguously skeptical tone in the SEC’s correspondence about the phrase, Brookfield held its line for more than five months. The company repeatedly parried the SEC’s concerns in a dispute that played out in a cat-and-mouse series of filings before Brookfield finally consented to change its wording in November. Find out more about a host of concerns the SEC had in 2009 about another Brookfield subsidiary, Brookfield Homes.[/module]
投资者可能会接受布鲁克菲尔德希望以这种方式进行分析的愿望，但美国证券交易委员会公开质疑布鲁克菲尔德如何使用特定投资条款及其估值方法。在 2011 年 7 月的一个例子中，SEC 注意到它担心布鲁克菲尔德使用的短语“运营现金流量”超出了标准定义。尽管美国证券交易委员会对这句话的信件中明确表示怀疑的语气，但布鲁克菲尔德坚持了五个多月。在 Brookfield 于 11 月最终同意更改其措辞之前，该公司在一系列猫捉老鼠的文件中多次回避 SEC 的担忧。
//Brookfield’s leveraged complexity should be unravelled
应该揭开布鲁克菲尔德的杠杆复杂性
What foresight do BIP shareholders receive for the management fees and incentive distributions?
BIP 股东对管理费和激励分配有何远见？
John Dizard 约翰迪扎德
As we gradually emerge from the shutdowns, quarantines and mourning, we will need to deal as quickly as possible with a financial system that will not be capable of delivering the income streams it has promised or, in its present form, efficiently allocating capital across the global economy. The public shock will turn to anger at failed promises of wealth, or even functionality.
随着我们逐渐摆脱停工、隔离和哀悼，我们将需要尽快应对金融体系，该体系将无法提供其承诺的收入流，或者以目前的形式在整个金融体系中有效分配资本。全球经济。公众的震惊将转变为对财富甚至功能性承诺失败的愤怒。
The restructurings that are coming will have to cut away wasteful and self-serving corporate forms, pointless “activity” and opaque “disclosure”. Among the financial structures we do not need any more are highly leveraged holding companies that depend on continuous capital markets access to shuffle debt and interests in operating companies.
即将到来的重组将不得不削减浪费和自私的公司形式、毫无意义的“活动”和不透明的“披露”。在我们不再需要的金融结构中，高杠杆控股公司依赖于持续的资本市场准入来洗牌运营公司的债务和利益。
The most questionable groups are those which have explicitly or implicitly promised public investors steady streams of dividends from “operating” earnings that appear to come from the revaluation and releveraging of their asset base. The holding companies of these groups collect very high management fees for this asset shuffling.
最值得怀疑的群体是那些明确或隐含地向公众投资者承诺从“经营”收益中获得稳定股息的群体，这些收益似乎来自其资产基础的重估和再杠杆化。这些集团的控股公司为这次资产洗牌收取了非常高的管理费。
In recent weeks the public has numbly accepted state and central bank support for banks and corporate finance. There is a revulsion, though, at allowing the bailed-out groups to pay dividends, high executive compensation or management bonuses. This is a mortal threat to the existence of asset shuffling leveraged holding companies.
最近几周，公众已经麻木地接受了国家和中央银行对银行和企业融资的支持。不过，人们对允许接受救助的集团支付股息、高额高管薪酬或管理奖金感到反感。这对资产洗牌杠杆控股公司的存在是致命的威胁。
For several years I have examined the Brookfield group, in particular Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (BIP) and its parent Brookfield Asset Management (BAM).
多年来，我一直在研究 Brookfield 集团，尤其是 Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (BIP) 及其母公司 Brookfield Asset Management (BAM)。
BIP had more than $56bn in assets at the end of 2019 and, according to chief executive Sam Pollock, “$20bn of capital”. On March 31, BIP’s management changed its corporate form from a Bermuda partnership to a Canadian corporation. BIP says these forms will be “economically” equivalent. BIP, now BIPC, does not have any employees of its own, depending on BAM to be its “service provider”. In the past, Brookfield compared BIP to US Master Limited Partnerships, which pass through dividend income from energy-related assets such as pipelines and gas processing plants.
截至 2019 年底，BIP 拥有超过 560 亿美元的资产，据首席执行官山姆·波洛克 (Sam Pollock) 称，“拥有 200 亿美元的资本”。 3 月 31 日，BIP 的管理层将其公司形式从百慕大合伙企业更改为加拿大公司。 BIP 表示，这些表格在“经济上”是等效的。 BIP，现在的 BIPC，没有任何自己的员工，依赖 BAM 作为其“服务提供商”。过去，布鲁克菲尔德将 BIP 与 US Master Limited Partnerships 进行了比较，后者通过管道和天然气加工厂等能源相关资产的股息收入。
MLPs have gone out of favour as a group, since under the Trump tax reforms there are fewer advantages to investors from the pass through structure. Also, the perceived value of energy assets has declined with oil and gas prices.
MLP 作为一个整体已经失宠，因为在特朗普的税收改革下，传递结构对投资者的优势越来越小。此外，能源资产的感知价值随着石油和天然气价格的下降而下降。
But MLPs and Reits, their pass-through cousins in the property and data centre trades, pay dividends to investors that are less than the cash flows they receive from operations. For example, Magellan Midstream, an energy MLP, last year paid out only about 71 per cent of its cash flows as dividends. Digital Realty, a data centre Reit, paid out about 73 per cent of its cash flow in dividends.
但是，MLPs 和 Reits，它们在房地产和数据中心交易中的直通表兄弟，向投资者支付的股息少于他们从运营中获得的现金流量。例如，能源 MLP Magellan Midstream 去年仅支付了约 71% 的现金流作为股息。数据中心房地产投资信托基金 Digital Realty 支付了约 73% 的现金流股息。
BIP, in contrast, appears to be paying out more in management fees to BAM, dividends to its unit holders, and “incentive distributions” to BAM and its senior management, than it receives as dollars paid in to BIP’s holding company as dividends from its operating subsidiaries.
相比之下，BIP 向 BAM 支付的管理费、向其单位持有人的股息以及向 BAM 及其高级管理人员的“激励分配”似乎比它从 BIP 的控股公司收到的作为股息支付的美元要多经营子公司。
The difference between cash dividends from operating subsidiaries coming in and fees, incentive payments, and dividends going out appears to be covered by capital markets activity at the holding company level, ie. BIP’s net issuance of equity, debt and preferred shares. A person close to Brookfield stated this analysis was untrue. I refer readers to the “Consolidated Statement Of Cash Flows” in Brookfield’s 2019 annual report, page F-13, if they would like to draw their own conclusions.
来自运营子公司的现金股息与费用、激励支付和流出的股息之间的差异似乎被控股公司层面的资本市场活动所覆盖，即。 BIP净发行的股权、债务和优先股。一位接近布鲁克菲尔德的人士表示，这种分析是不真实的。如果读者想得出自己的结论，我建议读者参阅布鲁克菲尔德 2019 年年度报告中的“综合现金流量表”，第 F-13 页。
In the near future it may be even more difficult to raise or maintain the flow of cash dividends from BIP subsidiaries, such as rail and pipelines in the US or toll roads in Brazil to the BIP holding company, BAM and their outside partners. BIP’s holdings are not reported by country, but Brazilian assets seem to comprise more than a quarter and as much as a third of its total. Since May the Brazilian real has declined by about a third against the US dollar in which BIP reports. There would be similar currency value and forex transfer issues with BIP’s substantial assets in India.
在不久的将来，要提高或维持 BIP 子公司（例如美国的铁路和管道或巴西的收费公路）流向 BIP 控股公司、BAM 及其外部合作伙伴的现金红利流量可能会更加困难。 BIP 的资产未按国家/地区报告，但巴西资产似乎占其总资产的四分之一以上和三分之一。据 BIP 报道，自 5 月以来，巴西雷亚尔兑美元汇率下跌了约三分之一。 BIP 在印度的大量资产也会有类似的货币价值和外汇转移问题。
What foresight do BIP shareholders receive for the hundreds of millions of management fees and incentive distributions? Well, on February 10, Mr Pollock said on an investor call that “from a BIP perspective, we do not anticipate any material financial impact from the coronavirus situation and remain optimistic regarding the business outlook for the regions we operate in”.
数亿的管理费和分红，BIP股东有何先见之明？好吧，2 月 10 日，Pollock 先生在一次投资者电话会议上表示，“从 BIP 的角度来看，我们预计冠状病毒情况不会对财务产生任何重大影响，并对我们经营所在地区的业务前景保持乐观”。
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