今天下过班又翻译了几段，看看这个老生常谈的话题。
巴菲特其实不光投资在股票上，他投资的很重要的一部分是全资收购一些好的企业，这些企业虽然可能在买的时候比在二级市场上贵一些，但是这些企业就成了伯克希尔的子公司，巴菲特有权处置企业的现金流，这些钱往往又会用来收购别的好企业，或者用来在二级市场上买一些便宜的好企业的股票，这就是巴菲特源源不断现金来源的秘密。
而且这还没完，这些控股子公司重要组成部分就是保险，保险会带来大量的保险浮存金，浮存金相当一种安全的、长期的、无风险的杠杆。
虽然我们学不了老巴投资的这一招，但另一招在二级市场上的投资就人人可以学了。
其中的关键就是要抱着买生意的角度去买股票，而不是为了赚差价去买股票，为了差价就涉及到博弈，也就需要猜市场的心思，这就变味了，甚至就不是投资了，而是投机，当然投机没什么不好，它很好玩，也确实有人能赚到钱，它唯一的缺点就是很难持续地赚钱，投机和投资不是一个游戏，正如老巴所说：“查理和我都不是选股专家，我们是生意人”
原文我也贴一下吧：
Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership.
查理和我把你们在伯克希尔的钱投资到两个方向。
First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions.
首先，我们投资于控股收购，通常是全资收购，伯克希尔管理这些子公司的资本配置，并挑选出负责日常运营决策的CEO。
When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.
在管理大型企业时，信任和规则都是必不可少的，伯克希尔极度强调信任，失望在所难免，我们对商业错误可以谅解，但对个人不端行为的零容忍。
In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.
我们的第二类投资中，我们购买公开交易的股票，通过这些股票我们拥有企业的一部分，虽然我们在管理上没有发言权。
Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers.
我们两种投资的目标，都是具有长期良好经济特征、有值得信赖的管理层的企业。
Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales.
请特别注意，我们持有公开交易的股票是基于我们对其长期业绩的预期，而不是因为我们将其视为灵活买卖的工具。
That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
这一点很关键： 查理和我都不是选股专家，我们是生意人。
Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal.
这些年来，我犯了很多错误。因为我的错误，导致我们目前持有的企业包括：少数真有非凡经济效益的企业、许多具有良好经济特征的企业、还有一大群处于边缘地位的企业。
Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”
这一路，我投资的一些企业已经倒闭，它们的产品不受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面性：这一体系创造了越来越多的输家，同时提供了大量改善的商品和服务，熊彼特称这种现象为“创造性破坏”。
One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices.
投资公开交易股票的一个优势是，偶尔能以极好的价格购买一些绝妙的企业。
It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.
重要的是要明白，股票交易的价格往往非常愚蠢，无论是高还是低。“有效”市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，有市场交易的股票和债券的价格令人困惑，它们的表现通常只有在回顾时才能理解。
Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.
控股企业则是另一种类型，它们的价格有时高得离谱，几乎从来没有便宜的估值，除非受到胁迫，控股企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌性估价出售。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)
到现在，我的成绩单还过得去，在管理伯克希尔这58年中，我的大部分资本配置决策都不怎么样，还好有时，我的臭棋也会被大量的好运气所挽救。(还记得我们从美国航空和所罗门的艰难逃生吗? 我到现在还心有余悸。)
Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years
我们令人满意的业绩就来自于那十几个真正好的决策，算下来大约每五年只有一个好决策。
出自《巴菲特编年史》之2023年，大唐炼金师编译，晚安各位。
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