| 发布于: 修改于: | 雪球 | 回复：21 | 喜欢：23 |
$Meta(META)$ 毛利率从79.4%到81.8%，费用率从58.9%到41.6%，运营利润率从20.4%到40.3%提升了19.9%，FCF margin从0.6%到40.1%提升了39.5%。这降本增效的效果，离谱他妈给离谱开门，离谱到家了。用你们的话说，拧毛巾，挤海绵。
$微软(MSFT)$ 毛利率71.2% vs. 69.2%，费用率23.6% vs. 26.2%，运营利润率提升4.7%，FCF margin从33.7%到36.6%提升2.9%。
PS：前文，$谷歌A(GOOGL)$ FCF margin从23.3%到29.5%提升6.2%。
$亚马逊(AMZN)$ 毛利率44.7% vs. 47.6%，费用率42.6% vs. 39.6%，运营利润率从2%到7.8%提升5.8%，FCF margin从-4.1%到6.2%提升10.1%。亚马逊在口罩期间大举新建仓库招聘工人，资本开支巨大，自由现金流一下子就搞负了，LTM视角（排除季节性影响），过去8个季度的FCF margin分别为：-1.9%、 -4.3%、 -6.1%、 -6.9%、 -5.7%、 -3.8%、 -1.9%、 0.5%、 3.0%，主见零售行业决策错误后转身之困难。
$苹果(AAPL)$ 硬件毛利率从34.6%提升到36.6%（收入增长-5.3%的背景下），服务毛利率从70.5%提升到70.9%（收入增长16.3%的背景下），硬件毛利率提升可以解释为BOM降了，服务毛利率提升和收入增长这么不匹配就不好解释了。
整体毛利率从42.3%到45.2%提升了2.9%。
费用率从14.6%到15.0%，运营利润率从27.6%到30.1%提升了2.5%。
FCF margin从23.1%到21.7%降了1.6%。
不过人苹果也没说自己要降本增效啊。。。
刚好看了@钟晓渡 推荐的fundsmith基金的2023年半年报。他的基金因为是10年开始的，买入卖出的股票很多是我们熟悉的，比如微软meta亚马逊。很多问题比如公司回购、员工期权费用也讨论的很细致。非常感谢推荐，获益匪浅。
以下是google翻译。
最值得注意的营业额可能是我们出售亚马逊，我们是在 2021 年 7 月才开始购买的。出售的直接原因是我们对潜在资本错配的担忧。 新任CEO Andy Jassy阐述了投资项目必须具备的一些投资原则，即： 1.规模大，能够带来良好的资本回报。 2. 为消费者尚未得到良好服务的市场领域提供服务。 3. 亚马逊必须对竞争对手采取差异化的方法； 4. 亚马逊必须拥有或能够获得执行能力。 我们的观点是，这种说法有很多值得喜欢的地方，它让我们在购买之前回避的股票时感到一些安慰。 然而，说起来总是比付诸行动容易，首席执行官关于他希望亚马逊寻求在杂货零售领域做大的路线的声明与所有这些原则背道而驰。 我们认为，食品杂货零售业不具备这些特征，而亚马逊已经通过收购全食超市而在这一领域碰壁。 此外，我们最近与我们认为正在进行资本配置和其他错误的公司打交道的经验表明，忽视我们的公司比倾听我们的公司要长得多，因此我们可能会更积极地摆脱这种情况 我们不同意投资者资本分配的方式。 如果公司选择在他们已经拥有专业知识的强大核心特许经营权之外进行投资，我们认为他们可能会破坏价值，特别是当他们进入一个回报率本来就很差的行业时。
The most noteworthy item of turnover was probably our sale of Amazon which we had begun purchasing only in July 2021. The immediate cause of the sale was our concern over potential capital misallocation. Relatively new CEO Andy Jassy enunciated some principles of investment which investment projects had to have, namely: 1. Be big and capable of delivering good returns on capital. 2. Serve an area of the market in which consumers are not already well served. 3. Amazon had to have a differentiated approach to competitors’ and 4. Amazon had to have or be able to acquire the competence to execute. Our view was that there was a lot to like about that statement, and it gave us some comfort in purchasing a stock we had shied away from before. However, it is always easier to talk the talk than it is to walk the walk and the CEO’s pronouncement that he wanted Amazon to 4 seek routes to get bigger in grocery retail ran counter to all these principles. In our view grocery retail has none of these characteristics and Amazon has already stubbed its toe in this sector with the Whole Foods acquisition. Moreover, our recent experience of engagement with companies which we believe are making capital allocation and other mistakes has produced a much longer list of those who have ignored us than of those who have listened and so we are likely to be more active in exiting such situations where we disagree with the manner in which our investors’ capital is being allocated. Where companies choose to invest outside a powerful core franchise in which they already have expertise we believe they are likely to destroy value, and especially so where they are entering a sector which already has poor returns.