巴菲特致股东的信-2023年（中英文全文）（一）
The Scorecard in 2023
2023年绩效报告
Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
每个季度我们都发布一份新闻稿，报告了我们以以下类似方式总结的营运收益（或损失）。以下是全年汇编：
At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a sho summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% ofoperating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.
2023年5月6日，在伯克希尔的年度聚会上，我介绍了当天早晨发布的第一季度结果。随后我简要总结了全年展望：
（1）我们大部分非保险业务在2023年面临较低收益；
（2）这种下降将得到我们两家最大的非保险业务BNSF和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（“BHE”）的良好结果的支撑，二者合计在2022年占了超过30%的营运收益；
（3）我们的投资收入肯定会有大幅增长，因为伯克希尔持有的大笔美国国债终于开始带来远远超过我们一直在收到的少量利润，而且
（4）保险业可能会表现良好，部分因为其承保收益与经济其他部分的收益无关，并且此外，财产保险价格有所增强。
Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.
保险业的表现符合预期。然而，我在对BNSF和BHE的预期方面出现了错误。让我们分别来看一下。
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Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
铁路对于美国的经济未来至关重要。从成本、燃料使用和碳排放强度等方面来看，铁路显然是将重物品运送到遥远目的地的最高效方式。对于短途运输来说，卡车可能是更佳选择，但是许多美国人需要的商品必须要行驶数百甚至几千英里才能送到客户手中。没有铁路，这个国家将无法正常运转，铁路行业的资本需求将永远庞大。实际上，与大多数美国企业相比，铁路需耗费大量资本。
BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.
BNSF是覆盖北美洲的六个主要铁路系统中最大的一个。我们的铁路在资产负债表上载有23759英里的主线轨道、99个隧道、13495座桥梁、7521台机车以及其他各种固定资产，总价值达700亿美元。但我猜测，要复制这些资产至少需要5000亿美元的投资，并耗时几十年才能完成任务。
BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.
BNSF必须每年花费超过其折旧费用来维持其目前的业务水平。这种现实对于投资者来说不利，无论是在哪个行业中投资，但在资本密集型行业中尤为不利。
At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.
在过去14年中，BNSF的额外支出超过了GAAP折旧费用，累计高达220亿美元，相当于每年超过15亿美元。这种差距意味着BNSF支付给其所有者伯克希的股息将经常远远低于BNSF报告的盈利，除非我们定期增加铁路的债务。而这并不是我们的打算。
Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.
因此，伯克希购买价格获得了一个可以接受的回报，尽管看起来要少一些，并且在财产的替换价值方面微不足道。这对我或伯克希的董事会并不意外。这解释了为什么我们可以在2010年以比其替换价值只有一小部分的价格购买BNSF。
North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.
北美的铁路系统运送大量的煤炭、谷物、汽车、进口和出口商品等，长途单程运输往往导致回程运输收入难题。天气条件极端，经常妨碍或甚至阻碍轨道、桥梁和设备的使用。洪水可能会成为一场噩梦。所有这些都不足为奇。当我坐在舒适的办公室里时，铁路工作是一个户外活动，许多员工在艰难甚至危险的条件下工作。
An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.
一个不断发展的问题是，越来越多的美国人不愿意从事某些铁路运营中固有的困难和孤独的就业条件。工程师们必须面对这样一个事实，在美国的3.35亿人口中，一些心情沮丧或精神不稳定的美国人会选择通过躺在无法在一英里内停下来的超重100节车厢的火车前自杀。您愿意成为无助的工程师吗？在北美，这种创伤每天发生一次；在欧洲更为常见，这种情况将永远存在。
Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.
铁路行业的工资谈判可能最终会落入总统和国会的手中。此外，美国的铁路公司每天都必须运输许多危险品，这是这个行业非常不情愿的。"普通承运人"这个词定义了铁路公司的责任。
Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
去年BNSF的收入下降超出了我的预期，因为营收下降。尽管燃料成本也下降了，但在华盛顿颁布的工资增加远远超出了国家的通货膨胀目标。这种差异可能会在未来的谈判中再次出现。
Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.
尽管BNSF运输的货物更多，资本支出也比北美洲其他五家主要铁路公司中的任何一家都多，但自我们购买以来，其利润率相对于这五家公司已有所下降。我相信我们广阔的服务领域是首屈一指的，因此我们的利润比较可以并且应该得到改善。
I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.
我尤其为BNSF对国家做出的贡献以及在北达科他州和蒙大拿州冬季零下的户外工作中努力工作的人们感到自豪，他们保持着美国商业动脉的畅通。铁路在运行时很少受到关注，但如果它们不可用，整个美国将立即感受到这种空缺。
A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.
一百年后，BNSF将继续是这个国家和伯克希的重要资产。您可以放心。
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Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
我们去年第二次、也是更为严重的盈利不佳发生在BHE。该公司的大部分大型电力公用事业业务，以及其庞大的天然气管道，表现基本符合预期。但是，在一些州的监管环境引发了零利润甚至破产的担忧（这在加利福尼亚最大的公用事业公司已经成为事实，在夏威夷目前也是一个威胁）。在这样的司法管辖区，很难预测曾被视为美国最稳定行业之一的收益和资产价值。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
长达一个多世纪以来，电力公用事业公司通过州际承诺提供固定股权回报（有时还附带一小笔卓越业绩奖金）筹集巨额资金，以支持其增长。采取这种方式，为了未来几年可能需要的产能进行了大规模的投资。这种前瞻性的监管反映了一个现实，即电力公用事业公司会建设发电和输电资产，而这往往需要很多年的时间来建设。BHE在西部进行的大规模多州输电项目始于2006年，离完成还有一些年的时间。最终，该项目将为涵盖美国大陆30%土地面积的10个州提供服务。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactoryreturn pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
采用这种模式的私营和公共电力系统，即使人口增长或工业需求超过预期，灯光仍然亮着。这种“安全边际”方法对监管机构、投资者和公众似乎很明智。现在，在一些州，固定但令人满意的回报承诺已经被打破，投资者开始担心这种裂痕可能会蔓延。气候变化增加了他们的担忧。地下输电可能是必要的，但几十年前，谁会想要为这种建设支付巨额成本呢？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们已经对发生的损失金额做出了最佳估计。这些成本来自森林火灾，其频率和强度已经增加，而且如果对流风暴变得更频繁，它们很可能会继续增加。
It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
直到很多年以后，我们才能知道BHE的森林火灾损失的最终金额，并能就未来投资于脆弱西部州的可取性做出明智决策。尚不清楚监管环境在其他地方是否会发生变化。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公用事业公司可能面临类似太平洋瓦斯电力和夏威夷电力的生存问题。对我们目前问题的没收解决显然对BHE是个负面影响，但是该公司和伯克希尔本身结构良好，可以应对负面意外。我们在保险业经常面临这些问题，我们的基本产品是风险承担，这些问题也会发生在其他领域。伯克希尔可以承受财务意外，但我们不会明知故犯地接着投入好钱。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
不管是在伯克希尔的情况，还是电力行业的最终结果可能是不祥的：一些公用事业公司可能不再吸引美国公民的储蓄，被迫采用公共电力模式。内布拉斯加在上世纪30年代做出了这个选择，全国各地有许多公共电力运营。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们更喜欢哪种模式。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当风尘定息时，美国的能源需求以及相应的资本支出将是巨大的。我没有预料到或甚至考虑到监管回报方面的不利发展，与伯克希尔在BHE的两个合作伙伴一起，我们在没能这么做方面犯了一个代价高昂的错误。
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Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.
足够谈及问题了：我们的保险业务去年表现异常出色，在销售额、浮存资金和承保利润方面创下纪录。财产险和意外伤害险（“财险”）为伯克希尔的幸福和增长提供支柱。我们已经从事这项业务57年了，尽管我们的规模增长了近5000倍——从1,700万美元增长到830亿美元——但我们还有很大的增长空间。
Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.
除此之外，我们已经学到了很多关于应该避免的保险业务类型和避免哪种人类型的教训——这一来过于频繁而痛苦。最重要的一点是，我们的承保人员可能是瘦的、胖的、男性、女性、年轻的、年老的、外国的或是国内的。但他们在办公室里不能是乐观主义者，尽管这种品质在生活中通常是可取的。
Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.
财险业务中的意外事件——可能发生在六个月或一年后保单已到期的几十年后——几乎总是负面的。该行业的会计设计旨在认识到这一现实，但估计错误可能是巨大的。当有骗子参与时，发现往往既缓慢又昂贵。伯克希尔将始终努力准确估计未来的赔付，但通货膨胀——无论是货币膨胀还是“法律”方面的——都是一个不确定因素。
I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
我讲过我们的保险业务的故事那么多次，所以我只会将初次听闻者引导到第18页。在这里，我只会重复我们的处境如果没有阿吉特·贾因在1986年加入伯克希尔公司将是怎样。在那之前的幸运日子之外——除了在1951年初就开始并永远不会结束的与GEICO几乎难以置信的美好经历——我在苦苦挣扎中试图建立我们的保险业务中大部分时间都在迷茫中徘徊。
Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.
自从加入伯克希尔以来，阿吉特的成就得到了我们各种财险业务中一大批极具才华的保险执行人员的支持。他们的名字和面孔大多数媒体和公众并不了解。伯克希尔的管理团队对财险业务就像库珀斯敦名人堂对棒球一样。
Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.
伯蒂，你可以为拥有一个如此了不起的财险业务的一部分感到自豪，这个业务现在在全球范围内运营，拥有无与伦比的金融资源、声誉和人才。在2023年大获成功。
What is it with Omaha?
关于奥马哈是怎么一回事？
Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper.
请于2024年5月4日参加伯克希尔（Berkshire）年度聚会。在舞台上，您将看到三位现在承担主要责任指导您公司的经理们。也许您会想，这三人有什么共同之处呢？他们看起来确实并不相似。让我们深入了解一下。
Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.
格雷格·艾贝尔（Greg Abel）负责经营伯克希尔所有非保险业务，在各方面都已经准备好明天成为伯克希尔的首席执行官。他出生并成长在加拿大（他仍然打曲棍球）。然而，在1990年代，格雷格在奥马哈居住了六年，离我家只有几个街区远。在那段时间里，我从未和他见过面。
A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).
大约十年前，阿吉特·简（Ajit Jain）在印度出生、成长和接受教育，他与家人在奥马哈生活，离我家只有一英里左右（我自1958年起就居住在那里）。阿吉特和他的妻子蒂库（Tinku）在奥马哈有很多朋友，尽管自他们三十多年前搬到纽约（为了到达再保险行业的主要活动地区）以来已经过去很久了。
Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
今年缺席舞台的将是查理。他和我都是奥马哈出生的，离您在五月聚会时所坐的地方大约两英里远。在查理的前十年中，他住在距伯克希尔长期驻地大约半英里远的地方。查理和我都在奥马哈公立学校度过了童年时光，并且受到了我们在奥马哈度过的童年的深刻影响。然而，我们直到很晚才见面。（一个可能让您惊讶的注脚：查理在美国45任总统中有15任任期内。人们将拜登总统称为第46位，但这一编号将格罗弗·克利夫兰视为第22和第24位，因为他的连任非连续。美国是一个非常年轻的国家。）
Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home. As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.
公司层面上的移动，伯克希尔自1970年从它在新英格兰的81年居住地搬迁至奥马哈，在新家中摆脱了困境并蓬勃发展。作为“奥马哈效应”的最后一点，伯蒂 - 是的，就是那个伯蒂 - 在奥马哈一个中产阶级社区度过了她的早年形成阶段，几十年后，崛起为美国一位伟大的投资者。
You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
您可能会认为她把所有的钱都投到伯克希尔，然后简简单单地将其放着。但事实并非如此。1956年组建家庭后，伯蒂在金融领域积极活跃了20年：持有债券，将她1/3的资金投入公开持有的共同基金，并频繁交易股票。她的潜力未被注意到。
Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).
然后，在1980年，46岁时，独立于任何来自她弟弟的劝告，伯蒂决定采取行动。她只保留了共同基金和伯克希尔，接下来的43年内没有进行新的交易。在那段时间里，她变得非常富有，即使在进行慷慨捐赠之后（想象一下九个数字）。
Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
数百万美国投资者本可以跟随她的理念，这些理念仅涉及她在奥马哈的童年时期获得的常识。她不冒风险，每年五月回到奥马哈进行再次注入活力。
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So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?
那么究竟发生了什么？是奥马哈的水吗？是奥马哈的空气吗？是一种类似于造就牙买加短跑运动员、肯尼亚马拉松选手或俄罗斯国际象棋专家的奇怪的行星现象吗？难道我们必须等到人工智能有一天揭开这个谜题的答案吗？
Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.
保持开放的思维。在五月来到奥马哈，吸入空气，饮用水，并对伯蒂及她那看起来不错的女儿们说声“你好”。谁知道呢？没有坏处，无论如何，您会度过愉快的时光，结识很多友好的人。
To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.
最后，我们将推出新版的《查理的年鉴》第四版。拿一本。查理的智慧将改善您的生活，就像它影响了我的生活一样。
February 24, 2024 Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2024年2月24日 沃伦·巴菲特
董事会主席
附录，伯克希尔自1965～2023年，收益及与标普500收益比较：
