2月24日，巴菲特旗下伯克希尔·哈撒韦发布2023年四季度及全年财报，同时发布巴菲特一年一度致股东信。
英文全文请直接访问伯克希尔哈撒韦官网：网页链接
下面是股东信全文（致芒格部分，请参见单独文章）：
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire Hathaway Inc.股东：
Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.
伯克希尔拥有超过三百万股东账户。我有责任每年写一封信，对这个多样化且不断变化的所有者群体来说是有用的，其中许多人希望了解他们的投资情况。
Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.
查理·芒格，几十年来一直是我在管理伯克希尔的合作伙伴，他也认为这是一样的责任，并期望我按照常规方式与您沟通。他和我在对待伯克希尔股东方面心心相印。
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Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).
作家们发现把他们寻找的读者形象化很有用，而且他们通常希望吸引广泛的受众。在伯克希尔，我们有一个更为有限的目标：那些信任伯克希尔用他们的储蓄，却没有任何转售预期的投资者（态度上类似于为了购买农场或租赁物业而储蓄的人，而不是偏爱用多余资金购买彩票或“热门”股票的人）。
Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.
多年来，伯克希尔吸引了大量这种“终身”股东及其继承人。我们珍视他们的存在，并认为他们有权听到每年由他们的首席执行官直接而非由投资者关系官员或永远提供乐观和动情言辞的传播顾问传达的好消息和坏消息。
In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.
For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.
Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.
在设想伯克希尔所寻找的股东时，我很幸运地拥有绝佳的思维模型，我的姐姐，伯蒂。让我来介绍她。
首先，伯蒂聪明，睿智，喜欢挑战我的思维。然而，我们从未发生过争吵或接近破裂的关系。我们永远也不会。
此外，伯蒂及她的三个女儿，有很大一部分储蓄都投资在伯克希尔股份中。他们的所有权跨越几十年，每年伯蒂都会阅读我要说的话。我的工作是预先设想她的问题并给她诚实的答复。
Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.
伯蒂，就像大多数人一样，理解许多会计术语，但她还没有准备好参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻 – 每天阅读四家报纸 – 但她并不认为自己是经济专家。她很明智 – 非常明智 – 本能地知道应该始终忽略评论者。毕竟，如果她能可靠地预测明天的赢家，她会自由分享她宝贵的见解，并因此增加竞争性购买吗？那就好比找到黄金然后把展示其位置的地图交给邻居们一样。
Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.
So, what would interest Bertie this year?
伯蒂理解激励的力量 – 无论是好是坏，人类的弱点，当观察人类行为时可以识别的“暗示”。她知道谁在“出售”，谁是可信赖的。简而言之，她不是傻瓜。
那么，今年会引起伯蒂的兴趣是什么呢？
Operating Results, Fact and Fiction
运营结果，事实与虚构
Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial. Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.
让我们从数字开始。官方年度报告从K-1页开始，一共有124页。里面包含大量信息 - 一些重要，一些琐碎。在诸多披露中，许多股东、财务记者将会关注第K-72页。在那里，他们将找到俗称的“底线”，标有“净收益（亏损）”。数字显示为2021年为900亿美元，2022年为负230亿美元，2023年为960亿美元。
What in the world is going on?
究竟发生了什么？
You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . . . and the results of its operations . . . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . . . .”
你寻求指导，被告知计算这些“收益”的程序由庄重和具有资质的财务会计准则委员会（FASB）制定，由专注且努力工作的证券交易委员会（SEC）强制执行，并由世界一流的德勤会计师事务所（D&T）审计。在第K-67页，D&T毫不客气地指出：“在我们的意见中，财务报表……在所有重大方面公允地展示了公司的财务状况……以及2018年12月31日结束的三年期间的经营结果……”
So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.
经过这样的圣洁，这种比毫无用处的“净收入”数字快速通过互联网和媒体传播到全世界。所有相关方都相信他们已经完成了自己的工作 - 在法律上，他们确实做到了。
We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.
然而，我们感到不舒服。在伯克希尔，我们认为“收益”应该是贝蒂会发现略微有用 - 但仅作为评估业务的起点的一个合理概念。因此，伯克希尔还向贝蒂和你报告我们称之为“营运收益”的数据。以下是它们讲述的故事：2021年276亿美元；2022年309亿美元；2023年374亿美元。
The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.
强制数字与伯克希尔偏好数字之间的主要差异是我们排除了有时每天超过50亿美元的未实现的资本收益或亏损。讽刺的是，我们的偏好在2018年之前基本上是一种规则，当时这种“改善”被强制执行。
几个世纪前，伽利略的经历应该教会我们不要随意改变来自权威方面的强制性规定。但是，伯克希尔可以固执一些。
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Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire’s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?
不要误解资本收益的重要性：我预计它们将在未来几十年内成为伯克希尔价值增值的一个非常重要组成部分。否则，我们何必投入大量资金（你的和贝蒂的）到有市场价值的股票中，就像我一直在我的投资生涯中所做的那样呢？
I can’t remember a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.
我几乎记不得自1942年3月11日——我首次购买股票的日子以来——我没有将大部分净值投资于股票，尤其是美国股票。目前为止，一切都很好。在那个命运的日子，1942年，道琼斯工业平均指数跌破了100点，我就“扣动了扳机”。放学后我亏了大约5美元。很快，情况发生了变化，现在该指数大约在38,000左右。美国一直是股民的绝佳国家，他们所需做的就是安安静静地坐下来，不听任何人的话。
It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”
然而，基于“收益”来评估伯克希尔的投资价值是愚蠢的，因为这些“收益”包含了股市日复一日、甚至年复一年的反复无常。正如本·格雷厄姆教导我的那样：“短期内市场行为如同投票机，长期内则是称重机。”
What We Do
我们的做法
Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.
我们在伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们想要拥有那些享有良好且根本持久的经济基础的企业，不论是全部还是部分。在资本主义社会中，一些企业将会蓬勃发展很长时间，而另一些则会被证明是无底洞。要预测哪些会是赢家哪些会是输家比你想象的要困难得多。那些告诉你他们知道答案的人通常要么是自欺欺人，要么是江湖郎中。
At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.
在伯克希尔，我们特别青睐那些能在未来以高回报率部署额外资本的稀有企业。拥有其中之一——然后保持不动——几乎可以创造出无法估量的财富。即使是这种持有者的继承人有时甚至可以过上一生的悠闲生活。
We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.
我们也希望这些受偏爱的企业由能干且值得信赖的管理者运营，尽管这是一个更难做出的判断，而伯克希尔也有过它的失望。
In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.
1863年，美国第一位总务长休·麦卡洛克给所有国家银行发送了一封信。他的指示包括这样的警告：“永远不要指望可以阻止一个流氓欺骗你。” 许多银行家以为他们可以“管理”这个流氓问题，但学会了麦卡洛克先生的建议的智慧——我也是。人们并不容易看透。诚意和同情心很容易被伪装。这与1863年一样真实。
This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate.
If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.
Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.
我描述的这两种获取企业的必要条件的结合，一直是我们在购买中的目标，有一段时间，我们有很多候选者可以评估。如果我错过一个——我错过了许多——总会有另一个出现。
那些日子早已过去；规模使我们身败名裂，尽管购买竞争的增加也是一个因素。
Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)
伯克希尔现在拥有——远远——任何美国企业记录的最大GAAP净值。创纪录的营业收入和强劲的股市推动了年底的5610亿美元。其他499家标准普尔公司的总GAAP净值——一个美国商业的佼佼者——在2022年达到8.9万亿美元。（标准普尔2023年的数据尚未统计，但不太可能大幅超过9.5万亿美元。）
By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).
从这个角度看，伯克希尔现在几乎占据了其运营范围内近6%的市场份额。在比如说，五年的时间内，翻倍我们庞大的基础简直是不可能的，尤其是因为我们非常不愿发行股票（这一举动立即会提升净值）。
There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.
在这个国家，只有少数几家公司能够真正推动伯克希尔的增长，它们一直被我们和其他人反复挑选。有些我们可以估值；有些我们无法。而且，如果我们可以的话，它们必须具有吸引人的价格。在美国境外，基本上没有什么有意义的资本部署候选。总的来说，我们没有看到非常引人瞩目的表现的可能性。
Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.
尽管如此，管理伯克希尔一直是有趣的，总是让人感到兴奋。积极的一面是，59年的拼凑之后，该公司现在或者完全拥有各种企业的一部分，这些企业在加权基础上的前景比大多数美国大公司更好。凭借运气和勇气，几个巨大的成功者已经在许多决策中脱颖而出。现在我们有一小群永远不考虑去其他地方的长期管理人员，他们将65岁看作只是另一个生日。
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Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.
伯克希尔受益于异常的恒定和清晰的目标。虽然我们强调善待员工、社区和供应商——谁不希望这样做呢？——但我们始终忠于我们的国家和股东。我们永远不会忘记，尽管您的资金与我们的资金混合在一起，但并不属于我们。
With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.
有了这个焦点，以及我们目前的业务组合，伯克希尔应该比美国普通公司做得更好一点，更重要的是，也应该在资本永久损失的风险方面运营得更少。然而，任何超过“稍微更好”的期望都是一厢情愿的。这种谦虚的志向不是Bertie全力以赴投入伯克希尔时的情况，但现在是这样。
Our Not-So-Secret Weapon
我们的非秘密武器
Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can – and will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days
in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant
worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t happen often – but they will happen.
偶尔，市场和/或经济会导致一些大型而根本良好的企业的股票和债券定价出现明显的错误。事实上，市场可以无法预测地停滞或甚至消失，就像1914年的四个月和2001年的几天一样。如果您相信美国投资者现在比过去更稳定，请回想一下2008年9月。通信速度和技术的奇迹使全球瞬间陷入瘫痪，我们已经远离烟信号的时代。这样的瞬间恐慌不会经常发生，但它们确实会发生。
Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.
伯克希尔公司有能力立即通过巨额资金和表现的确定性对市场的崩溃做出回应，这可能给我们带来偶尔的大规模机会。尽管股市比我们早期时代大得多，但当今的活跃参与者既不比我在学校时更情绪稳定，也没有接受更好的教育。出于各种原因，市场现在展现出的赌场行为远比我年轻时要多。赌场现在存在于许多家庭中，每天都在诱惑居住者。
One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its figurative sense – would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’ juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed – not by everyone but always by someone.
金融生活中的一个事实永远不应被遗忘。华尔街 - 在其比喻意义上使用这个术语 - 希望其客户赚钱，但真正让其居民兴奋的是充满狂热的活动。在这些时刻，无论什么愚蠢行为可以被推销，都会受到积极推销 - 不是每个人，但总会有人。
Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.
偶尔，情况变得难看起来。政客们变得愤怒；最严重的违法行为者逃脱制裁，变得富有且免受惩罚；你隔壁的朋友变得困惑、变得贫穷，有时还会变得报复性。他得知，金钱胜过道德。
One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been – and will be – rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.
在伯克希尔的一个投资规则从未改变，也永远不会改变：永远不要冒永久性资本损失的风险。多亏了美国的顺风和复利的力量，我们经营的领域已经 - 也将会 - 为人们带来回报，只要您在一生中做出一两个正确的决定，并避免严重错误。
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I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire’s goal will be to function as an asset to the country – just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.
我相信伯克希尔有能力处理迄今为止经历的任何程度的财务灾难。这种能力是我们不会放弃的。当经济动荡发生时，正如在2008-9年以微小的方式消除金融危机一样，伯克希尔的目标将是成为对国家有益的资产，并帮助扑灭金融火灾，而不是成为众多企业中那些无意或其他方式引发大火的其中之一。
Our goal is realistic. Berkshire’s strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA” is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and near-paralysis.
我们的目标是现实的。伯克希尔的实力来自于其庞大多样的收入，经过利息、税收以及用于折旧和摊销的大额费用后（“EBITDA”是伯克希尔公司内被禁止使用的指标）。即使在国家遭遇全球经济疲弱、恐惧和近乎瘫痪的长期时期，我们也保持着极低的现金需求。
Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.
伯克希尔目前不支付股息，其股份回购100%由自主决定。年度债务到期从未构成重大问题。
Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets. We did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.
您的公司还持有远远超过传统智慧认为必要的现金和美国国债头寸。在2008年的恐慌中，伯克希尔通过运营产生现金，完全没有依赖商业票据、银行信贷或债券市场。我们没有预测经济瘫痪的时间，但我们始终为之做好准备。
Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to
be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.
Berkshire is built to last.
极端的财政保守主义是我们向那些与我们共同拥有伯克希尔股权的人作出的企业承诺。在大多数年份 - 事实上大多数十年 - 我们的谨慎可能会被证明是多余的行为 -类似于对一座被认为不会着火的堡垒型建筑购买的保险政策。但伯克希尔不想给伯蒂或任何信任我们处理他们的储蓄的个人们带来永久的财务伤害。
伯克希尔是经得起时间考验的。
Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable
非受控制的使我们感到舒适的企业
Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.
去年我提到了伯克希尔（Berkshire）持有的两个长期部分所有权的头寸——可口可乐和美国运通。这些头寸不像我们在苹果的头寸那样巨大。每个只占了伯克希尔GAAP净值的4-5%。但它们是有意义的资产，也展示了我们的思考过程。
American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.
美国运通始于1850年，可口可乐于1886年在亚特兰大一家药店推出。（伯克希尔对新来者不太感兴趣。）这两家公司多年来试图在不相关领域扩张，但在这些尝试中都没有取得什么成功。过去曾经—但绝对不是现在—两者甚至都被管理不善。
But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.
但每家公司都在其基本业务上取得了巨大成功，在必要时进行了一些调整。至关重要的是，它们的产品“旅行”了。可口可乐和美国运通都成为了全球闻名的品牌，就像它们的核心产品一样，而液体消费和对无可置疑的金融信任的需求是我们世界永恒的基本需求。
During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.
在2023年，我们没有买入或卖出美国运通或可口可乐的股份 - 延续了我们自己的睡美人式沉睡，这已经持续了二十多年。去年，这两家公司再次通过增加他们的盈利和股息来奖励我们的不作为。事实上，我们在2023年的美国运通盈利份额远远超过了我们很久以前购买的13亿美元成本。
Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”
美国运通和可口可乐几乎可以肯定会在2024年增加他们的股息 - 美国运通的增幅约为16% - 而我们几乎可以肯定会在整个年份内保持我们的持股不变。我是否能创造比这两家公司更好的全球业务？正如Bertie会告诉你的那样：“不可能。”
Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.
虽然伯克希尔在2023年没有购买这两家公司的股份，但因为我们在伯克希尔进行的股份回购，你对可口可乐和美国运通的间接持股在去年增加了一点。这些股份回购有助于增加您对伯克希尔拥有的每项资产的参与度。对于这个显而易见但经常被忽视的真相，我补充我的惯常警告：所有的股份回购都应该取决于价格。如果以溢价形式进行，那么原本合理的回购在贵价格下则变得愚蠢。
The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.
从可口可乐和美国运通身上我们能学到的教训是什么？当你找到一个真正出色的企业时，坚持下去。耐心是值得的，一个出色的企业可以抵消不可避免的许多平庸决策。
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This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023. At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.
今年，我想描述另外两项我们预计会长期持有的投资。类似于可口可乐和美国运通，这些承诺相对于我们的资源并不算是巨额投资。然而，它们是值得的，我们在2023年能够增加这两个头寸。截至年底，伯克希尔拥有Occidental Petroleum普通股的27.8%，同时也持有认股权证，超过五年来，这些认股权证使我们有权利以固定价格大幅增加我们的持股比例。虽然我们非常喜欢我们的持股，以及这个选择权，但伯克希尔没有兴趣购买或管理Occidental。我们特别喜欢它在美国的庞大石油和天然气资源，以及其在碳捕集倡议中的领导地位，尽管这种技术的经济可行性尚未得到证实。这两项活动都非常符合我们国家的利益。
Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.
不久以前，美国非常严重地依赖外国石油，碳捕集也没有实质性的支持者。事实上，在1975年，美国的产量为每天八百万桶石油当量（"BOEPD"），远远不够满足该国的需求。从促进美国参加二战的有利能源地位，美国已经沦为严重依赖外国—潜在不稳定—供应商。预测还将有进一步的石油产量下降以及未来使用量增加。
For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.
长期以来，悲观主义似乎是正确的，到了2007年，产量降至每天五百万桶石油当量（"BOEPD"）。同时，美国政府在1975年创建了战略石油储备（"SPR"）以减轻—尽管未完全消除—美国自给自足的侵蚀。
And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.
然后—哈利路亚！—页岩经济在2011年变得可行，我们的能源依赖结束了。现在，美国的产量超过每天一千三百万桶石油当量，石油输出国组织（"OPEC"）不再占上风。Occidental本身每年的美国石油产量几乎可以与战略石油储备的整个库存相匹敌。如果国内产量一直保持在每天五百万桶石油当量，且严重依赖非美国来源，那么我们国家今天将变得非常—非常—紧张。在那个水平上，如果外国石油不可用，几个月内战略石油储备就会被耗空。
Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.
在Vicki Hollub的领导下，Occidental为其国家和所有者做了正确的事情。没有人知道未来一个月、一年或十年油价会如何波动。但Vicki知道如何将石油从岩石中分离出来，这是一种不寻常的才能，对她的股东和她的国家都是宝贵的。
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Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very
large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.
此外，伯克希尔继续持有对五家非常大型日本公司的被动和长期利益，每家公司都以类似于伯克希尔本身经营方式的高度多样化方式运作。在格雷格·阿贝尔和我去东京与它们的管理层交谈之后，去年我们增加了对这五家公司的持股。伯克希尔现在每家公司持有约9%的股份。（一个小细节：日本公司计算未流通股的方法与美国不同。）
Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies
calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.
伯克希尔还向每家公司保证不会购买使我们持股超过9.9%的股票。我们对这五家公司的总成本为1.6万亿日元，年末这五家公司的市值为2.9万亿日元。然而，日元近年来走弱，我们的年末未实现收益以美元计算为61%，即80亿美元。
Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.
格雷格和我都不认为我们能够预测主要货币的市场价格。我们也不认为自己能够雇佣具备这种能力的人。因此，伯克希尔用来资助其日本头寸的大部分资金来自1.3万亿日元的债券。这笔债务在日本受到了很好的接受，我认为伯克希尔持有的日元计价债务超过了其他任何一家美国公司。日元的走弱为伯克希尔带来了亿美元的年末收益，根据GAAP规定，这笔收益在2020-23年间将被定期计入收入。
In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.
在某些重要方面，伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友这五家公司都实行了比美国通常实践的更为股东友好的政策。自从我们开始在日本购买以来，这五家公司中的每一家都以有吸引力的价格减少了其未流通股的数量。
Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.
同时，这五家公司的管理层在自己的薪酬方面远不像在美国那样充满进取性。值得注意的是，这五家公司中每一家仅将大约1/3的收益用于股利。这五家公司保留的大笔资金既用于发展他们的众多业务，也在较小程度上用于回购股份。与伯克希尔一样，这五家公司不愿发行股份。
An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.
对于伯克希尔的另一个好处是，我们的投资可能会为我们提供与五家大型、管理良好且备受尊重的公司在全球范围内合作的机会。它们的利益远比我们广泛。而反过来，日本的首席执行官放心地知道伯克希尔将始终拥有巨额流动资金，可以随时为此类合作提供支持，无论其规模如何。
Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.
我们的日本投资始于2019年7月4日。鉴于伯克希尔目前的规模，通过公开市场购买建立头寸需要非常耐心并经过漫长时期的“友好”价格。这个过程就像转动一艘战舰。这是一个我们在伯克希尔早期并不会面临的重要劣势。