常常看到国内很多媒体的报道，说巴菲特是15%的菲利普·费雪和85%的本·格雷厄姆。从1995年伯克希尔股东大会的问答来看，这个观点应该修正。
巴菲特认为自己是100%的费雪和100%的格雷厄姆，两人的观点并不冲突，只是侧重点不同（英文原文是I think I’d rather think of myself as being a sort of a hundred percent Ben Graham and a hundred percent Phil Fisher in the points where they don’t — and they really don’t — contradict each other. It’s just that they had a vastly different emphasis.）。
巴菲特是大概是在1950年左右的时候，接触到了格雷厄姆的书，并且非常推荐《聪明投资者》的第8章和第20章。认为格雷厄姆思想包括3条核心原则（1995年股东大会上午场地31个问题），第一是市场先生（your attitude toward the stock market.），第二是安全边际（margin of safety），第三是把股票看成是一门生意（looking at stocks as businesses）。
巴菲特是在1960左右才第一次读到费雪的书，费雪的书强调成长。巴菲特认为格雷厄姆也不会反对费雪的观点，毕竟格雷厄姆的钱大部分是从盖可保险赚来的。
区别在于，格雷厄姆认为自己基于财务报表上统计数据的分析更加容易易于实践（easier policy to apply）和易于教会别人（more teachable），但是在实践过程中，巴菲特管理大资金的时候，长时间找不到投资标的。
此外，巴菲特多次强调格雷厄姆的方法不能管理大钱（can not manage lots of money），并引述格雷厄姆一纽曼公司基金一共有1200万美元。
总结来说，巴菲特铭记格雷厄姆提出的3点核心思想，但是在实战中，由于巴菲特的资金体量越来越大，格雷厄姆的方法无法容纳大资金，所以巴菲特去投资拥有护城河的公司。
从价值投资的学习进阶来看，我觉得还是要反反复复去阅读巴菲特致股东的信和巴菲特股东大会的问题，最好是去阅读原版的英文，这是最原汁原味。
下文是原版英文以及对应的翻译。选自1995年伯克希尔股东大会。非常感谢雪球一只喵的翻译。
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9、比较格雷厄姆和费雪的投资风格
9. Comparing investing styles of Ben Graham and Phil Fisher
股东：尼尔·麦克马洪，来自纽约，也是红杉资本的股东。
你很推崇本·格雷厄姆，而格雷厄姆又很鼓励不断转手（持有的公司），而你的投资思想是集中投资加上非常长远的眼光，请问你仍旧是15%的菲利普·费雪和85%的本·格雷厄姆吗?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, Neil McMahon (PH), New York City, also a Sequoia shareholder.
Ben Graham investing encouraged turnover. Looking at Berkshire’s holdings, concentration and long-term, are you still a 15 percent Phil Fisher and 85 percent Graham?
巴菲特：我也不知道具体的百分比。在我先前讲的三条哲学基础方面，我是100%的本·格雷厄姆。这三条真的很重要。
我在1960年左右第一次读费雪的两本书，我认为那两本书是很了不起的书籍，费雪是一个很了不起的人。
我认为假如算我的方法受人影响的百分比的话，《福布斯》的杰姆,迈克尔斯(Jim Michaels)算一个。
我可以对这些人给我的影响加一个百分比数字。
我认为我是100%的菲利普·费雪和100%的本·格雷厄姆，[A1] 他们两人的观点并不冲突，只是侧重点不同而已。
资本回报率高而且可以不断追加投资的企业是世界上最好的企业。格雷厄姆不会反对这个观点。格雷厄姆的钱大部分是从GEICO (政府雇员保险公司)中赚来的，这家公司就是那种最好的企业。
所以格雷厄姆是认同这个观点的。格雷厄姆只是认为买进从大量统计数据上看非常便宜的东西易于实践，也易于教会别人。
格雷厄姆会觉得费雪的方法比他的方法更难传授。不过格雷厄姆的方法比费雪的价值更有限，因为格雷厄姆的方法不适用于大规模资金。
格雷厄姆一纽曼公司(Graham Newman Corp.)实际上是一个开放式基金，有600万美元的净值。纽曼和格雷厄姆(Newman Graham)是这家公司的合伙人，自己也有600万美元。所以他们一共有1,200万美元。
(只有1,200万美元)，他们可以买进小型机械公司或者别的什么公司，都是从统计数据上看非常便宜的公司。那是非常不错的合伙操作。
格雷厄姆必须要卖出。假如你买的是糟糕的企业，那么你迟早还是要把它出售的。假如你买了一组糟糕的企业，你的指望是其中有一些能够被并购或者发生什么事件，你需要转手。
另一方面，假如你买的是一家好企业，那么你基本上用不着转手。
查理？
WARREN BUFFETT: I don’t know what the percentage would be. I’m a hundred percent Ben Graham in those three points I mentioned earlier, and those really count.
I am very — I was very influenced by Phil Fisher when I first read his two books, back around 1960[A2] or thereabouts. And I think that they’re terrific books, and I think Phil is a terrific guy.
So, I think I probably gave that percentage to — I think I first used it in Forbes one time when Jim Michaels wrote me. And I think I, you know, it was one of those things. I just named a number.
But I think I’d rather think of myself as being a sort of a hundred percent Ben Graham and a hundred percent Phil Fisher[A3] in the points where they don’t — and they really don’t — contradict each other. It’s just that they had a vastly different emphasis.
Ben would not have disagreed with the proposition that if you can find a business with a high rate of return on capital[A4] that can keep using more capital on that — that that’s the best business in the world. And of course, he made most of his money out of GEICO, which was precisely that sort of business.
So, he recognized it, it’s just that he felt that the other system of buying things that were statistically very cheap, and buying a large number of them, was an easier policy to apply, and one that was a little more teachable.[A5]
He would’ve felt that Phil Fisher’s approach was less teachable than his, but his had a more limited value because it was notworkable with really large sums of money[A6] .
At Graham-Newman Corp — Graham-Newman Corp was a closed-end fund — oh, it was technically an open-end fund, but it had $6 million of net worth. And Newman and Graham, the partnership that was affiliated with it, had 6 million. So, you had a total pool of 12 million.
Well, you could go around buying little machine tool companies — stocks in machine tool companies, whatever it might be, all statistically cheap. And that was a very good group operation.
And he had — you have — if you own a lousy business, you have to sell it at some point. I mean, if you own a group of lousy businesses, you better hope some of them get taken over or something happens. You need turnover.
If you own a wonderful business, you know, you don’t want turnover, basically.
Charlie?
芒格：我发现有一点很有趣，费雪当年买的好企业，很多都没能一直好下去。
其中有一家叫产权保险信托公司(Title Insurance and Trust Company)，该公司曾在加利福尼亚州首屈一指。
该公司有最大的产权保险部门，都是手工作业的。还有非常好的财务实力、商业信誉等。该公司在一个利润丰厚的领域中称雄。
不过，计算机出现了。只要投资几百万美元，就能建立一个产权保险部门，而且不比过去的人海战术差。
很快出现了很多产权保险公司，这些公司都去找大客户(比如说大型放贷机构和大型房地产经纪人机构)，支付给他们按照以前标准来看高得惊人的佣金，从而抢走很多业务。
所以在加利福尼亚州，所有产权保险公司的总利润之和降到了零以下。本来这个行业是一个垄断行业，看起来不可能会出现竞争的。
假如你展望未来20年，那么很少有公司能称得上安全科技进步有时候给你带来好处，有时候能害你赔得很惨。
如产权保险信托公司能聪明一点，就会发现计算机能降低成本这个事实可能算得上是有史以来最可怕的诅咒。
CHARLIE MUNGER: What was interesting to me about the Phil Fisher businesses is that a very great many of them didn’t last as wonderful businesses.
One of his businesses was Title Insurance and Trust Company, which dominated the state of California.
It had the biggest title plant, which was maintained by hand, and it had great fiscal solvency, and integrity, and so forth. It just dominated a lucrative field.
And along came the computer, and now you could create, for a few million dollars, a title plant and keep it up without an army of clerks.
And pretty soon, we had 20 different title companies, and they would go to great, big customers like big lenders and big real estate brokers, and pay them outlandish commissions by the standards of yore, and bid away huge blocks of business.
And in due course, in the State of California, the aggregate earnings of all the title insurance companies combined went below zero — starting with a virtual monopoly.
WARREN BUFFETT: From what looked like a monopoly.
CHARLIE MUNGER: So, very few companies are so safe that you can just look ahead 20 years. And technology is sometimes your friend and it’s sometimes your bitter enemy.
If Title Insurance and Trust Company had been smart, they would’ve looked on that computer, which they saw as a cost reducer, as one of the worst curses that ever came to man.
巴菲特：比起格雷厄姆的方法，费雪的方法可能需要更多的商业经验和洞察力。不过格雷厄姆的方法可能会很长时间找不到可投资的目标，而且也很难应用于大资金。
但是，若你严格遵循他对流动资本的安全要求，那么这方法是行得通的。尽管可能不适合大资金，而且有些时间段里找不到投资目标。
本真的更像一个老师，而不是一个——我的意思是，他没有想要赚很多钱的冲动。他对此不感兴趣。所以他真的想要一些他认为可以教的东西作为他哲学和方法的基石。
他觉得你可以坐在奥马哈读他的书，然后申请——买一些统计上便宜的东西，你不需要对商业或消费者行为有任何特别的见解，或任何类似的东西。
我不认为这是真的有任何问题，但我也不认为你可以用本的方式去管理大量的钱。
WARREN BUFFETT: You can — it probably takes morebusiness experience and insights,[A7] to some degree, to apply Phil Fisher’s approach than it does Graham’s approach. If you —
The only problem is, you may be shut out of doing anything for a long time[A8] with Ben’s approach, and you may have a lot of difficulty in doing it with big money.
But if you strictly applied, for example, his working capital test to securities, you know, it will work. It just may not work on a very big scale, and there may be periods when you’re not doing much.
Ben really was more of a teacher than a — I mean, he had no urge to make a lot of money. It did not interest him. So he was — he really wanted something that he thought was teachable as a cornerstone of his philosophy and approach.[A9]
And he felt you could read his books sitting out here in Omaha and apply — buying things that were statistically cheap, and you didn’t have to have any special insights about business or consumer behavior, or anything of the sort.
And I don’t think there’s any question about that being true, but I also don’t think you can manage lots of money[A10] in accord with it.
31. Focus on Graham’s three principles（非常重要）
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 5?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: John Rankin (PH), Fort Collins, Colorado. Thanks for having us.
In the book, “Warren Buffett Way,” the author describes the capital growth model that you’ve used to evaluate intrinsic value in common stock purchases.
My question is, do you also still use the formula Ben Graham described in “The Intelligent Investor,” that uses evaluating anticipated growth, but also book value?[A11]
It seems to me that fair value is always a bit higher when using Mr. Graham’s formula than the stream of cash discounted back to present value that is in “Warren Buffett Way” and also that you’ve alluded to in annual reports.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, we’ve tried to put in the annual report pretty much how we approach securities. And book value is not a consideration — virtually, not a consideration at all.[A12]
And the best businesses, by definition, are going to be businesses that earn veryhigh returns on capital employed[A13] over time. So, by nature, if we want to own good businesses, we’re going to own things that have relatively little capital employed compared to our purchase price.
That would not have been Ben Graham’s approach. But Ben Graham was — Ben was not working with very large sums of money. And he would not have argued with this approach, he just would’ve said his was easier. And it is easier, perhaps, when you’re working with small amounts of money.
My friend Walter Schloss[A14] has hewed much more toward the kind of securities that Ben would’ve selected. But he’s worked with smaller amounts of money. He has an absolutely sensational record. And it’s not surprising to me at all. I mean, when Walter left Graham-Newman, I would’ve expected him to do well.
But I don’t look at the primary message[A15] , from our standpoint, of Graham, really, as being in that — in anything to do with formulas. In other words, there’s three important aspects to it.
You know, one is your attitude toward the stock market.[A16] That’s covered in chapter eight of “The Intelligent Investor.” I mean, if you’ve got that attitude toward the market, you start ahead of 99 percent of all people who are operating in the market. So, you have an enormous advantage.
Second principle is the margin of safety[A17] , which again, gives you an enormous edge, and actually has applicability far beyond just the investment world.
And then the third is just looking at stocks as businesses[A18] , which gives you an entirely different view than most people that are in the market.
And with those three sort of philosophical benchmarks, the exact — the evaluation technique you use is not really that important. Because you’re not going to go way off the track, whether you use Walter’s approach — Walter Schloss’s — or mine, or whatever.
Phil Carret has a slightly different approach. But it’s got those three cornerstones to it, I will guarantee. And believe me, he’s done very well.
Charlie?
[A1]自认为是100的费雪和100%的格雷厄姆
[A2]大约在1960年读的费雪的两本书
[A3]100%的格雷厄姆和100%的费雪，只是重点不同
[A4]格雷厄姆也同意资本回报率最高的公司，并且从盖可保险赚取了很多的钱。
[A5]格雷厄姆的方法容易时间，也容易教会别人。
[A6]格雷厄姆的方法不适用于大资金
[A7]商业经验和洞察力
[A8]格雷厄姆的方法，长时间找不到投资标的
[A9]本的关注点更多的是的是理论框架方法论
[A10]本的方法不能管理大钱，是不是因为本没有管理过大钱？
所以说，投资最终还是要学习巴菲特
[A11]使用预期增长还是账面价值？
[A12]根本不考虑账面价值么？
[A13]最好的生意是投入的资本可以产生很高的回报。
[A14]施洛斯用格雷厄姆的这个方法，但是管理的是小钱。
[A15]不看格雷厄姆的主要消息？啥意思
[A16]对市场先生的态度
[A17]安全边际
[A18]股票看成是一门生意