@云蒙   我觉得您的杠杆上太早了些，这样就站在时间的对立面，心里上更期待股价上涨。 如果是缓慢的加仓，让时间和您站一起，我想您会更希望股价更低些您可以买的更便宜，然后安安心心的拿股息。 用枯坐三年的耐心来等待市场的回归。

对那一大段英文的翻译。节选自《巴菲特1990年给股东的信》～真希望有人能看看我的翻译，好累。*＿＊

银行生意不是我们最喜欢的，在这个行业里，资产和股权资本的比值经常在20：1左右，因此只要相对于资产的很小比例的错误就会摧毁大部分的股权资本，而且这种类型的错误在银行业里就像“家常便饭”一样经常出现，而不是人们理解的那种概率很小的事件。这种错误的原因经常是由管理层失败导致的，导致管理层失败的大部分原因是由于我们曾经提到的“组织倾向性”，即不论CEO的做法有多么愚蠢，这种做法经常被其他CEO想都不想的模仿下来。银行家在房贷时就像狂热的小旅鼠一样遵循着“跟着大哥”的原则。
因为20:1的杠杠率放大了管理层的优秀或者愚蠢，因此我们根本没有兴趣在一个“便宜”的价格购买管理操蛋的银行，我们对银行业唯一的兴趣就是用公平的价格购买管理出色的银行。
至于富国银行，我们认为我们拥有这个行业最优秀的管理者：C.R和P.H，这对组合让我想起了资本城公司的Tom Murphy和Dan Burke.首先，两对组合都拥有一种比两个人的能力总和更强大的能力，因为他们彼此之间能够互相理解，互相信任，互相崇拜；其次，两个管理组合都爱才如命，但又都不喜欢臃肿的管理总部；第三，两个组合都不遗余力的削减成本，不论当年的利润处于历史高位，还是处于逆势环境中；最后，两个管理团队都把自己的行为限制在他们懂的事情上，用他们的能力大小决定他们的行为，而不是他们的攀比心（就像IBM的创始人说的那样“我不是天才，但我确实在某些方面比较精明，但是我就在这几方面做事情”）。
1990年银行类股票的市场混乱帮助了我们，因此我们买了富国银行。这种混乱是可以理解的，因为几乎每个月都会爆出诸如管理层以前声称绝对没问题的贷款出现问题，随着一个又一个损失的曝光，投资者们开始意识到没有一个银行的资产负债表是可信的。在他们快速逃离银行股的帮助下，我们花费了2.9亿美元买了10%的富国银行，价格小于当年税后利润的5倍，小于当年税前利润的3倍。
富国的体量很大，有560亿的账面资产，股权利润率是20%，资产利润率是1.25%。我们大约花费了29亿买了一个值50亿的具有相同赚钱能力的银行。但如果我们通过收购一个类似的银行，我们大概需要花费58亿，而且我们不能找到像富国这样的管理层。
当然，拥有一个银行和拥有其他任何生意一样，远远不能说是无风险的：比如加州银行就受到大地震的威胁，地震可能对债务人造成极大的破坏从而让他们不能还清贷款。第二种风险就是系统性风险，比如某一行业的衰落或者严重的金融恐慌，在这种情况下，任何高负债率的生意都会遭遇重创。最后，当前市场上普遍认为的西海岸房地产泡沫会破裂，会造成银行贷款的损失，而富国银行是业内领先的房地产贷款的提供者，因此大部分人认为富国银行特别脆弱。
（再后面就是巴菲特假设富国的坏账率是10%，贷款回收率是30%，就像@云蒙 那样计算了一下富国的风险，就不翻译了）
补充：我记得查理曾经说过，你投资一个银行的唯一理由是你了解银行的管理者；
再补充：巴菲特曾经评论查理管理的储蓄贷款公司时说，“ 查理一发现风向不对，就封闭船舱，什么都不做 ，最严重的时候，查理关闭了所有的分支机构，只保留了总部对面的一个小小的门面”
还要补充：我的看法是，美国的银行业制度当然和我国的银行业制度有所不同，至于怎么不同我又不懂而不能说清楚，因此还是留给有心人来做吧。也许中国的银行就是风险很小，那真要恭喜云蒙了。但一定要做出细心的评估才行。
翻译好累，致敬@RanRan 。

我看到挂单了，云蒙农行盈透买盘和摩根士丹利对手盘互砍了，打光最后一根子弹支持云蒙

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are twenty times equity - a common ratio in this industry - mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the "institutional imperative:" the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

      Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

      With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another - Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. (Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no genius," he said. "I'm smart in spots - but I stay around those spots.")

      Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled - often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well - investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings, and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

      Wells Fargo is big - it has $56 billion in assets - and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however, has been able to hire the dean.

      Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business - is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable.