GM Financial 和 GE Capital根本不是一类公司, 风险性质完全不同。GM Financial风险很低,GE Capital风险很高,瘦身后的GE Capital回归captive finance传统,风险大大降低了
可以看到,在2017年的运营利润上,GM Financial 为母公司直接贡献了10%+,在2015年这个贡献只有5%-。
另外,在算margin的时候,其实SG&A应该算到Auto那个section里面,因此得出 GM Financial 和 Auto(即主业务 --- 卖车) 的 Operating Margin 大概都在8%左右。没有Auto margin低、 GM Finance margin 高之说。
在这里我们很关心一个数据:信贷渗透率。意思是,在所有卖的车中,有多少车是通过GM Financial贷款的。在查阅了三年的年报后,我们可以看到信贷渗透率从 2014 的 10% 到 2017 的 37%。由此可见,GM Financial 对汽车销量的愈来愈重要的贡献。
2017 10-K: GM Financial's retail penetration in North America grew to approximately 37% in the year ended December 31, 2017 from approximately 33% in 2016 as a result of the expanded leasing and lending programs.
2016 10-K: GM Financial's retail penetration in North America grew to approximately 33% in the year ended December 31, 2016 from approximately 30% in the corresponding period in 2015 as a result of the expanded leasing and lending programs.
2015 10-K: In the year ended December 31, 2015 GM Financial's retail penetration in North America grew to approximately 30%, up from approximately 10% in 2014.
另外,很有意思的一点是,你可以看出美国人民对皮卡和SUV的喜爱【其实很多时候我们认为皮卡业务属于2B,而非2C的业务,因为皮卡大多作为生产工具。在美国,皮卡的效用大概相当于五菱宏光,但其售价很贵 — 大概比奔驰E的稍微便宜一些】:
直接从金融市场融资:放贷后将资产证券化,卖给金融市场中的机构投资者。所以,母公司不用为了支持信贷业务掏钱。
Generally GM Financial seeks to fund its operations in each country through local sources to minimize currency and country risk. GM Financial primarily finances its loan, lease and commercial origination volume through the use of secured and unsecured credit facilities, through securitization transactions where such markets are developed and through the issuance of unsecured debt in public markets.
To help mitigate interest rate risk or mismatched funding, GM Financial may employ hedging strategies to lock in the interest rate spread.
In GM Financial's securitization transactions it can transfer fixed rate finance receivables to securitization trusts that, in turn, sell either fixed rate or floating rate securities to investors.
GM Financial的资产证券化行为都是通过VIE (特殊用途企业)发的,和母公司隔离。所以即使消费者如果不还钱了,母公司也不用承担债务责任。
但是需要注意的是,通用在处理母公司的财务报表的时候,并不把这些VIE的部分做为表外资产。在 2017, 大概 37%’s asset 和 liabilities 是属于这些VIE的。所以,作为投资者,在算ROA和各种leverage的ratio的时候,其实应该去除这一部分。
Facilities or asset-backed securities to investors in securitization transactions. The debt issued by these VIEs is backed by finance receivables and leasing related assets transferred to the VIEs (Securitized Assets).
While these subsidiaries are included in GM Financial's consolidated financial statements, they are separate legal entities and their assets are legally owned by them and are not available to GM Financial's creditors. The following table summarizes the assets and liabilities related to GM Financial's consolidated VIEs:
在2017年,GM Financial 的 33%的贷款是次贷。但同时,另一个数据让我吃惊:回首2014年,83%的贷款是次贷!可以看到,从2014年到2017年,GM Financial变的整体更健康了。【所谓次贷,就是把钱借给信用分数很低的消费者,以便帮助他们完成买车心愿。】
2017 10-K: At December 31, 2017 and 2016 33% and 41% of retail finance receivables were from consumers with sub-prime credit scores, which are defined as FICO scores or equivalent scores of less than 620 at the time of loan origination.
2016 10-K: At December 31, 2016 and 2015, 48% and 60% of the retail finance receivables in North America were from consumers with sub-prime credit scores, which are defined as FICO scores or its equivalent of less than 620 at the time of loan origination.
2015 10-K: At December 31, 2015 and 2014, 60% and 83% of the retail finance receivables in North America were from consumers with sub-prime credit scores, which are defined as FICO scores of less than 620 at the time of loan origination.
1. GM Financial 有33% 的消费者是次贷,虽然比例较高,但比2014年已经健康了很多。
2. 通用在2015 -2017年这个周期的增长是由消费者信贷扩张支撑的。从更宏观的角度考虑,车贷的利率在过去三年都在4%以下,消费者也有充分的动机利用车贷来买新车。
3. GM Financial 与母公司有很好的法律和财务隔离,所以至少信贷部门不会在金融危机的时候让通用死掉。。
但是,从宏观角度讲,现在将近40%的消费者通过车贷买车,可见车贷是导致汽车行业的周期性的一个重要原因。
这个行业享受了消费者债务扩张带来的繁荣,因此也要承受消费者信贷紧缩时的痛苦。
狂暴的欢愉,必以狂暴结局。这大体是华尔街给通用6倍PE的原因吧。
GM Financial 和 GE Capital根本不是一类公司, 风险性质完全不同。GM Financial风险很低,GE Capital风险很高,瘦身后的GE Capital回归captive finance传统,风险大大降低了
简明扼要的分析很赞!有没有关于EV的分析?
很有意思的研究,可以横向比较一下其他车企。