25. Keynes: Great “wisdom” about investing
25. 凯恩斯：关于投资的伟大“智慧”
WARREN BUFFETT: Zone 2? 巴菲特：2区？
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) from Houston, Texas. From time to time, you have quoted John Maynard Keynes, the British economist.
观众：（听不清）来自德克萨斯州休斯顿。你不时引用英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）的话。
SYNC VIDEO TO PARAGRAPH 将视频同步到段落
So, I would assume that you have read the investment writings very extensively. What are two or three investment lessons, in your opinion, one can learn from that economist?
因此，我认为您已经非常广泛地阅读了投资著作。在您看来，两三个投资课程是什么，可以从那位经济学家那里学到？
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I forget which, I think it’s chapter eight of “The General Theory,” do you remember Charlie? Or is it chapter —
巴菲特：嗯，我忘了这是《通论》的第八章，你还记得查理吗？还是章节——
CHARLIE MUNGER: No. 芒格：没有。
WARREN BUFFETT: There’s one chapter in “The General Theory” that relates to markets, and the psychology of markets, and the behavior of market participants and so on, that probably is, aside from Ben Graham’s two chapters, eight and 20, in “The Intelligent Investor” — I think you’ll find you’ll get as much wisdom from reading that as anything written in investments. And you’ll know it when you see it in “The General Theory.”
巴菲特：《通论》中有一章与市场、市场心理、市场参与者的行为等有关，除了本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）在《聪明的投资者》（The Intelligent Investor）中的两章（第八章和20章）之外，我想你会发现，从阅读这些内容中，你会得到的智慧与投资中写的任何东西一样多。当你在《通论》中看到它时，你就会知道它。
It’s a chapter that jumps out to you about securities and so on. And I — could be chapter eight, but I may be wrong on that. But I would recommend reading that.
这是一章，跳出来给你关于证券等等。而我——可能是第八章，但我可能在这一点上错了。但我建议阅读它。
Keynes and Graham, from vastly different starting points, came to the same conclusion at about the same time in the ’30s, as to the soundest way to invest over time. They differed some on their ideas on diversification. Keynes believed in diversifying far less than did Graham.
凯恩斯和格雷厄姆的出发点截然不同，在30年代的同一时间得出了相同的结论，即随着时间的推移进行最合理的投资方式。他们对多元化的看法有些不同。凯恩斯对多元化的信念远不如格雷厄姆。
But Keynes started off with the wrong theory, I would say, in the ’20s and essentially tried to predict business cycles in markets, and then shifted to fundamental analysis of businesses in the ’30s, and did extremely well.
但凯恩斯在20年代从错误的理论开始，基本上试图预测市场的商业周期，然后在30年代转向对企业的基本面分析，并且做得非常好。
And about the same time, Graham was writing his first material. I think Janet Lowe, in her book on Ben Graham, actually has a little correspondence that took place between Keynes and Ben. So I would advise you to read that.
大约在同一时间，格雷厄姆正在写他的第一个材料。我认为珍妮特·洛（Janet Lowe）在她关于本·格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）的书中，实际上有一段凯恩斯和本之间的通信。所以我建议你阅读它。
And there’s some letters of his that he — of Keynes’ — that he wrote to co-trustees of life insurance societies, and colleges, and so on, that I think you’d find interesting, too.
还有一些他的信，他——凯恩斯的——写给人寿保险协会、大学等的共同受托人，我想你也会觉得很有趣。
Morning Session - 2022 Meeting
On the other hand, if you go back, perhaps the greatest chapter ever written on the operation of markets, particularly the stock market, is in a book, probably one of the most famous books in economic history, The General Theory, written by John Maynard Keynes. I think it was 1936.
另一方面，如果你回过头来看，也许有史以来关于市场运作，特别是股票市场最伟大的章节是在一本书中，可能是经济史上最著名的书之一，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯写的《通论》。我想那是 1936 年。
And I don’t know whether it’s chapter — I think it was chapter 12 — but whatever it is, he describes what markets are all about in 1936. And he describes something, in beautiful prose, that explains why the whole country in March of this year was sitting around trading Occidental in some crazy way that enabled us to buy a quarter of what wasn’t owned by four other institutions that weren’t going to sell.
我不知道这是否是第12章——我想是第12章——但不管是什么，他描述了1936年市场的全部内容。他用优美的散文描述了一些东西，解释了为什么今年三月整个国家都坐下来以某种疯狂的方式交易西方石油，使我们能够购买其他四家不会出售的机构不拥有的四分之一。
But we could buy a quarter of it. And we could’ve bought a lot more. I mean — you just wondered if there was anybody that really was thinking about investment. If you —
但我们可以买四分之一。我们本可以买更多。我的意思是——你只是想知道是否有人真的在考虑投资。如果你——
Going back to investing, I mean, investing is laying out money now with the hope of getting back more later on. It’s really laying out purchasing power now with the hope of getting more purchasing power back.
回到投资，我的意思是，投资就是现在花钱，希望以后能赚回更多钱。它现在真的在布局购买力，希望能找回更多的购买力。
But that’s the reason you’d — and, you know, that’s the way you learn in the textbooks, that you defer consumption now so you can consume more later on, so that you can take care of your family — all these things about how investment takes place.
但这就是你这样做的原因——你知道，这就是你在教科书中学到的方式，你现在推迟消费，这样你以后就可以消费更多，这样你就可以照顾你的家人——所有这些关于投资如何发生的事情。
And that is what happens with farms. I mean, if somebody buys a farm and they, generally, they ultimately leave it to their kids or they got it from their parents.
这就是农场发生的事情。我的意思是，如果有人买了一个农场，一般来说，他们最终会把它留给他们的孩子，或者他们从父母那里得到它。
And, I mean, they don’t sit there every day and, you know, get quotes 15 times a day and say, you know, I’d like to get a call — I’d like to sell a put, you know, on the guy’s farm next to me. And you can have a call on mine. And then I’ll have something called a straddle or a strangle, or whatever it may be. And, you know, they just —
而且，我的意思是，他们不是每天都坐在那里，你知道，每天得到15次报价，然后说，你知道，我想接到一个电话 - 我想在我旁边的那个人的农场里卖一个看跌期权。你可以打电话给我。然后我会有一种叫做跨式或绞杀的东西，或者其他什么。而且，你知道，他们只是——
They go about making the farm worth more money. And they do the same thing if they’ve got an auto dealership. And they do the same thing, you know, if they’ve got an apartment house. They look to improve it and attract tenants, all those kind of things. And —
他们努力让农场值更多的钱。如果他们有汽车经销商，他们会做同样的事情。他们做同样的事情，你知道，如果他们有一套公寓。他们希望改善它并吸引租户，所有这些事情。而且——
Forty — what would it be? — 40 trillion at least, you know, of the ownership of all of the American business — people treat it as poker chips or pulling the handle.
四十岁——那会是什么？——你知道，至少40万亿美国企业的所有权——人们把它当作扑克筹码或拉把手。
And they’ve got systems set up so that if you want to buy a three-day call on a stock, you can do it. And they make more money selling you calls than if you buy stocks. So, they teach you on calls. (Laughs)
他们已经建立了系统，如果你想购买一个股票的三天看涨期权，你可以做到。他们卖给你看涨期权比你买股票赚的钱还多。所以，他们教你打电话。（笑）
Nobody’s going around selling calls on farms or anything of the sort.
没有人在农场或类似的东西上卖电话。
But that’s why markets do crazy things. And occasionally, Berkshire gets a chance to do something. And it’s —
但这就是为什么市场会做疯狂的事情。偶尔，伯克希尔会有机会做点什么。它就是——
It’s not because we’re smart. It’s because we’re — the only thing I can say we’re qualified on —and sometimes I wonder about that — but I think we’re sane. You know, I mean, and that’s the main requirement in this business.
这不是因为我们聪明。这是因为我们是——我唯一能说我们有资格的——有时我想知道这一点——但我认为我们是理智的。你知道，我的意思是，这是这个行业的主要要求。
And — Charlie? 还有——查理？
Morning Session - 1998 Meeting
9. Efficient market hypothesis “contaminates” business schools
9. 有效市场假说“污染”商学院
WARREN BUFFETT: OK, zone 2.
沃伦·巴菲特：好的，2区。
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning. My name is Joe Lacey (PH). I’m from Austin, Texas.
观众：早上好。我的名字是Joe Lacey（PH）。我来自德克萨斯州奥斯汀。
In this era when the financial departments of the institutions of higher learning are referring to you as an anomaly, and they preach the efficient markets hypothesis, saying that you can’t outperform the market, where does one go to find a mentor like you found in Ben Graham? Someone you can ask questions to regarding value investing.
在这个高等院校的金融部门把你称为异类，宣扬有效市场假说，说你跑赢市场，去哪里找一个像你本·格雷厄姆那样的导师呢？您可以向某人提出有关价值投资的问题。
WARREN BUFFETT: My understanding is that the University of Florida has instituted a couple of courses that, actually, Mason Hawkins gave them a significant amount of money to finance. And I believe they’re teaching something other than efficient markets there.
巴菲特：我的理解是，佛罗里达大学已经开设了几门课程，实际上，梅森霍金斯给了他们一大笔钱来资助。我相信他们在那里教授的不是有效市场。
There’s a very good course at Columbia I know that gets a lot of visiting teachers to come in. I go there and teach occasionally, but a number of practitioners do.
我知道哥伦比亚大学有一门非常好的课程，吸引了很多访问老师。我偶尔去那里教书，但一些从业者会这样做。
So there — I think the efficient market theory is less holy writ now than it was 15 or 20 years ago in universities, but it’s — there’s a lot of it taught, but I think you can find more diversity in what is being offered now than ten or 20 years ago. And I’d recommend, you know, looking into those two schools.
所以在那里——我认为有效市场理论现在不像15或20年前在大学里那么神圣，但它是——有很多教，但我认为你会发现现在提供的东西比十年或20年前更多样化。我建议，你知道，研究这两所学校。
You know, it’s really quite useful. If you had a merchant shipping business, if all of your competitors believe the world is flat, you know, that is a huge edge, because they will not take on any cargo to go to places that are beyond where they think they will fall off. And so we should be encouraging the teaching of efficient market theories in universities. (Laughter)
你知道，它真的非常有用。如果你有一个商船业务，如果你所有的竞争对手都认为世界是平的，你知道，这是一个巨大的优势，因为他们不会接受任何货物去超出他们认为会掉下来的地方。因此，我们应该鼓励在大学里教授有效的市场理论。（笑声）
It amazes me. But, you know, I think one time that — was it Keynes that said that most economists are most economical about ideas? That they make the ones they learned in graduate school last a lifetime. (Laughter)
这让我很惊讶。但是，你知道，我想有一次——凯恩斯是不是说大多数经济学家对思想最经济？他们让他们在研究生院学到的东西持续一生。（笑声）
And what happens is that you spend years getting your Ph.D. in finance and you learn theories with a lot of mathematics in them that the average layman can’t do.
发生的事情是，你花了数年时间获得金融博士学位，你学习的理论中有很多数学知识，这是普通外行人做不到的。
And you become sort of a high priest. And you get an enormous amount of yourself and ego, and even professional security, invested in those ideas. And it gets very hard to back off after a given point. And I think that to some extent has contaminated the teaching of investing in the universities.
然后你变成了一个大祭司。你会在这些想法中投入大量的自我和自我，甚至是职业安全感。在给定的点之后很难退缩。我认为这在某种程度上污染了大学投资的教学。
Charlie? 查理？
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I would argue that the contamination was massive. (Laughter)
芒格：嗯，我认为污染是巨大的。（笑声）
But it’s waning. 但它正在减弱。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, it is waning.
巴菲特：是的，它正在减弱。
CHARLIE MUNGER: It’s waning. The good ideas eventually triumph.
芒格：它正在减弱。好的想法最终会胜利。
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. The word “anomaly” I’ve always found interesting on that, because, you know, after a while — I mean Columbus was an anomaly, I suppose, for a while. But what it means is something that the academicians could not explain, and rather than re-examine their theories, they simply discarded any evidence of that sort as anomalous.
巴菲特：是的。“异常”这个词我一直觉得很有趣，因为，你知道，过了一段时间——我的意思是哥伦布是一个异常，我想，有一段时间。但这意味着什么，学者们无法解释，他们没有重新审视他们的理论，而是简单地将任何此类证据视为异常。
And I think when you find information that contradicts previously cherished beliefs, that you’ve got a special obligation to look at it and look at it quickly.
我认为，当你发现与以前珍视的信念相矛盾的信息时，你就有特殊的义务去看它，并快速看它。
I think Charlie told me that one of the things Darwin did was that whenever he found anything that contradicted some previous belief, he knew that he had to write it down almost immediately because he felt that the human mind was conditioned, so conditioned to reject contradictory evidence, that unless he got it down in black and white very quickly his mind would simply push it out of existence.
我想查理告诉我，达尔文做的一件事是，每当他发现任何与先前的信念相矛盾的东西时，他知道他必须几乎立即把它写下来，因为他觉得人类的思想是有条件的，如此习惯于拒绝矛盾的证据，除非他很快把它白纸黑字写下来，否则他的头脑只会把它赶出存在。
Charlie knows more about Darwin than I do. Maybe he can explain that.
查理比我更了解达尔文。也许他可以解释这一点。
CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I don’t know about Darwin, but I did find it amusing. One of these extreme efficient market theorists explained Warren for many, many years as an anomaly of luck. And he got the six sigmas, six standard deviations of luck. And then people started laughing at him because six sigmas of luck is a lot. So he changed his theory. Now Warren has six or seven sigmas of skill. (Laughter)
芒格：嗯，我不知道达尔文，但我确实觉得很有趣。其中一位极端有效的市场理论家多年来一直将沃伦解释为运气的异常。他得到了六个西格玛，六个运气标准差。然后人们开始嘲笑他，因为六西格玛的运气很多。所以他改变了他的理论。现在沃伦有六七西格玛的技能。（笑声）
WARREN BUFFETT: No. 巴菲特：不。
CHARLIE MUNGER: So you see —
芒格：所以你看——
WARREN BUFFETT: I’d rather have the six sigmas of luck, actually. (Laughter)
巴菲特：实际上，我宁愿拥有运气的六西格玛。（笑声）
CHARLIE MUNGER: The one thing he couldn’t bear to leave was his six sigmas. (Laughter)
芒格：他不忍心离开的一件事是他的六西格玛。（笑声）