巴菲特在前两天的致股东的信中，总结了自己的2022年。
他解释了伯克希尔利润受所投资公司的股价波动的影响很大，而真正分析伯克希尔最好把这部分的影响去掉，因为短期股价波动是难以预测的，巴菲特也不是因为某个季度或者某年所投资的股票赚了些，就把股票全卖掉。
过去长期来看这些投资的表现不错，巴菲特相信未来的表现应该也说的过去。
巴菲特还介绍了一个收购案，也就是投资业务的一大分支，收购优秀企业，这些被买来的控股企业的业务经营利润，才是巴菲特计算伯克希尔利润时看重的，另外老巴介绍了我上篇帖子提到的保险浮存金。
然后巴菲特谈到了回购，都是老生常谈的了，对有疑惑的可以看看老巴怎么说。
最后老巴强调了财务造假让人恶心，确实如此。
老巴原文和大唐炼金师的翻译如下：
The Past Year in Brief 简述过去一年
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion.
伯克希尔在2022年度过了美好的一年，公司的经营利润创下308亿美元的记录，我们使用美国通用会计准则（GAAP）计算的利润，但是去掉股票组合产生的资本收益或损失。
Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:
查理和我专注于这个经营数字，并鼓励你也这样做。GAAP计算的利润数字，如果没有经过我们这种的调整，在每个报告日都会剧烈波动，请注意它在2022年耍杂技般的变化，这并不罕见:
The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains,
从季度甚至年度来看，GAAP计算的利润是100%具有误导性的。
to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
可以肯定的是，在过去几十年里，股票收益对伯克希尔来说非常重要；我们预计在未来几十年里，股票收益也将有显著正面贡献。但它们起伏不定的季度波动，经常被媒体盲目报道，完全误导了投资者。
A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance.
伯克希尔去年第二个积极的发展是：我们收购了由乔·布兰登担任董事长的财产意外保险公司——Alleghany。我过去曾与乔共事，他对伯克希尔和保险都很了解。
Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
Alleghany 对我们来说具有特殊的价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力，使其保险子公司能够专注提供有价值和持久的保单，这点几乎所有竞争对手都无法做到。
Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time.
在Alleghany的帮助下，我们的保险浮存金在2022年从1470亿美元增加到1640亿美元。通过严格的保险核算，随着时间的推移，这些资金很有可能成为零成本。
Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations.
自1967年收购第一家财产意外险公司以来，通过收购、运营和创新，伯克希尔的浮存金增长了8,000倍。
Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
虽然在我们的财务报表中没有得到确认，但这些浮存金对伯克希尔来说是一笔非凡的资产，新股东可以通过阅读A-2页来了解浮存金的价值。
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A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours.
2022年，伯克希尔通过回购股票，每股的内在价值获得了小幅的增长，苹果和美国运通也类似举措，这两家公司都是我们重要的投资对象。
At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
在伯克希尔，我们通过回购1.2%的公司流通股，直接增加了你对我们独特业务组合的权益，在苹果和美国运通，回购增加了伯克希尔的持股比例，而我们没有付出任何代价。
The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices.
计算并不复杂：当股本减少时，你的股份比例就会上升。如果回购以低于公司价值的价格进行，那么再小的回购都有帮助。
Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
当然，当一家公司支付过高的回购价格时，继续持有股票的股东就会蒙受损失。在这种时候，获利的只有卖股票的股东，以及那些友好建议愚蠢回购，但收费昂贵的投资银行家。
Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect.
需要强调的是，增加每股价值的回购，带来的收益有利于所有股东。
Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?
你可以想象一下，一家汽车经销商的三个完全知情的股东，其中一人管理着该业务，而另一个不管理的股东希望将自己的股份买掉，价格对另外两个继续持有的股东有吸引力。交易完成后，是否伤害了任何人？那个管理者是否比另外一个继续持有的股东更受益？公众受到伤害了吗？
When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
当有人告诉你，所有的回购都对股东或国家有害，或者对CEO特别有利，此人要么是一个经济文盲，要么就是能言善辩的煽动家 (这两个角色并不相互排斥)。
Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section.
伯克希尔2022年的运营细节几乎全列在K33 ～ K66页上，查理和我，以及许多伯克希尔的股东，都喜欢研究这部分的许多事实和数据。
These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.
然而，这几页不是必读的，伯克希尔有很多百万富翁、亿万富翁，他们从未研究过我们的财务数据，他们只是知道查理和我、以及我们的家人和好友都一直在投资伯克希尔，他们相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。
And thatis a promise we can make.
这也是我们可以做出的承诺。
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Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.
最后，一个重要的警告：即使是我们喜欢看的经营利润数据，也很容易被管理层操纵，CEO、董事和他们的顾问通常认为这种篡改行为很老练，记者和分析人士也欣然接受它的存在，毕竟超“预期”的利润被视为管理层的胜利。
That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
那种财报操纵真恶心，操纵数字不需要天赋，只需要强烈地欺骗欲望。一位CEO曾对我说，“大胆而富有想象力的会计”已经成为资本主义的耻辱之一。
