The Berkshire Partnership
伯克希尔伙伴关系
Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow thestate’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act inthe best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directorsembrace that doctrine.
$伯克希尔-哈撒韦A(BRK.A)$ 是特拉华州的一家公司，我们的董事必须遵守该州的法律。其中一项要求是，董事会成员必须以公司及其股东的最佳利益为出发点。我们的董事们拥护这一原则。
In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delightits customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, tobehave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the manycities and states in which we operate. We value these four importantconstituencies.
此外，伯克希尔的董事们当然也希望公司能取悦客户，培养和奖励36万名员工的才能，与贷款机构保持良好的关系，并在许多我们运营业务的城市和州被视为良好公民。我们重视这四个重要的群体。
None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining suchmatters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions anddivestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’sdirectors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of thecorporation and its owners.
然而这些团体中，没有任何一个团体在确定诸如股息、战略方向，首席执行官人选、并购和资产剥离之类的事情上有投票权。这些方面的责任完全是伯克希尔公司董事们的责任，他们必须忠实地代表公司及其所有者的长期利益。
Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation tothe many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal historymay help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes ourbehavior.
除了法律要求之外，查理和我觉得对伯克希尔的许多个人股东负有特殊的义务。在这里，我谈一点个人经历，可能会帮助您了解我们不寻常的关系，以及它是如何塑造我们的行为的。
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Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”).
在我执掌伯克希尔之前，我通过一系列的合伙人公司关系为许多人管理资金，头三个是1956年建立的。随着时间的推移，同时运营多个实体变得难以控制，在1962年，我们将12个合伙企业合并为一个独立的实体，即巴菲特合伙有限公司（Buffett Partnership Ltd．“ BPL”）。
By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife aswell, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. Ireceived no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensatedby my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annualthreshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to becarried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that neverhappened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”) As the yearswent by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles,cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.
到了那一年，我自己的钱，我妻子的钱，几乎都和我许多有限合伙人企业的基金一起投资了。我没有收取薪水或费用。相反，作为普通合伙人，我的有限合伙人只有在确保回报率高于6%的年度门槛后，如果收益未能达到该水平，差额部分就从我未来的应得利润中扣除。（幸运的是，从未发生过这种事：合伙人回报率总是超过6%的“标准杆”。）随着岁月的流逝，我父母、兄弟姐妹、姨妈姑婶、叔叔舅舅、表兄弟和姻亲都将大部分资金投资给了上述合伙企业。
Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did.Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of ourpartners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our venturessimply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals– either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctlyconcluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss ofcapital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected todo reasonably well with it.
查理在1962年成立了合伙公司，运作方式和我差不多。我们都没有任何机构投资者，我们的合作伙伴中也很少有金融行家。那些加入我们公司的人相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。这些人——要么凭直觉，要么依靠朋友们的建议——正确地得出了这样的结论：查理和我对资本的永久亏损有着极端的厌恶，除非我们预期他们的钱会做得相当不错，否则我们不会接受他们的钱。
I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control ofBerkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. Afteryearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along withthree stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.
1965年BPL收购伯克希尔哈撒韦的控制权后，我无意中进入了企业管理领域。后来，在1969年，我们决定解散BPL。年底后，这家合伙企业按比例分配了所有现金和三支股票，其中价值最高的是BPL在伯克希尔哈撒韦的70.5%股权。
Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets hedistributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company hispartnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among thethree stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.
与此同时，查理在1977年结束了其公司的运营。在他分配给合伙人的资产中，包括Blue Chip Stamps的主要股份，这是他的合伙人、伯克希尔和我共同控制的一家公司。Blue Chip也是我的合伙公司解散时分配的三支股票之一。
In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’sbase of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wantedeveryone – old, new and prospective shareholders – to be on the samepage.
1983年，伯克希尔和Blue Chip合并，使伯克希尔的注册股东基础从1900人扩大到2900人。查理和我希望所有人——新老股东和潜在股东——都能步调一致达成共识。
Therefore, the 1983 annual report – up front – laid out Berkshire’s“major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although ourform is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationshipin 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well –believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.
因此，在1983年的年度报告中，伯克希尔提出了“主要商业原则”。第一个原则：“虽然我们的形式是公司，但我们的态度是合作伙伴关系。”这一点在1983年定义了我们的关系；它还定义了公司的今天。查理和我——还有我们的董事们——相信，这句格言将在未来几十年都会很好地为伯克希尔服务。
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Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by meas a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I ownare annually distributed to various philanthropies.
伯克希尔的所有权现在分布于五个大的“桶”里，其中一个被我作为“创始人”占据着。我这“桶”肯定是空的，因为我拥有的股份每年都会分配给各种慈善机构。
Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors,each handling other people’s money. That, however, is where thesimilarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not bemore different.
其余四桶中有两桶由机构投资者占据，各自负责管理他人的资金。然而，这就是这两个桶之间的不同之处：它们的投资程序截然不同。
In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushroomingsegment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that theytrack. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshireis a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire sharessimply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot,buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.
一个机构类型是指数基金，这是投资界一个规模庞大、迅速发展的领域。这些基金只是紧贴它们追踪的指数。指数投资者最喜欢的是 $标普500 ETF-SPDR(SPY)$ （S&P 500），伯克希尔哈撒韦是该指数的成份股。应该强调的是，指数基金持有伯克希尔股票的原因很简单，因为它们必须这样做。他们纯粹是“自动驾驶”，买卖股票唯一的目的就是调整“权数”。
In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage theirclients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals,universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have amandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment asto valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.
另一个机构类型则是管理客户资金的专业人士，不管这些资金属于富人、大学、退休人员或任何人。这些职业经理人的职责是根据他们对估值和前景的判断，将资金从一项投资转移到另一项投资。这是一个光荣而艰难的职业。
We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhilesearch for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Somemanagers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently.Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or saleof shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go basedupon their macro-economic judgments.
我们很高兴为这个“活跃的”团体工作，同时他们也在寻找更好的地方来配置客户资金。可以肯定的是，一些基金经理着眼长远，交易频率很低。还有一些人使用计算机，利用算法可以在一纳秒内指导股票的买卖。一些专业投资者会根据他们对宏观经济的判断来调整仓位。
Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in amanner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. Theseowners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source offunds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrelwith that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of theequities we own at Berkshire.
第四类是个人股东，他们的运作方式与我刚才描述的积极型机构经理人类似。可以理解的是，当这些股东看到另一项令他们兴奋的投资时，他们会把自己持有的伯克希尔股票视为可能的资金来源（因而卖出伯克希尔股票）。我们对这种态度没有异议，这与我们看待伯克希尔一些股票的方式类似。
All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did notfeel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investorswho simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future maybring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similarto that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnershipyears, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.
综上所述，如果查理和我对我们的第五桶没有特别的亲缘感，那我们就没有人性了。第五桶就是超过百万的个人投资者们，他们相信我们会代表他们的利益，不管未来会发生什么。他们加入我们并不打算离开，他们的心态与我们最初的合作伙伴相似。事实上，在我们合伙期间的许多投资者，以及/或他们的后代，仍然是伯克希尔的主要股东。
A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generousOmaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed apartnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd.Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.
斯坦·特鲁尔森(Stan Truhlsen)就是这些“老合作伙伴”的一个典型代表，他是奥马哈市一位开朗慷慨的眼科医生，我们私下也有交情。他在2020年11月13日迎来了自己的100岁生日。1959年，斯坦和其他10名年轻的奥马哈医生与我结成了伙伴关系。他们创造性地将自己的公司命名为Emdee, Ltd。每年，他们都会和我和妻子一起在家里吃庆祝晚餐。
When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all ofthe doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins andouts of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshirethey would be treated as partners.
当我们的合伙人在1969年分配伯克希尔股票时，所有的医生都保留了他们得到的股票。他们可能不知道投资或会计知识，但他们知道，在伯克希尔他们将被视为合伙人。
Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continueto hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability – along with thefact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively – serves up an interestingquestion: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?
斯坦的两名来自Emdee的朋友现龄都90多岁了，他们仍然持有伯克希尔的股票。我们这群人有着惊人的持久性，再加上查理和我分别是97岁和90岁这个事实，这就提出了一个有趣的问题：长久持有伯克希尔股票会让人长寿吗?
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Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add toyour understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts andinstitutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’tthink that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.
伯克希尔的不同寻常、备受重视的个人股东群体，可能会让你更好地理解我们对于“讨好华尔街分析师及机构投资者”这一行为的不情愿。我们已经拥有了我们自己所理想中的投资者群体，并且总得来说，我们不认为他们会离开或是被替代。
There are only so many seats – that is, shares outstanding – availablefor Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupyingthem.
伯克希尔公司的“席位”——即流通股数——十分有限，我们对于那些已经拥有份额的投资者们致以真诚的敬意。
Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope,however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover infriends, neighbors or marriage?
当然，“合伙人”也会发生一些变动。不过，查理和我希望这不要有太大变动。毕竟，谁会希望自己的朋友、邻居或是婚姻是日异月更的呢？
In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogizedrunning a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners,he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgersserved with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. Butyou must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Yourmessage to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find uponentering your premises.
1958年，菲利普·费雪（Phil Fisher）写了一本投资领域的旷世奇作。在书中，他将经营一家上市公司比作经营一家餐厅。他说，你可以用汉堡配可口可乐或法国菜配上异国情调的葡萄酒来吸引顾客；但同时，他也提醒广大读者：不要随意地切换菜品的搭配方案，因为潜在客户所提供的信息必须要与他们进入餐厅后所发现的一致。
At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. Wecherish the clientele this fare has attracted.
在伯克希尔，我们已经提供“汉堡加可口可乐”长达56年，我们也十分珍视被我们的菜品搭配所吸引到的长期客户。
The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the UnitedStates and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes.They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want pricetargets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors.“Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chartportend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.
美国和其他地方的数千万投资者和投机者有各种各样的股票选择，以符合他们的偏好。他们将会找到拥有诱人想法的CEO和市场专家们。如果他们想要价格目标，管理收益和“美好的故事”，他们不会缺人的。“专家”将充满信心地指点他们，告诉他们股价图表上的某些波动会预示着股票未来的何种走势等等，对于交易行为的呼声永远不会停止。
Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all,ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient andlevel-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a boardlisting all of the S&P 500, will – over time – enjoy dividends andcapital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes inits original “selections.”
我需要补充的是，这些投资者中的很多人会表现得很好。毕竟，持有股票很大程度上是一个“正和博弈”。实际上，就算是一只猴子，倘若可以头脑冷静且有足够耐心，通过向标普500的上市公司投掷50个飞镖来构建投资组合，随着时间的推移，其也可以享受到丰厚的股息和资本利得——前提是他们不会轻易因为受到诱惑而改变之前的“选择”。
Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, businessownership produce wealth – lots of it. Most owners of such propertieswill be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm,ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still,investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income.And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.
诸如农场、房地产、企业所有权这样的生产性资产，都可以产生财富——大量的财富。大多数拥有这些财产的人都将得到回报，所需要的仅仅是时间的流逝、内心的平静、充分的多元化配置以及交易费用的最小化。不过，投资者们绝不能忘记一点，即他们的支出便是华尔街的收入。不过，和猴子不同，华尔街的人可绝对不是为了花生工作，你懂我的意思。
When seats open up at Berkshire – and we hope they are few – we wantthem to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. Afterdecades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We canand do, however, pledge to treat you as partners.
当伯克希尔有空位的时候——当然我们希望这不会太多——我们希望这些空位可以被那些充分了解我们并渴望得到我们所提供服务的投资者所拥有。即便在资产管理领域摸爬滚打几十年，查理与我仍无法拍着胸脯保证投资的结果。但是，我们能够并确实会保证会将投资者们视为亲密无间的合作伙伴。
And so, too, will our successors.
我们的继任者也将如此。
A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You
伯克希尔的一个可能令你吃惊的数字
Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected:Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment – the sortof assets that make up the “business infrastructure” of our country – with aGAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company.Berkshire’s depreciated cost of these domestic “fixed assets” is $154billion. Next in line on this list is AT&T, with property, plant andequipment of $127 billion.
最近，我了解到一个事实，并深信不疑：伯克希尔拥有美国的房地产、工厂和设备——这类资产构成了我们国家的“商业基础设施”——在GAAP下的估值超过了其他任何一家美国公司。伯克希尔对这些国内“固定资产”的折旧成本为1540亿美元。紧随其后的是美国电话电报公司(AT&T)，拥有资产、厂房和设备，价值1270亿美元。
Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not,in itself, signal an investment triumph. The best results occur atcompanies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses– and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume withonly minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of theseexceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, growslowly.
我应该补充一点，我们在固定资产所有权方面的领导地位，本身并不意味着投资取得了胜利。最好的投资结果出现在那些只需要很少资产就能开展高利润业务的公司，以及那些只需要很少额外资本就能扩大销售额的产品或服务的公司。事实上，我们拥有一些这样的杰出企业，但它们相对较小，发展也比较缓慢。
Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed,we are delighted with our two giants – BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire’s firstfull year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of $4.2billion. In 2020, a tough year for many businesses, the pair earned $8.3billion.
然而，重资产的公司依然可能会是很好的投资选择。我们很高兴看到我们的两大巨头——BNSF 和BHE ：2011年，伯克希尔持有BNSF的第一年，这两家公司的总收益为42亿美元。到了2020年，对许多企业来说都是艰难的一年，而这两家公司去年的收入达到83亿美元。
BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades tocome. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns onthe incremental investment.
BNSF和BHE在未来几十年将需要大量的资本支出。但好消息是，这两家公司都将会带来适当的增量投资回报。
Let’s look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of allnon-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in theUnited States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft. By asignificant margin, BNSF’s loads top those of any other carrier.
我们先来看BNSF。该公司铁路运输的非本地货物的吨英里数占全美国（囊括了铁路、卡车、管道、驳船和飞机各个运输方式）的15%。BNSF的装载量远远超过其他任何一家运输公司。
The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or soof frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies,reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a fewdecades ago as mature and rationalized.
美国铁路的历史很有趣。在经历了150年左右的疯狂建设、欺诈、过度建设、破产、重组和合并之后，铁路行业终于在几十年前趋于成熟并合理化了。
BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeasternIllinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased ormerged. The company’s extensive lineage is laid out at 网页链接
1850年运营之初，BNSF仅在伊利诺伊州东北部有一条12英里长的铁路线。如今，它通过一系列收购和合并而形成了390条铁路线。这家公司广泛的分布可以参看网页链接．
Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroadhas invested $41 billion in fixed assets, an outlay $20 billion in excess ofits depreciation charges. Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-longtrains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they allthe while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massiveflooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spreadthroughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety andservice throughout its vast system.
2010年初伯克希尔收购了BNSF，由此BNSF（有了足够的资金）来铺开铁路线网络。自从被我们收购以来，BNSF的铁路业务已经在固定资产上投资了410亿美元，除开折旧费用，投资额达200亿美元。铁路运输是露天的，不管是极寒天气还是极热天气，不管是沙漠还是山区，不管有没有遇到大规模洪水，火车都必须可靠地运行。BNSF拥有23000英里的铁路，遍布28个州，在这么庞大的铁路系统中，我们必须不惜一切代价在其庞大的系统中最大化安全和服务。
Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire – $41.8billion in total. The railroad pays us, however, only what remains after itboth fulfills the needs of its business and maintains a cash balance of about$2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates,independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.
尽管如此，BNSF还是向伯克希尔支付了巨额股息，总计418亿美元。然而，铁路公司只会在满足其业务需要并保留大约20亿美元的现金后才会支付给我们剩下的钱。这种保守的政策允许BNSF以低利率借款，而不依赖伯克希尔对其债务的任何担保。
One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and hisnumber two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenseswhile navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline inthe volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF’s profit margin by2.9 percentage points. Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie tookover as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.
关于BNSF还有一点值得注意：去年，该公司首席执行官CarlIce和他的二把手Katie Farmer在控制开支方面表现出色，同时度过了业务的严重低迷期。尽管载货量下降了7%，但这他们实际上使BNSF的利润率提高了2.9个百分点。Carl如计划的那样，在年底退休了，Katie接任了首席执行官一职，铁路的管理状况依旧令人安心。
BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, ahighly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policyhas been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, ourcountry’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimatecosts will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings fordecades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment willbe appropriately rewarded.
与BNSF不同的是，BHE对其普通股不派息，这在电力行业是极不寻常的做法。这种“斯巴达”式的政策贯穿了我们的21年持有期。与铁路行业不同，美国国家的电力设施需要大规模的改造与翻新，最终的成本将是天文数字。这一成本支出将“透支”在未来几十年BHE的全部收入。但我们乐意接受挑战，相信所增加的投资将得到适当的回报。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its $18 billioncommitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid thatnow transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.
让我来告诉你BHE的一项努力——它承诺投入180亿美元，对已经过时的电网进行返工和扩建，这些电网现在正在向整个西部地区输送电力。BHE在2006年开始这个项目，预计在2030年完成——是的，2030年。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity.Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed waslocated close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new worldof wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHEassessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment inwestern transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmentalentities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after theytallied the project’s cost.
可再生能源的出现使我们所投资的项目成为社会的必需品。从历史上看，长期以来盛行的燃煤发电都位于人口密集的地区，然而，新世界风能和太阳能发电的最佳地点往往是在偏远地区。当BHE在2006年评估形势时，对西部输电线路进行巨额投资已不是什么秘密。然而，很少有公司或政府机构在计算完项目成本后能有足够的财力开展建设项目。
BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trustin America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollarsneeded to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lineshad to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its ownrules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds oflandowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers thatgenerated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute theelectricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the oldorder, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, hadto be brought on board.
值得一提的是，BHE的决定是基于它对美国政治、经济和司法体系的信任。要获得可观的收入，需要先投入数十亿美元。输电线路必须跨越各州和其他司法管辖区的边界，每个州都有自己的规则和选区。BHE还需要与数百名土地所有者打交道，并与生产可再生能源的供应商和向客户输送电力的远方公用事业公司签订复杂的合同。相互竞争的利益相关方、旧秩序的捍卫者，以及那些渴望建立“新世界”的梦想家们，都会加入进来。
Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, wasthe fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment andthe financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many yearsbefore our western transmission project is completed, we are today searchingfor other projects of similar size to take on.
惊喜和延迟都是肯定的。然而，同样可以肯定的是，BHE有管理才能、机构承诺和财力来履行其承诺。虽然我们的西部输电项目要多年才能完成，但我们目前也正在积极寻找其他类似规模的项目来承担。
Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleanerenergy.
无论遇到何种障碍，BHE都将成为提供更清洁能源的领导者。
The Annual Meeting
股东大会
Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annualmeeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.
去年2月22日，我写信告诉你我们计划召开一个盛大的股东大会。不到一个月，这个计划就被取消了。
Our home office group, led by Melissa Shapiro and Marc Hamburg,Berkshire’s CFO, quickly regrouped. Miraculously, their improvisations worked.Greg Abel, one of Berkshire’s Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a darkarena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and Iarrived about 45 minutes before “showtime.”
由Melissa Shapiro和伯克希尔首席财务官Marc Hamburg领导的总部小组迅速重组，他们的即兴方案奇迹般地奏效了。我也和伯克希尔副董事长之一Greg Abel一起走上台，面对着一个漆黑的舞台、1.8万个空座位和一台摄像机。我们在“表演时间”开始前45分钟就位，没有彩排。
Debbie Bosanek, my incredible assistant who joined Berkshire 47 yearsago at age 17, had put together about 25 slides displaying various facts andfigures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team ofcomputer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in properorder.
Debbie Bosanek是我的绝佳助手，她是47年前加入伯克希尔哈撒韦的，当时她只有17岁。她整理了约25张幻灯片，用以展示我在家里收集好的各种事实和数据，还有一个能力很强的幕后计算机和摄制团队，将幻灯片按顺序一一投射到屏幕上。
Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience.Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questionsfrom thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers hademailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage. See’s peanutbrittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.
雅虎直播了股东大会的整个过程，观众达到创纪录的规模。CNBC的Becky Quick，待在她位于新泽西州的家中，从数千个股东早前提交的问题、以及观众在我和Greg上台的四个小时里通过电子邮件发给她的问题当中，挑选出问题向我们转述。当时我们吃着See的花生糖和软糖，喝着可口可乐。
This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely onYahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. EasternDaylight Time (“EDT”). Simply navigate to 网页链接
今年5月1日，我们计划办一场更好的股东大会。我们仍然将依赖于雅虎和CNBC的完美表现。雅虎通道将于美国东部夏令时间下午1点上线，直播网址网页链接。
Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by5:30 p.m. Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayedby Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will beasked. Send your zingers to BerkshireQuestions @cnbc.com. Yahoo will wrap thingsup after 5:30.
正式会议将于美东时间下午5点开始，下午5点半结束。早些时候，在1:30-5:00之间，我们会回答由Becky转达的问题。一如既往，我们无法预知会被问到哪些问题。届时请将问题发送到BerkshireQuestions @cnbc.com，雅虎将在5:30后关闭通道。
And now – drum roll, please – a surprise. This year our meeting will beheld in Los Angeles . . . and Charlie will be on stage with me offeringanswers and observations throughout the 31⁄2-hour question period. I missed himlast year and, more important, you clearly missed him. Our otherinvaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answerquestions relating to their domains.
现在（此处应有掌声）惊喜来了！今年我们的会议将在洛杉矶举行……查理将会和我一起在台上参与整整三个半小时的提问环节，回答问题并发表观点。去年我很想念他，更重要的是，你们显然也很想念他。其他两位副董事长，Ajit Jain和Greg Abel，将与我们一起回答有关他们业务领域的问题。
Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! Wewill have fun, and we hope you will as well.
通过雅虎加入我们，直接把你的难题掷问查理吧！我们会玩得很开心，希望你们也一样。
Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. Ihope and expect that will be in 2022. The citizens of Omaha, our exhibitingsubsidiaries and all of us at the home office can’t wait to get you back for anhonest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.
当然，更好的还是我们有一天能面对面见到你们，我希望那会是2022年。奥马哈市的市民、我们参展的子公司以及我们总部的所有人都迫不及待地想让你们回来，参加一场伯克希尔式的、真正的年度股东大会。
February 27, 2021
2021年2月27日
Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
沃伦·巴菲特董事会主席
期待和阿浦会员们2022相聚奥马哈，一起参与巴菲特股东大会！