下午茶分享《巴菲特致股东的信(1973)中英对照版》

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下午茶时间到!让我们一起来跟着巴菲特老爷子学投资吧!今天我们分享的是《巴菲特致股东的信(1973)》。文章翻译来源于网络,向那些把知识带给我们的人致敬!向那些提供知识交流渠道的人致敬!

1973年我们的财务状况是比较令人满意的。营业利润11,930,592美元,初始股东权益的回报率达17.4%。虽然每股的营业利润从11.43美元上升至12.18美元,但和1972年的19.8%的利润率相比,权益利润有所下跌。这是因为股东投资的增加并不相当于利润的增加。在去年的年度报告中我们预料到了出现这种情况的可能性。很不幸,我们的预测成为了现实。

我们的纺织、银行,和大部分的保险业务表现都不错,但保险业某些特定的部门却有些不尽如人意。总体上来说,保险仍将继续是投入资金的最理想的行业之一。管理层的目标是,在运用合理的会计和债务政策的同时,长期的资金回报率能够平均高于国内行业整体的回报率。过去的几年我们一直保持了这样的成绩,也正在努力采取各种措施帮助我们继续维持这一成绩。预计1974年我们的资本金仍将面临回报率的进一步下降。

纺织业

1973年对纺织品的需求还是非常之大的。问题主要是纤维的短缺,需要复杂操作流程的纤维短缺就使机器生产能力的运用显得不那么充分。某些纤维的价格在这一年飙升。价格管制委员会的规定使很多制成品的价格没有达到我们某些竞争对手的定位。但是利润回报跟我们的资金投入相比还是合理的,虽然如果我们按照市场水平定价的话回报可能会更高一些。纺织业有很强的循环性,价格管制会帮助清除很多的障碍,但也会带来其他一些副作用。由于1973年原材料的价格飞涨(这一趋势1974年有望继续),我们决定采用存货估价的"后进先出法"。这种方法能够更好的反映当前的成本,并使得报告利润中的存货“利润”最小化。关于这一改变更多的信息,可以查看我们财务报表的附注部分。

保险业

1973年,Jack Ringwalt从国家赔付总裁的职务上退休。这家公司自1940年创立以来,Jack给它带来了绝佳的营业记录。接替他的是Phil Liesche, 很幸运的是,在保险和管理方面,他坚持着和Jack 一样的做事方式。我们主要的保险业务是国家赔付和国家火险经营的汽车和一般责任险。这两项业务1973年的承保状况都非常好。但业务额还是又一次下降了。竞争很激烈,我们放弃了像一些乐观的承保者那样降低利率的机会。目前有些微弱的迹象表明这些人中的一些已经意识到了他们利率(以及损失储备)的不足。或许这可以缓解市场上的压力。如果这是这样的话,那我们就可以期望交易额的上升了。

再保险业务也差不多面临了同样的局面——整体表现不错,但很难达到之前的交易额水平。由兢兢业业的George Young领导的这一部门,自其1969年成立起就一直是主要的盈利部门。本土化保险公司在Nebraska和Minnesota两州的发展很好,业务量有了显著增长,亏损率也在可接受范围内。年底Iowa的业务也已展开。最大的问题在Texas,由于原来的管理层无法有效地成功地经营,我们必须重新开始。这样做的代价是很高昂的,我们的工作会十分艰巨。但是,从总体来看,本土化业务有着巨大的潜力。

主营城市汽车保险的家庭与汽车保险公司这一年在芝加哥的经营状况很差。看起来在Cook County这一主要营业地区的利率是不够充分的,尽管当前的能源局势让事情更加复杂。问题在于降低了的事故发生频率(石油价格上升,人们驾车出行次数相对减少)是否会抵消医疗和修理赔付价格的上升。我们认为,相对于事故低发于我们的帮助,价格上升对我们的冲击更大,但貌似一些竞争对手不这么认为。家庭与汽车保险公司在这一年将业务拓展到了Florida 和California两周,但目前还不能确定这样做会不会带来收益。

家庭与汽车保险公司业绩较差的其中一个影响因素是会计系统,它不能有效及时的把信息反映到管理层。这一年保险公司的投资也过多地集中于普通股,这就使年底普通股股份出现了超过1200万美元的折旧,这个可以在财务报表上看到。但是,我们相信,从企业内在价值看我们持有的普通股投资组合是物有所值的。虽然在年末出现了大量的未实付损失,但从更长远来看,这一投资组合会给我们带来满意的收益。

银行业经营

位于Rockford的伊利诺伊州银行与信托公司又取得了创纪录的一年。平均存款接近1亿3千万美元,其中60%为定期存款。自年中起政策允许的上限提升了之后,消费者储蓄利率有了大幅上升。尽管这一政策主要针对计息存款,但我们的税后(包括一项新的伊利诺伊州的收入所得税)利润还是高出了普通存款的2.1%。我们现在仍然是Rockford最大的银行,仍旧保持了超常的流动性,仍然能够满足客户不断增长的贷款需求,并且仍旧维持了很高的盈利。这要直接归功于董事会主席Gene Abegg和总裁Bob Kline的领导才干,前者从1931年银行成立起就一直管理着它的业务。

并购多元化零售公司

董事们已经同意了将多元化零售公司并入伯克希尔公司,条件是将其100万股流通股转换成195,000股伯克希尔的股票。鉴于多元化零售公司及其子公司已持有109,551股伯克希尔的股份,因此这笔交易带来的伯克希尔流通股份净增长不会超过85,449股。要完成这笔交易,还必须要获得各种各样的许可证明,委托资料在晚些时候会递交董事会投票决定。多元化零售公司经营着一家平价女士衣物连锁店,同时还经营者再保险业务。但在管理层看来,这家公司最重要的资产是占其股份16%的蓝筹印花邮票。

蓝筹印花邮票

去年年底我们所持有的蓝筹印花邮票的股份已经占到了其总发行股份的19%。然后,我们又增购了一些股份使其达到22.5%:而想要真正收购多元化零售公司这一数字必须要达到38.5%。

我们对蓝筹印花邮票权益在1973年第一次显得如此重要,也就带来了一个会计上的问题:那就是哪一段时间的利润收入才应被记录到我们今年的财务报告中去呢。蓝筹印花邮票的会计年度截止于最接近2月28号的星期六,是伯克希尔会计年度结束之后两个月。或者说,他们的会计年度比我们的提早十个月结束。对于我们来说,一个可以接受的办法就是,鉴于我们之前拥有的蓝筹印花邮票较少的股份,在我们1973年的收入中囊括进蓝筹印花邮票632,000美元的权益收入(他们1973年的会计年截止于3月3号)。但是这种做法似乎与现实情况不符,并且意味着以后每年计算时都会有十个月的差池。因此,我们的选择是在蓝筹印花邮票公布的截止到11月份的未经审计的中期收入的基础上,将1,008,000美元的蓝筹印花邮票权益包括在我们1973年的收入中。由于我们采用了这种虽未经审计但却是当前的数据,而不是那种审计过却早已过时的数据,Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.会计公司无法对我们1973年盈利中来自蓝筹印花邮票的部分作出判断。

蓝筹印花邮票的年度报告,包括由普华永道审计的截止于1974年3月2号的财务报表,在五月初就会公布。Berkshire Hathaway Inc.任何有兴趣的股东,都可以到时写信给加利福尼亚州洛杉矶东南大街5801号蓝筹印花邮票公司秘书Mr. Robert H. Bird,邮编90040,获得一份报告。蓝筹印花邮票公司的交易券业务自去年来有了大幅下滑,但是其子公司喜事糖果公司以及Wesco 金融公司还有相当强大的盈利能力,后者是一家经营储蓄和贷款业务的企业。我们希望蓝筹印花邮票未来几年的会有不错的盈利收入,当然如果交易券业务不下滑的话利润收入肯定会更高。尊敬的主席先生管理着蓝筹印花邮票,Wesco 金融公司以及喜事糖果公司的董事会,三家企业的管理人员也都是一流的、经验丰富的。

太阳报业

在1969年的年度报告中,我们提到了对太阳报业的收购,这是一家在奥马哈市区发行的周报企业。以后的年度报告中,我们一直没有提到它的运营情况,也没有采取措施加强其盈利能力,因为这家公司规模较小,财务状况也就“不那么理想”。但在1973年这种“不理想”的状态并没有影响到出版物的质量。5月7号太阳报业凭借它1972年5月30号一篇关于当地Boys Town(孤儿乐园)的专题调查报道获得了普利策奖。这是历史上第一次一家周报在这一领域获此荣誉。这篇文章报道了自从1948年Flanagan神父去世后不断积累的财富和不断恶化的服务质量之间的矛盾。

除了普利策奖之外,该报纸还赢得了Sigma Delta Chi(全国性的专业记者协会)的Public Service Award,以及其它的七个全国性的荣誉。

我们要祝贺编辑Paul Williams,出版商Stan Lipsey,还有太阳报业的全体工作人员,他们的成就让我们明白出版的水平并不一定和报纸的规模划等号。

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:


Our financial results for 1973 were satisfactory, with operating earnings of $11,930,592, producing a return of 17.4% on beginning stockholders' equity. Although operating earnings improved from $11.43 to $12.18 per share, earnings on equity
decreased from the 19.8% of 1972. This decline occurred because the gain in earnings was not commensurate with the increase in shareholders' investment. We had forecast in last year's report that such a decline was likely. Unfortunately, our forecast proved to be correct.


Our textile, banking, and most insurance operations had good years, but certain segments of the insurance business turned in poor results. Overall, our insurance business continues to be a most attractive area in which to employ capital.


Management's objective is to achieve a return on capital over the long term which averages somewhat higher than that of American industry generally—while utilizing sound accounting and debt policies. We have achieved this goal in the last few years, and are trying to take those steps which will enable us to maintain this performance in the future. Prospects for 1974 indicate some further decline in rate of return on our enlarged capital base.


Textile Operations


Textile demand remained unusually strong throughout 1973. Our main problems revolved around shortages of fiber, which complicated operations and resulted in something less than full utilization of loom capacity. Prices of some fibers skyrocketed during the year. Cost of Living Council regulations prevented the pricing of many finished products at levels of some of our competitors. However, profits were reasonably commensurate with our capital investment, although below those that apparently might have been achieved had we been able to price at market levels. The textile business has been highly cyclical and price controls may haveserved to cut down some of the hills while still leaving us with the inevitable valleys. Because of the extraordinary price rises in raw materials during 1973, which show signs of continuing in 1974, we have elected to adopt the "lifo" method of inventory pricing. This method more nearly matches current costs against current revenues, and minimizes inventory "profits" included in reported earnings.Further information on this change is included in the footnotes to our financial statements.


Insurance Operations


During 1973, Jack Ringwalt retired as President of National Indemnity Company after an
absolutely brilliant record since founding the business in 1940. He was succeeded by Phil Liesche, who, fortunately for us, possesses the same underwriting and managerial philosophy that worked so well for Jack. Our traditional business, specialized auto and general liability lines conducted through National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, had an exceptionally fine underwriting year during 1973. We again experienced a decline in volume. Competition was intense, and we passed up the chance to match rate-cutting by more optimistic underwriters. There currently are faint indications that some of these competitors are learning of the inadequacy of their rates (and also of their loss reserves) which may result in easing of market pressures as the year develops. If so, we may again experience volume increases.

Our reinsurance operation had a somewhat similar year—good underwriting experience, but difficulty in maintaining previous volume levels. This operation, guided by the tireless and welldirected efforts of George Young, has been a major profit producer since its inception in 1969. Our "home state" insurance companies made excellent progress in Nebraska and Minnesota, with both good growth in volume and acceptable loss ratios. We began operations late in the year in Iowa. To date, our big problem has been Texas. In that state we virtually had to start over during 1973 as the initial management we selected proved incapable of underwriting successfully. The Texas experience has been expensive, and we still have our work cut out for us.

Overall, however, the home state operation appears to have a promising potential.
Our specialized urban auto operation, Home and Automobile Insurance Company, experienced very poor underwriting in Chicago during 1973. It would appear that rates are inadequate in our primary Cook County marketing area, although the current energy situation confuses the picture.


The question is whether possible lowered accident frequency because of reduced driving will more than offset continuing inflation in medical and repair costs, as well as jury awards. We believe that inflation will hurt us more than reduced driving will help us, but some of our competitors appear to believe otherwise. Home and Auto expanded into Florida and California during the year, but it is too early to know how these moves will prove out financially.


A contributing factor in our unsatisfactory earnings at Home and Auto during 1973 was an accounting system which was not bringing information to management on a sufficiently timely basis. On the investment side of our insurance operation, we made substantial additional commitments in common stocks during 1973. We had significant unrealized depreciation—over $12 million— in our common stock holdings at year-end, as indicated in our financial statements.


Nevertheless, we believe that our common stock portfolio at cost represents good value in terms of intrinsic business worth. In spite of the large unrealized loss at year-end, we would expect satisfactory results from the portfolio over the longer term.


Banking Operations


The Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford again had a record year in 1973. Average deposits were approximately $130 million, of which approximately 60% were time deposits. Interest rates were increased substantially in the important consumer savings area when regulatory maximums were raised at mid-year. Despite this mix heavily weighted toward interest bearing deposits, our operating earnings after taxes (including a new Illinois state income tax) were again over 2.1% of average deposits. We continue to be the largest bank in Rockford. We continue to maintain unusual liquidity. We continue to meet the increasing loan demands of our customers. And we continue to maintain our unusual profitability. This is a direct tribute to the abilities of Gene Abegg, Chairman, who has been running the Bank since it opened its doors in 1931, and Bob Kline, our President.


Merger With Diversified Retailing Company, Inc.
Your Directors have approved the merger of Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. into Berkshire Hathaway Inc. on terms involving issuance of 195,000 shares of Berkshire stock for the 1,000,000 shares of Diversified stock outstanding. Because Diversified and its subsidiaries own 109,551 shares of Berkshire, the net increase in the number of shares of Berkshire outstanding after giving effect to this transaction will not exceed 85,449. Various regulatory approvals must be obtained before this merger can be completed, and proxy material will be submitted to you later this year so that you may vote upon it. Diversified Retailing Company, Inc., though subsidiaries, operates a
chain of popular-priced women's apparel stores and also conducts a reinsurance business. In the opinion of management, its most important asset is 16% of the stock of Blue Chip Stamps.


Blue Chip Stamps
Our holdings of stock in Blue Chip Stamps at year-end amounted to approximately 19% of that company's outstanding shares. Since year-end, we have increased our holdings so that they now represent approximately 22.5%: implementation of the proposed merger with Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. would increase this figure to about 38.5%.
Our equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps became significant for the first time in 1973, and posed an accounting question as to just what period's earnings should be recognized by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. as applicable to the financial statements covered by this annual report. Blue Chip's fiscal year ends on the Saturday closest to February 28, or two months after the fiscal year-end of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Or, viewed alternatively, their year ends ten months prior to Berkshire Hathaway's. An acceptable accounting choice for us, and one which, if made, would not have required an auditor's disclaimer as to scope, was to recognize in our 1973 income an equity of $632,000 in Blue Chip's earnings for their year ended March 3, 1973 with regard to the fewer shares of Blue Chip we owned during this earlier period. But such an approach seemed at odds with reality, and would have meant a ten month lag each year in the future. Therefore, we chose to reflect as 1973 income our equity of $1,008,000 in Blue Chip's earnings based upon unaudited interim earnings through November as publicly reported by Blue Chip Stamps and with regard to our shareholdings during 1973.


Because we made this choice of unaudited but current figures, as opposed to the alternative of audited but far from current figures, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. were unable to express an opinion on our 1973 earnings attributable to Blue Chip Stamps. The annual report of Blue Chip Stamps, which will contain financial statements for the year ending March 2, 1974 audited by Price, Waterhouse and Company, will be available in early May. Any shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. who desires an annual report of Blue Chip Stamps may obtain it at that time by writing Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040. Blue Chip's trading stamp business has declined
drastically over the past year or so, but it has important sources of earning power in its See's Candy Shops subsidiary as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, a 54% owned subsidiary engaged in the savings and loan business. We expect Blue Chip Stamps to achieve satisfactory earnings in future years related to capital employed, although certainly at a much lower level than would have been achieved if the trading stamp business had been maintained at anything close to former levels.


Your Chairman is on the Board of Directors of Blue Chip Stamps, as well as Wesco Financial Corporation, and is Chairman of the Board of See's Candy Shops Incorporated. Operating management of all three entities is in the hands of firstclass, able, experienced executives.


Sun Newspapers, Inc.
In the 1969 annual report we commented on the purchase of Sun Newspapers Inc., a group of weekly papers published in the metropolitan Omaha area. Since that time we have not commented on their operations in the text of our annual reports, nor have we consolidated their financial results since the operation, because of the small investment involved, has been "financially insignificant." During 1973 it was made quite apparent that such insignificance did not extend to publishing quality. On May 7th Sun Newspapers was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for local investigative reporting (the first time in history that a weekly had won in this category) for its special section of March 30,1972 relating to Boys Town. We reported the extraordinary contrast
between decreasing services and mounting wealth that had taken place since Father Flanagan's death in 1948.


In addition to the Pulitzer Prize, the reporting job also won the Public Service Award of Sigma Delta Chi, the national society of professional journalists, as well as seven other national awards.


Our congratulations go to Paul Williams, Editor, and Stan Lipsey, Publisher, as well as the entire editorial staff of Sun Newspapers for their achievement, which vividly illustrated that size need not be equated with significance in publishing.

@今日话题 @雪球保险 

内容来源:量化小兵sss、搜狐财经频道

编辑:NANA

声明:本文意在传播价值,不涉及商业用途。版权归原作者所有

全部讨论

2021-11-10 19:14

1973

2021-05-19 21:55

看了这一年的致股东的信,我突然感觉到中国的会计准则与当年美国的会计准则存在非常大的差异,我不了解美国的会计准则,但是巴菲特的解释显示了当时的会计准则
1.存货计价方式:
美国容许后进先出法,而中国只能先进先出,从这个角度看,巴菲特是出于客观的角度才这么做的,但是,中国政府是出于计量方便以及防备企业造假而禁止后进先出法
因此,像巴菲特这样做很大程度上考验了企业的公知
2.股权折旧
巴菲特提到保险公司持有普通股,并进行了普通股股权的折旧,而中国的会计准则上找不到任何股权类资产的折旧政策,唯一相似的地方是股权的减值
但是,二者存在明显差异,折旧是每年都要发生的,而减值是只有特定情况下才会发生
另外,关于纺织业务,由于政府对价格进行调控,带来的影响是当年的一些规模不好的纺织企业会在原料价格上涨时面临更大影响,龙头企业能活得相对更好

2020-09-11 00:53

1973

2020-02-22 13:23

1973