问题27:投资收益与会计利润差异(2024伯克希尔年会完整版)

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点评:自从2010年收购BNSF铁路以来,超过GAAP 会计准则的折旧费用高达惊人的 220 亿美元,相当于每年超过 15 亿美元,这些都是真金白银的,这就意味着伯克希尔的股息要扣除BNSF 报告的220亿美元收益。而铁路收入几乎停滞,更要面对汽车、飞机的竞争,2023年BNSF铁路收入为238亿美元,会计上折旧是26.17亿美元,真实的折旧支出超过41亿美元,这相当于BNSF收入的17%,同时又要管理超过37000员工,从投资上看BNSF不可能获得高额的回报。

Becky Quick:是的,你确实预料到了其中一个问题。我们来谈谈另一个问题。这个问题来自德国慕尼黑的 Vincent James。在董事长的信中,沃伦指出,BNSF 的利润率相对于其他五家铁路公司都有所下降。然而,沃伦在信中评论说,BNSF 的货运量和资本支出都比其他五家主要铁路公司都要多,而且服务区域广阔,无与伦比。鉴于沃伦对 BNSF 明显优势的评论,收入和利润的下降,特别是相对于其他五家铁路公司的利润率下降的原因是什么?相对于其他铁路公司存在哪些问题,正在采取哪些措施来解决这些问题?请具体说明。好的。

沃伦·巴菲特:我会的。好吧,我们能说得有多具体取决于格雷格想说什么。但格雷格就是这样。这是格雷格的责任。在格雷格接手之前,购买和运营都是我的责任。但我想让格雷格来回答这个问题。

格雷格·阿贝尔:当然。是的,沃伦提到了这一点。那里反映的评论非常准确。如果你看看本季度的业绩或我们去年的业绩,它们都是令人失望的——作为股东,它们令人失望,相对于其他一级铁路公司而言也令人失望。正如问题中所强调的那样,还有其他五条一级铁路公司。因此,很容易了解您的表现与其他公司相比如何。还有很多其他变量,但有一些非常简单的东西需要考虑。

当我们回顾我们与伯灵顿的关系时,我会。我会稍微回顾一下,因为如果你回到 2021 年,伯灵顿团队、管理团队和集团,我们在运营方面取得了许多重大进展,无论是在运营铁路方面,还是在运营铁路方面,我们都在高效和有效方面取得了巨大进展。我记得自己在 2022 年发表过非常具体的评论,我评论说那一年是供应链问题频发的一年,西海岸港口发生了很多事情。

我们的火车在很多地方都堵车了,我们称那一年为重置年。我认为我们确实需要在运营方面进行重置。但当我们进入 23 年后,业务成本水平、成本结构并没有根据我们看到的潜在需求进行重置。我们预计会有更多需求,但我们并没有重置成本结构。现在,团队正在非常努力地重置成本结构,并将成本资源分配到需要的地方。当你经历这样的事情时,我们作为一个组织已经认识到,是的,铁路的需求将推动一定程度的成本,但现实情况是,如果你回溯很多年,铁路行业是平缓的。这个行业没有太多的增长。有机会变得更高效、更有效,我们的利润率也会上升。但现实是需求将保持平稳。但它确实在铁路的不同领域内有所变化。它可以是消费品,可以是工业品,也可以是农业品。但总体而言,它通常会相对平稳。所以我们需要正确制定成本结构,我们需要正确制定它,不仅是为了来年,也是为了长期。这意味着这将是一项持续的工作。我们不能停下来。我们不能说我们已经走得足够远了。因为我们的竞争对手,我们与其他铁路公司竞争,但我们也与卡车行业竞争。我们必须有一个成本结构,让我们既能在铁路行业内竞争,也能在整个运输行业内竞争。

因此,伯灵顿的团队正在非常努力地解决成本结构问题,就像我们过去所做的那样。我认为我们确实认识到一件事,当其他铁路公司实施精确调度铁路时,我们必须继续关注其他指标并挑战自己。如果我们没有达到他们的水平,那么是什么在推动着我们?所以我们会。当他们询问具体细节时,我会给你一些。我们必须看看我们的铁路站场,了解我们是如何管理的。我们必须看看我们的机车车队,包括规模和我们如何利用它们,并挑战自己。然后我们必须回到我们如何使用员工资源并将它们分配到整个业务中。所以有很多事情要做。我们的团队 100% 致力于推动正确的成本结构,这与业务的潜在需求相一致,然后我们不能止步于此,这就是答案。所以,有很多事情要做,但我们有一个绝对投入并致力于此的团队,我们将在今年取得良好进展。

沃伦·巴菲特:在伯克希尔,我们希望每个人都知道,每个企业都有很多事情要做,你知道吗?所以,我的意思是,确实如此。我们建立了一个非常了不起的公司,奥马哈建筑公司真的非常了不起。还有个问题,在他们做了所有事情之后,他们做了一些特别好的事情,你知道,在东河下挖一条隧道之类的,他说这是不可能的。

他会说他会的。他很高兴,但并不满意。这正是我们希望伯克希尔永远保持的态度。奥马哈是一个铁路小镇。如果林肯总统在 1862 年决定选择圣乔或普拉特史密斯或任何其他地方修建横贯大陆的铁路,奥马哈可能会在密苏里河畔修建一个 20,000 人的小镇。但是,由于林肯希望将其作为东部连接并修建横贯大陆的铁路,奥马哈就起飞了。所以它一直在它的基地上修建铁路。你知道。任何对金融感兴趣的人都必须考虑铁路。而且它们本身就有一定的魅力。

但有趣的是,我们的主要竞争对手联合铁路公司在 20 或 25 年前就落后了。在 Jim Young 上任之前,也就是 2000 年,大概是 2008 年左右,我开始购买三家铁路公司的股票,分别是联合太平洋铁路公司、BNSF 铁路公司和诺福克西部铁路公司。我不知道为什么我没有购买 C 和 O 铁路公司,但无论如何,Jim Young 在联合太平洋铁路公司做得非常出色。所以我们拥有这三家公司的股票。但我们在 2009 年做到了这一点。好吧,我们已经拥有了 22% 的股份,但总的来说,它有 3500 万美元,占我们资本的很大一部分。我们能够把它投入到我们喜欢的业务中。而且,从拥有 80% 以上股份的公司中赚钱,有一定的税收优势。在这种情况下,我们称之为 100% 拥有,而不是通过股票赚钱。因此,通过拥有所有铁路,我们可以从拥有其他铁路公司中赚取相同的利润,从而获得净收益,我们在经济衰退期间获得了 350 亿美元。

我认为那是最糟糕的一个季度,即 2009 年第三季度,也许是铁路行业长期以来最糟糕的一个季度。所以这很成功。实际上,这很成功,但那是因为我们在 2008 年和 2009 年投入了资本,如果我们把钱投入到任何东西上,我们都会赚很多钱。但从 100% 拥有和一堆 5% 或 10% 拥有的企业中赚钱更令人满意,而且从税收角度来看,这实际上在某些方面更好。正如我在年度报告中提到的那样,铁路对国家绝对必不可少。

这并不意味着它们处于一切事物的前沿。它们只是对国家至关重要。这就是为什么政府,我想他们曾经接管过这些铁路,并就我们的劳动协议等问题进行谈判。如果你关闭全国的铁路,那将会产生令人难以置信的影响,但是。现在就不可能修建铁路了。

我的意思是,看看加州在试图修建铁路时发生的情况。我的意思是,你知道,每个人都担心每英里对环境的影响,你知道,以及各种鸟类会发生什么。你能想象美国的铁路系统正在建设中吗?除非战争爆发,政府接管一切并下令修建,否则这将需要几十年的时间。你无法创造它。所以我们喜欢拥有这样的企业。从现在起 100 年后,它不会成为那段时期世界上增长最快的企业,但它将是必不可少的。它的收入与其重置价值相比微不足道。但就我们为它付出的代价而言,我们会做得很好。我们将以非常节税的方式,根据支付给伯克希尔的金额分配大量资金。所以,问题在于何时。问题是,相关问题是什么?其他铁路。如果我们收购了联合太平洋铁路,而吉姆·杨还活着为我们经营,那根本不是世界末日。那也很好。但我们有机会收购了 BNSF,这对他们有好处,对我们也有好处。我们认为这对国家来说是一笔非常重要的资产。我只是希望我们能在其他行业找到同样有意义的东西,我们可以在有利的时间投入一大笔钱。那么,让我们继续讨论第三站。对吗?是的。好的。

Becky Quick: Yes, you did anticipate one of the questions. Let’s go to another one. This question comes from Vincent James in Munich, Germany. In the chairman’s letter, Warren points out that the profit margins for BNSF have slipped relative to all five other railroads. However, Warren comments in the letter, BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the other five major railroads, and has a vast service territory second to none. Given the comments from Warren about the clear strengths of BNSF, what explains the decline in revenue and profit, and in particular, the profit margins relative to the other five railroads? What are the issues relative to the other railroads, and what is being done to address them? Please be specific. Okay.

Warren Buffett: And I will. Well, how specific we get depends on what Greg wants to say. But Greg is that. It’s Greg’s responsibility. It’s my responsibility for the purchase and for the operation up till Greg took over. But I think I’ll let Greg answer that.

Greg Abel: Sure. Yeah, the Warren touched on it. And the comments as reflected there are very accurate. If you look at this quarter’s results or our last year’s results, they were both. - they’re disappointing as shareholders and disappointing relative to the other class one railroads. And as highlighted in the question, there’s five other class one railroads. So it’s pretty easy to understand how you’re performing versus the others. And there’s a lot of other variables, but there’s some very simple things to look at.

When we look at where we’ve been on with, associated with Burlington, I would. I would just back up a little bit, because if you go back to 2021, the Burlington team and management team and the group, we’re making excellent progress on a lot of fronts when it comes to our operating in both being efficient and effective in how we’re operating the railroad. And I remember very specific comments from myself in 2022, where I commented that that was the year there was all the supply chain issues, a lot going on in the west coast ports.

Our trains were backed up in a variety of places, and we called that a reset year. And I think we did need a reset year on the operational side. But as we moved into 23, the business cost level, cost structure, we didn’t reset it to the underlying demand we were seeing. We anticipated more demand, and we did not reset our cost structure. And the team’s working very hard as we speak, to both reset the cost structure and allocate the cost resources where they need to be. And when you go through something like that, what we’ve recognized as an organization, yes, the demand of the rail will drive a certain amount of the cost, but the reality is that the rail industry, if you go back many, many years, it’s flat. There’s not a lot of growth in the industry. There’s opportunities become more efficient, effective, and our margins can go up. But the reality is the demand is going to be flat. But it does move within different sectors of the rail. It can be in the consumer products, it can be an industrial, it can be in Ag. But overall, it’s generally going to be relatively flat. So we need to get our cost structure right, and we need to get it right, both for the coming year, but for the long term. And that means it’s going to be a continuous exercise. We can’t stop. We can’t say we, we’ve gotten far enough. Because our competitors, and we compete with the other rails, but we also do compete with the truck industry. We have to have a cost structure, allows us to compete both within our rail industry and within the transportation sector as a whole.

So the team at Burlington is working very hard to address the cost structure, just like we have in the past. I think one thing we do recognize, when the other railroads have implemented precision scheduled railroading, there’s other metrics that we have to continue to pay attention to and challenge ourselves. If we’re not at their level, what are the things that are driving it? So we’re gonna. When they ask for specifics, I’ll give you a few.We have to look at our rail yards and understand how we’re managing that. We have to look at our locomotive fleet, both the size and how we’re utilizing that, and challenge ourselves. And we have to then go back to how we’re using our employee resources and allocating them across the business. So there’s a lot to be done there. Our team’s 100% committed to driving to the right cost structure that’s going consistent with the underlying demand in the business, and then we can’t stop there is the answer. So, a lot to be done, but we have a team that’s absolutely engaged and committed to it, and we’re going to make good progress in this current year.

Warren Buffett: At Berkshire, we want everybody to have the idea that there’s a lot to be done with every business, you know? So, I mean, it is. We built a remarkable, remarkable company and Omaha building company, really remarkable. And there’s this question, after everything they did, that was something that was done particularly well, you know, digging a tunnel under the East river or something, said it couldn’t be done.

He would say he would be. He was pleased, but not satisfied. And that is exactly the way we want the attitude to be at Berkshire forever. Omaha is a railroad town. If President Lincoln, in 1862, I think it was, had decided to pick St. Joe or Plattsmith or anyplace else to build the transcontinental railroad, Omaha would probably build a little town of 20,000 or something on the banks of the Missouri. But making, with Lincoln’s desire to make this the eastern connection and make a transcontinental railroad, Omaha just took off. So it’s been it’s been railroading at its base. The. You know. And anybody that was interested in financial matters had to think about railroads. Plus they had a certain glamor to them anyway.

But the interesting thing is that UP, which is our main competitor themselves, fell way behind 20 or 25 years ago. Before Jim Young came in, in 2000, whenever it was ‘08 or so, I started buying three railroad stocks in Union Pacific, BNSF and Norfolk Western, I believe. I don’t know why I wasn’t buying C and O, but in any event, Jim Young had done a marvelous job with Union Pacific. So we owned all three stocks. But what we did in 2009 is we were able. Well, we already owned 22% of it, but overall, it was $35 million a billion dollars, which was a significant part of our capital. We were able to put it to work in a business we liked. And there’s certain tax advantages that come in terms of making money in something that’s more than 80% owned. We call it 100% owned, in this case, versus making it through stocks. So it has a net benefit to us from making the same amount of money owning one of the other railroads, by owning all of the railroads, and we got 35 billion out during a recessionary period.

I think that was the worst quarter, the third quarter of 2009, maybe the rails had had for a long time. So it’s worked out. Actually, it’s worked out very well, but it’s because we were putting out capital in 2008 and nine, and if we put money in anything, we’d have made a lot of money. But it’s more satisfying, and it’s actually better in certain ways, tax wise, to make it from something that’s 100% owned and a bunch of 5% or 10% owned businesses. As I mentioned in the annual report, railroads are absolutely essential to the country.

That doesn’t mean they’re on the cutting edge of everything. They’re just essential to the country. And that’s why the government, I think they took them over one time, and they negotiate what our labor settlements will be and everything. And if you shut down the railroads of the country, it would be incredible, the effects, but. And they would be impossible to construct now.

I mean, look at what’s happening in California when they’re trying to build a line. I mean, you know,everybody’s worried about the environmental effect of every mile, and, you know, and what will happen to the various species of birds. Can you imagine the rail system of the United States being built? It would take decades, unless the war was on and the government took over things and just ordered them. You can’t create it. So we love owning a business like that. It’s going to be around 100 years from now, won’t be the best growth business in the world at all during that period, but it will be essential. And what it earns in its relation to its replacement value is a pittance. But we’ll do fine in terms of what we paid for it. And we’ll distribute substantial amounts in relation to what we paid to Berkshire in a very tax efficient way. So it’s when.The question is, what are the issues relative? The other railroads. It wouldn’t have been the end of the world at all if we bought the Union Pacific and Jim Young had stayed alive to run it for us. That would have been great, too. But we had the opportunity to buy BNSF, and it’s been good for them, and it’s been good for us. And we think it’s been a very important asset to the country. And I just hope we can find something in other industries that makes as much sense as that, where we can put a whole bunch of money to work at an advantageous time. So, let’s go on to station three. Is that correct or not? Yeah. Okay.