采用英文原文和个人翻译结合，说说巴菲特的华盛顿邮报案例。1985年的致股东信里，巴菲特这样回顾这笔投资：
We bought all of our WPC holdings in mid-1973 at a price of not more than one-fourth of the then per-share business value of the enterprise.
1973年中期，我们以不超过企业每股内在价值四分之一的价格，买入了华盛顿邮报的股票。
Calculating the price/value ratio required no unusual insights. Most security analysts, media brokers, and media executives would have estimated WPC' s intrinsic business value at $400 to $500 million just as we did.
估算邮报的内在价值并不需要什么独特眼光。大多数证券分析师、媒体经纪人和媒体高管都估计华盛顿邮报的内在业务价值在4亿至5亿美元之间，我们也一样。
And its $100 million stock market valuation was published daily for all to see.
不过，华盛顿邮报的市值却长时间在1亿美元上下晃悠，每天都有成交。
Our advantage, rather, was attitude: we had learned from Ben Graham that the key to successful investing was the purchase of shares in good businesses when market prices were at a large discount from underlying business values.
我们的优势是对市场波动的理解。我们从格雷厄姆那里学到了，投资的关键是在市场价格相对内在价值有很大的折扣时，购买优质企业的股票。
Most institutional investors in the early 1970s, on the other hand, regarded business value as of only minor relevance when they were deciding the prices at which they would buy or sell.
而在20世纪70年代初期，大部分机构投资人却认为企业价值与他们的股票买卖决策之间，没有什么关系。
This now seems hard to believe. However, these institutions were then under the spell of academics at prestigious business schools who were preaching a newly-fashioned theory: the stock market was totally efficient, and therefore calculations of business value - and even thought, itself - were of no importance in investment activities.
现在看来当然令人难以置信，然而当时他们被知名商学院所提出的有效市场理论所迷惑:股票市场是有效的，股价反应一切信息，计算企业价值是投资的无用功。
(We are enormously indebted to those academics: what could be more advantageous in an intellectual contest - whether it be bridge, chess, or stock selection than to have opponents who have been taught that thinking is a waste of energy?)
事后想想，我们实在欠这些学者太多了，他们用完整的理论告诉我们的竞争对手：思考是没有用的。这给我们带来的帮助实在是无以伦比。
我想不管是在桥牌、国际象棋还是投资活动中都是这样吧!
Through 1973 and 1974, WPC continued to do fine as a business, and intrinsic value grew.
1973年至1974年，《华盛顿邮报》的经营情况依旧很好，企业内在价值稳步增长。
Nevertheless, by yearend 1974 our WPC holding showed a loss of about 25%, with market value at $8 million against our cost of $10.6 million. What we had thought ridiculously cheap a year earlier had become a good bit cheaper as the market, in its infinite wisdom, marked WPC stock down to well below 20 cents on the dollar of intrinsic value.
然而，到1974年底，我们花费1062万美元买进来的股票，却跌成800万美元左右，跌幅高达25%。一年前我们已经觉得便宜到离谱的东西，后来变得更加离谱。
所谓的有效市场以其惊人的智慧，让邮报的股票在内在价值的两折以下交易着。
You know the happy outcome. Kay Graham, CEO of WPC, had the brains and courage to repurchase large quantities of stock for the company at those bargain prices, as well as the managerial skills necessary to dramatically increase business values.
美妙的结局可想而知。集智慧与勇气于一身的邮报CEO凯瑟琳.格雷厄姆，一边利用其优秀的管理才能提升企业价值，一边以便宜到令人发指的价格大量回购公司股份。
Meanwhile, investors began to recognize the exceptional economics of the business and the stock price moved closer to underlying value.
此时，市场投资人开始认识到公司的竞争优势，股价逐步回归其内在价值。
Thus, we experienced a triple dip: the company' s business value soared upward, per-share business value increased considerably faster because of stock repurchases and, with a narrowing of the discount, the stock price outpaced the gain in per-share business value.
这个过程里，我们经历了三重享受：
一是企业价值提升；
二是公司回购注销导致的每股对应价值的增加；
三是随着折价幅度逐渐缩小，股价涨幅超越了内在价值的增速。
We hold all of the WPC shares we bought in 1973, except for those sold back to the company in 1985' s proportionate redemption. Proceeds from the redemption plus yearend market value of our holdings total $221 million.
我们1973年持有的华盛顿邮报所有股份，其中有1985年末被公司强制赎回的8%，总共市值达到2.05亿美元。
If we had invested our $10.6 million in any of a half-dozen media companies that were investment favorites in mid-1973, the value of our holdings at yearend would have been in the area of $40 - $60 million.
如果在1973年中，我们随便投资几个市场上受欢迎的媒体公司，那么我们的持有的股票价值将在0.4—0.6亿美元。
Our gain would have far exceeded the gain in the general market, an outcome reflecting the exceptional economics of the media business.
我们的收益将远超于市场平均水平，这一结果反映了媒体公司的商业模式的优越性。
The extra $160 million or so we gained through ownership of WPC came, in very large part, from the superior nature of the managerial decisions made by Kay as compared to those made by managers of most media companies.
至于通过持有华盛顿邮报所赚取的1.6亿美元左右的额外收益，很大程度上，归功于CEO凯瑟琳 的优秀管理决策的优越性。
Her stunning business success has in large part gone unreported but among Berkshire shareholders it should not go unappreciated.
她惊人的商业成就没有被大规模报道过，不为世人所知。但是，伯克希尔的股东们不应该忘却她所做的一切。
总结：
做出华盛顿邮报低估的判断并不难，但问题在于：从来没有任何理论或任何规则告诉我们，低估之后不会跌。
巴菲特以内在价值25%买进的股票，继续又跌25%，这丝毫也不奇怪！
在股价下跌的过程里，无数聪明人争先恐后地将手中持股卖出，并计划等『跌势止住』时买回来。
后来的故事，通常是一个个真傻的投资者大赚了，聪明人则继续练习着以各种优雅的姿势躲开下跌、躲开财富！