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美国作为世界上唯一的军事超级大国。它在军事上的支出比下一个支出最高的十个国家加起来还要多。
而中国现在是世界上唯一的制造业超级大国。其产量超过了九家第二大制造商的总和。本专题使用最近发布的经合组织TiVA数据库的2023年更新，描绘了中国实现超级大国地位之旅及其主导地位对全球供应链的不对称影响的八幅图表。
在与合著者丽贝卡·弗里曼和安杰洛斯·西奥多拉科普洛斯就全球供应链中断问题进行的工作中，注意到了一个我认为没有应有的那么广为人知的事实——中国是现在世界上唯一的制造业超级大国。
使用经合组织最近发布的2023年更新的其宝贵的TiVA数据库，在八张图表中展示了这是如何发生的。我将跳过中国改革的历史叙事，因为真正的中国专家已经很好地报道了这一点（例如Wang 2023，世界银行2013，Ranganathan 2023）
世界制造业大公司（来源：经合组织TiVA数据库，2023年更新）
图1中的图表显示了2020年（数据库中最近一年）全球制造业份额的两种视图。左侧面板以总产量显示世界份额；在右侧面板中，以附加值显示相同。区别在于中间投入：中国总产等于中国制造商的总销售额；中国增加值是他们的总产值减去购买的中间体。
图1 切片全球制造业馅饼，2020年，总生产基数
六个国家至少生产世界总量的3%。中国紧随其后的是美国、日本、德国、印度和韩国。注意世界是如何变化的。其中只有三个是历史悠久的工业经济体；其他三个是新兴工业化经济体。七国集团中的四个没有成功。该图表分别确定了份额至少为2%的国家，在左边，这包括意大利、法国和台湾（两个G7，英国和加拿大，没有削减）。在右侧面板（增值基）中，英国的份额略高于2%。
在总产量方面，中国的份额是美国的三倍，日本的六倍，德国的九倍。台湾、墨西哥、俄罗斯和巴西现在的总产量高于英国。加拿大排名进一步下降，排名第15位。
前所未有的工业化
中国的工业化是前所未有的。上一次“制造业之丘之王”被击下王位是在美国在第一次世界大战前超越英国时。美国花了一个世纪的大部分时间才登上顶峰；中美转换花了大约15或20年时间。简而言之，中国的工业化无法与之相比。
图2描绘了中国如何废黜了山丘之王。 如果我们把这想象成25圈的赛马——每年一圈——所有的兴奋都在前13圈。 由于数据只能追溯到1995年，中国开始比赛时略早于加拿大、英国、法国和意大利。 中国于1998年超过德国，2005年超过日本，2008年超过美国。 从那时起，中国的全球份额增加了一倍多，而美国的份额又下降了三个百分点。 如果这是一场现场赛马，几年前，无聊会把大多数观众赶走。
右侧面板显示，中国的份额现在超过了第二大制造商的总和。 这一了不起的事实有助于我们了解当前美中贸易紧张局势，以及中国在新冠疫情期间减少生产时发生的供应链中断程度。 印度（未单独显示）是第二快的股票增长者：自1995年以来，其全球制造业生产份额增长了两个百分点。
中国的崛起已经放缓，似乎停滞不前，约占世界产量的三分之一。然而，为了确认这一点，我们需要更多最新的数据，因为过去两年的样本被与新冠肺炎大流行有关的事件所迷惑。世界银行的世界发展指标（WDI）有截至2022年的增值数据，这些数据符合扁平化的叙述，但WDI没有报告总产量数据。
图2 1995-2020年中国制造业的陨益增长（世界总产值份额）
中国在出口方面的主导地位不那么明显（图3），尽管增长同样惊人。1995年，中国仅占世界制造业出口的3%，到2020年，其份额已上升到20%。G7份额的相应下降没有其生产份额那么显著。这可以解释为中国国内消费的迅速增长，自2004年以来，中国国内消费吸收了其制造业生产的份额不断增加。图表中没有显示的是，中国的出口与生产比率在2004年达到18%的峰值，2020年为13%——几乎回到了1995年11%的水平。附件中的相同图表显示了增值基础。
图3 1995-2020年中国在世界制造业出口中的份额
不对称供应链暴露：G7和中国
丽贝卡·弗里曼、安吉洛斯·西奥多拉科普洛斯和我去年制定的全球供应链指标（Baldwin等人，2022年）为识别供应链中的外国生产风险提供了一种便捷的方式（我们的八项新指标可以在TiVA 2023更新中找到）。 在描述全球供应链暴露时，我们的两个新指标特别直观。
国外生产暴露：iImport端（FPEM）。 这显示了一个国家从另一个国家采购的所有工业投入（包括国内采购的投入）的份额，比例为0到100。 FPEM在透视的基础上考虑了风险敞口，即它通过供应商对供应商的面纱来发现购买国对销售国生产的依赖。
图4，左侧面板，显示，美国对中国制造业生产的依赖远远超过反之。 2 虽然乍一看令人震惊，但这不应该出乎意料。 一个拥有世界产出11%的国家从一个产量为35%的国家购买的东西比反之亦然，这是很自然的，但这些数字令人震惊。 在2002年之前，中国更多地接触到美国的投入，但从那时起，美国接触量更大。 2020年，美国对中国制造业的接触量大约是中国的三倍，反之亦然。
国外生产暴露：出口侧（FPEX）。 该指标反映了一个国家出口给特定合作伙伴的中间产品总产量的份额。 这是衡量销售方面的风险敞口。
图4，右侧面板，显示了预期结果：中国现在和一直比相反更依赖对美国的销售。在2000年代中期，中国对美国的依赖是反向依赖的十倍，但不对称性已经大大缩小。
将这些碎片放在一起，这表明中国和其他主要制造国之间供应链依赖的显著、历史性、塑造世界的不对称性。 政客们可能希望将他们的经济与中国脱钩。 这些数据表明，解耦将是困难、缓慢、昂贵和破坏性的——特别是对G7制造商来说。 有关明确的估计，请参阅Felbermayr等人（2023年）和Goes and Bekkers（2022年）的模拟研究。
在结束关于中国崛起故事的这一章之前，重要的是要说，大规模的不对称性与中国无关。 这与中国在制造业的超级大国有关。 要看到这一点，想象一下，如果图表显示欧佩克和七国集团在石油行业的事实，会是什么样子。 我们将看到，七国集团对欧佩克供应的依赖程度要大于欧佩克，反之亦然。 故事的下一章将聚光灯转向了中国层面。
图4 中国和美国双边FPEM和FPEX，1995-2020
中国按部门划分的贸易差额、供应链参与度和开放性
从中国海岸上升到超级大国的地位是什么样子的？一个国家竞争力状况的一个方便的（如果简单的话）标准是按部门划分的贸易平衡。
图5的左侧面板显示了主要部门（制造业、农业、采矿业和服务业）的出口余额减去进口。 整体贸易平衡只是部门平衡的总和，用细黑线表示。 模式既清晰又不足为奇。 中国是制成品的净出口国，也是其他一切的净进口国——农产品、采矿产品和燃料以及服务。 正负净余额都在快速增长。 显然，中国是一个大进口国和大出口国。 总体而言，它在2000年代末出现了盈余，然后在2018年和2019年下降并转为负数（黑线）。
右边的面板提供了关于中国制造业演变的重要提示。 它描绘了该国中间投入和最终产品净出口的演变。 直到2000年代中期，中国是一个典型的离岸目的地：中间投入的净进口商和体现进口投入的最终货物的净出口国。 从2002年左右开始，中国成为中间商品和最终商品的大型净出口国。
图5 1995年至2020年按行业分列的出口净额，中国
如图5所示的总贸易平衡数字可以隐藏组成部分的演变。图6侧重于制成品，分别显示了出口和进口。在左侧面板中，我们可以观察到，直到2000年代中期，中国与全球供应链的接触都非常活跃。工业零部件的进出口快速增长，进出口同步增长。之后，出口增长更快，这种差异产生了制成品的正平衡。
右侧面板显示了最终制成品的不同图片。在这里，出口总是超过进口，不平衡在2010年代迅速加剧。
图6 中间体贸易与最终货物贸易，中国，1995年至2020年
下一对图表显示了中国出口部门构成的变化。
图7显示了1995年（数据库的第一年）和2020年的部门份额。这表明，中国已经从相对依赖纺织品和服装等简单的制造业转向更复杂的行业，如电子、基本和金属制品以及化学品和药品。一个有说服力的事实是，纺织品在1995年占了最大的份额，但电子产品在2020年做到了。
图7 中国的出口篮子，1995年与2020年
全球化比率
最后，考虑中国的全球化比率（图8）。 右侧面板显示了该国制造业的总全球化比（GGR）。 这是在国外销售的制成品生产的份额，其中产量以所有中国制造商的总销售额来衡量。 它与制造业GDP不同，因为它包括所有销售，而不仅仅是最终的良好销售。
谈到事实，我们看到，在制造业超级大国地位上升期间，中国的GGR在数据的头十年里飙升——几乎翻了一番。 事实上，大多数行动发生在1999年至2004年之间。 那个时期是全球化的非凡壮举，这可能就是为什么这么多人认为中国是一个极其依赖出口的经济体。 但这个故事并没有在2004年结束。
自2004年以来，中国的GGR一直在稳步下降。 不要错过这样一个事实，即在2020年，它比1995年开始时不远。 简而言之，中国制造业不再像许多人认为的那样依赖出口。 诚然，快速增长期的第一部分涉及出口增长速度快于生产（因此GGR上升）。 但随后，产量增长速度快于出口，这意味着与出口销售相比，国内销售正变得越来越重要——尽管在整个高增长时期，国内和国外销售都在蓬勃发展。 这消除了中国的成功可以完全归因于出口的神话。 从2004年左右开始，中国日益成为自己最好的客户。
要点很简单：从GGR衡量，中国的开放度已经迅速下降。 到2020年，它对出口销售的依赖程度仅略高于1995年。
图8 中国制造业增长和总全球化率（GGR）
图9 1995-2020年中国在世界制造业GDP中的份额
结束语
中国现在是世界上唯一的制造业巨头。 正如其最近在电动汽车领域的成功所表明的那样，其广泛而深厚的工业基础可以帮助其在几乎所有领域获得竞争优势。 例外是最先进的部门，G7国家仍然占主导地位。
沉迷于与中国脱钩的松散言论的政客们需要清醒地看待事实。 正如我们所表明的（Baldwin等人，2023年），世界上所有主要制造商至少2%的工业投入来自中国。 至少可以说，脱钩会很困难。
China is the world’s sole manufacturing superpower: A line sketch of the rise
网页链接{Richard Baldwin}
The US is the world’s sole military superpower. It spends more on its military than the ten next highest spending countries combined. China is now the world’s sole manufacturing superpower. Its production exceeds that of the nine next largest manufacturers combined. This column uses the recently released 2023 update of the OECD TiVA database to paint an eight-chart portrait of China’s journey to superpower status and the asymmetric impact that its dominance has had on global supply chains.
AUTHORS
网页链接{Richard Baldwin}
Professor of International Economics IMD Business School, Lausanne; VoxEU Founder & Editor-in-Chief VoxEU.org
I'm not an expert on China, but during ongoing work on global supply chain disruptions with my co-authors Rebecca Freeman and Angelos Theodorakopoulos, I've noticed a stark fact that I don’t think is as widely known as it should be. China is the now world’s sole manufacturing superpower.
This column uses the OECD’s recently released 网页链接{2023 update} of their invaluable TiVA database to show, in eight charts, how this came to be. I will skip the historical Chinese reform narrative as that has been well covered by real China experts (e.g. Wang 2023, World Bank 2013, Ranganathan 2023).
The world’s big players in manufacturing
The charts in Figure 1 show two views of global manufacturing shares in 2020 (the latest year in the database). The left panel displays world shares in terms of gross production; in the right panel, the same is shown in terms of value added. The distinction is in intermediate inputs: Chinese gross production equals the total sales of Chinese manufacturers; Chinese value added is their gross production minus the purchased intermediates.
Figure 1 Slicing the global manufacturing pie, 2020, gross production basis
Source: OECD TiVA database, 2023 update.
Six nations manufacture at least 3% of the world total. China is followed by the US, Japan, Germany, India, and South Korea. Note how the world has changed. Only three of these are long-established industrial economies; the other three are newly industrialised economies. Four of the G7 don’t make the cut. The chart separately identifies nations with shares of at least 2%, and on the left, this includes Italy, France, and Taiwan (two of the G7, the UK and Canada, don’t make the cut). In the right panel (value-added basis), the UK makes an appearance with a share just above 2%.
When it comes to gross production, China’s share is three times the US’ share, six times Japan’s, and nine times Germany’s. Taiwan, Mexico, Russia, and Brazil now have higher gross output than the UK. Canada is further down the ranking, in 15th place.
Unprecedented industrialisation
China’s industrialisation is unprecedented. The last time the ‘king of the manufacturing hill’ got knocked off the throne was when the US surpassed the UK just before WW1. It took the US the better part of a century to rise to the top; the China-US switch took about 15 or 20 years. China’s industrialisation, in short, defies comparison.
Figure 2 portrays how China dethroned the king of the hill. If we think of this as a 25-lap horserace – one lap per year – all the excitement was in the first 13 laps. Since data only go back to 1995, China started the race a bit ahead of Canada, Britain, France, and Italy. China passed Germany in 1998, Japan in 2005, and the US in 2008. Since then, China has more than doubled its world share while the US’s share has fallen by another three percentage points. If this were a live horserace, boredom would have driven most of the audience away years ago.
The right panel shows that China’s share now exceeds that of the next largest manufacturers combined. This remarkable fact helps us to understand current US-China trade tensions, and the magnitude of supply chain disruptions that occurred when China dialled down its production during Covid. India (not shown separately) was the second fastest share gainer: its global share of manufacturing production rose by two percentage points since 1995.
China’s rise has slowed and looks to have stagnated at about a third of world output. To confirm this, however, we will need more recent data since the last two years in the sample are muddled by events related to the Covid-19 pandemic. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) has data to 2022 for value added, and these conform to the flattening narrative, but the WDI do not report gross production data.
Figure 2 China’s meteoric rise in manufacturing, 1995-2020 (world gross production shares) 1
Source: OECD TiVA database, 2023 update.
China’s dominance is less stark in exports (Figure 3), though the rise is equally amazing. In 1995 China had just 3% of world manufacturing exports, By 2020, its share had risen to 20%. The corresponding fall in the G7 share was less dramatic than for its share of production. This is explained by the meteoric rise in Chinese domestic consumption, which has absorbed an increasing share of its manufacturing production since 2004. Not shown in the charts is that China’s export to production ratio, having peaked at 18% in 2004, is 13% in 2020 – almost back to its 1995 level of 11%. The same diagrams in the Annex are shown for a value-added basis.
Figure 3 China’s share of world manufacturing exports, 1995-2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
Asymmetric supply chain exposure: G7 and China
The global supply chain indicators that Rebecca Freeman, Angelos Theodorakopoulos and I developed last year (Baldwin et al. 2022) provide a convenient way of identifying foreign production exposure in supply chains (eight of our new indicators can be found in the TiVA 2023 update). Two of our new indicators are particularly intuitive when it comes to portraying global supply chain exposure.
Foreign Production Exposure: iMport side (FPEM). This shows the share of all industrial inputs (including domestically sourced inputs) that one nation sources from another on a scale of 0 to 100. FPEM accounts for exposure on a look-through basis in the sense that it looks through the suppliers-to-suppliers veil to discover the purchasing nation’s reliance on production in the selling nation.
Figure 4, left panel, shows that the US relies far more on Chinese manufacturing production than vice versa. 2 While shocking at first sight, this should not be unexpected. It is natural that a country with 11% of the world output buys more from a country that produces 35% than vice versa, but the numbers are astounding. China was more exposed to US inputs before 2002, but the US has had greater exposure since then. In 2020, the US was about three times more exposed to Chinese manufacturing production than vice versa.
Foreign Production Exposure: eXport side (FPEX). This indicator reflects the share of a nation’s gross output of intermediate goods that is exported to a particular partner. It is a measure of exposure on the sales side.
Figure 4, right panel, shows the expected result: China is and always has been more reliant on sales to the US than the other way round. In the mid-2000s, China’s dependence on the US was ten times the reverse dependence, but the asymmetry has narrowed substantially.
Putting together the pieces, this shows a remarkable, historical, world-shaping asymmetry in supply chain reliance between China and other major manufacturing countries. Politicians may wish to decouple their economies from China. These data suggest that decoupling would be difficult, slow, expensive, and disruptive – especially to G7 manufacturers. For explicit estimates, see the simulation studies by Felbermayr et al. (2023) and Goes and Bekkers (2022).
Before closing this chapter on the China rise story, it is important to say that the massive asymmetry has nothing really to do with China. It has to do with China’s superpower standing in manufacturing. To see this, imagine what the charts would look like if they displayed the facts for OPEC and the G7 in the petroleum sector. We would see that the G7 is massively more dependent on OPEC supplies than vice versa. The next chapter of the story redirects the spotlight to the China level.
Figure 4 China and US bilateral FPEM and FPEX, 1995-2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
China’s balance of trade by sector, supply chain engagement, and openness
What does the rise to superpower status look like from the shores of China? One convenient, if simplistic, yardstick of a country’s competitive profile is its balance of trade by sector.
The left panel of Figure 5 shows the balance of exports less imports in the major sectors: manufactures, agriculture, mining, and services. The overall trade balance, which is just the sum of the sectoral balances, is shown with the thin black line. The pattern is as clear as it is unsurprising. China is a net exporter of manufactured goods and a net importer of everything else – agriculture goods, mining goods and fuels, and services. Both the positive and negative net balances have been growing quickly. Plainly, China is a big importer and a big exporter. Overall, it ran surpluses in the late 2000s, which then decreased and turned negative in 2018 and 2019 (black line).
The right panel provides important hints about the evolution of China’s manufacturing. It charts the evolution of the country’s net exports of intermediate inputs and final goods. Until the mid-2000s, China was a typical offshore destination: a net importer of intermediate inputs and a net exporter of final goods that embodied the imported inputs. From about 2002, China became a large net exporter of intermediate goods as well as final goods.
Figure 5 Net exports by sector, China, 1995 to 2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
Aggregate balance-of-trade numbers like those in Figure 5 can hide the evolution of the constituent parts. Figure 6, which focuses on manufactured goods, shows exports and imports separately. In the left panel, we can observe that China’s engagement with global supply chains was extremely vigorous until the mid-2000s. Imports and exports of industrial parts and components were growing rapidly, and imports and exports were growing in tandem. Afterward that, exports grew faster, and this difference has produced the positive balance in manufactured goods..
The right panel shows a different picture for final manufactured goods. Here, exports have always exceeded imports, with the imbalance growing rapidly in the 2010s.
Figure 6 Trade in intermediates versus final goods, China, 1995 to 2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
The next pair of charts shows the change in the sectoral composition of China’s exports.
Figure 7 presents the sectoral shares for 1995 (first year in the database) and 2020. It shows that China has moved from being relatively reliant on simple manufacturing sectors like textiles and clothing to more sophisticated sectors like electronics, basic and fabricated metal products, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals. A telling factoid is that textiles accounted for the biggest share in 1995, but electronics did so in 2020.
Figure 7 China’s export basket, 1995 versus 2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
Globalisation ratio
Finally, consider China’s globalisation ratios (Figure 8). The right panel exhibits the country’s gross globalisation ratio (GGR) in manufacturing. This is the share of manufactured production that is sold abroad, where production is measured as the total sales of all China-based manufacturers. It differs from manufacturing GDP since it includes all sales, not just final good sales.
Turning to the facts, we see that during its rise to manufacturing superpower status, China’s GGR rocketed up – almost doubling – in the first decade of the data. Indeed, most of the action came between 1999 and 2004. That period was an extraordinary feat of globalisation, and it is probably why so many think of China as an economy that is incredibly dependent on exports. But the story doesn’t end in 2004.
Since 2004, China’s GGR has been falling steadily. And don’t miss the fact that it is, in 2020, not far above where it started in 1995. Chinese manufacturing, in short, is no longer as dependent on exports as many might believe. True, the first part of the rapid growth period involved exports growing faster than production (so the GGR rises). But then production grows faster than exports, implying that domestic sales were becoming relatively more important, compared to export sales – even though domestic and foreign sales were both booming throughout the high-growth episode. This dispels the myth that China’s success can be entirely attributed to exports. From around 2004, China increasingly became its own best customer.
The takeaway is simple: China’s openness, as measured by the GGR, has fallen rapidly. By 2020 it was only slightly more dependent on export sales than it was 1995.
Figure 8 China’s manufacturing growth and Gross Globalisation Ratio (GGR)
Source: OECD TiVA database.
Concluding remarks
China is now the world’s sole manufacturing giant. As its recent success in electric vehicles demonstrates, its wide and deep industrial base can help it gain a competitive edge in virtually all sectors. The exceptions are the most advanced sectors, where the G7 countries still dominate.
Politicians who indulge in loose talk about decoupling from China need a clear-eyed look at the facts. As we have shown (Baldwin et al. 2023), all the major manufacturers in the world source at least 2% of all their industrial inputs from China. Decoupling would be difficult, to say the least.
References
Baldwin, R, R Freeman and A Theodorakopoulos (2022), “网页链接{Horses for Courses: Measuring Foreign Supply Chain Exposure}”, NBER Working Paper w31820.
Baldwin, R, R Freeman and A Theodorakopoulos (2023), “网页链接{Hidden Exposure: Measuring Us Supply Chain Reliance}”, NBER Working Paper w31820 (forthcoming in Brookings Paper on Economic Activity).
Felbermayr, G, H Mahlkow and A Sandkamp (2023), “Cutting through the value chain: the long-run effects of decoupling the East from the West”, Empirica 50: 75–108.
Góes, C and E Bekkers (2022), “The impact of geopolitical conflicts on trade, growth, and innovation”, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2022-09.
Ranganathan, T C A (2023), “网页链接{What really made China the manufacturing superpower?”}, Deccan Herald.
Upadhyaya, Y (2023), “网页链接{How did China become a manufacturing superpower?}”, Medium.
Wang, T (2023), Making Sense of the Chinese Economy, Routledge.
World Bank and People’s Republic of China Development Research Center of the State Council (2013), “China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society”, The World Bank Group, No. 12925.
Annex
Figure A1 China’s share of world manufacturing GDP, 1995-2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
Figure A2 Asymmetric supply chain reliance (FPEM): G7, India, and Korea, 1995-2020
Source: OECD TiVA database.
Footnotes
Figure A1 in the Annex shows the shares from a value-added perspective. The G7 decline in manufacturing value added has been less brutal than it was in gross production, and the US’s value-added share has risen slightly since 2010. Recall that gross output is the total sales of manufactured goods while value added is this minus the value of intermediate inputs. This is why China’s dominance is less marked in value-added terms since it has specialized in sectors, like electronics, that are especially intensive in the use of intermediate inputs (so their gross production exceeds their value added by a margin that is unusual by world standards). Likewise, China's world manufacturing GDP share is less dominant than its production share, but it is still dominant. In 2020, for instance, its share was almost twice that of the US and four times larger than Japan’s.
Figure A2 shows this FPEM insight applies to other G7 nations, as well as India and South Korea.