（这是卡拉曼为《证券分析》所写的序言，是非常棒的一篇对价值投资的总结文章。以前发过一次，但是仅为选译，不够全面，这次补全。）
前言：格雷厄姆和多德的不朽智慧
在本杰明·格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham）和大卫·多德（David Dodd）出版《证券分析》（Security Analysis）七十五年后，作为一个不断扩大的、现代价值投资者小圈子内的成员，仍然对他们不胜感激。格雷厄姆和大卫所处时代的金融业犹如一片蛮荒之地，两位勤奋而富有洞察力的思想家，试图为之建造一座灯塔。他们在灯塔上燃起火炬，从此照亮了价值投资者的道路。如今，在不可预测、动荡不安、时而极为危险的金融市场中，《证券分析》依然是投资者宝贵的生存指南。《证券分析》内容详尽、充满时代智慧，经常被誉为“价值投资的圣经”。尽管书中的许多实例已然显得有些老旧，但其教益常读常新。虽然文字读起来有些枯燥乏味，但读者几乎可以在每一页上都能找到极具价值的观点。自1934年以来，金融市场发生了难以想象的改变，但格雷厄姆和多德的投资方法依然极具使用价值。
Seventy-five years after Benjamin Graham and David Dodd wrote Security Analysis, a growing coterie of modern-day value investors remain deeply indebted to them. Graham and David were two assiduous and unusually insightful thinkers seeking to give order to the mostly uncharted financial wilderness of their era. They kindled a flame that has illuminated the way for value investors ever since. Today, Security Analysis remains an invaluable roadmap for investors as they navigate through unpredictable, often volatile, and sometimes treacherous financial markets. Frequently referred to as the “bible of value investing,” Security Analysis is extremely thorough and detailed, teeming with wisdom for the ages. Although many of the examples are obviously dated, their lessons are timeless. And while the prose may sometimes seem dry, readers can yet discover valuable ideas on nearly every page. The financial markets have morphed since 1934 in almost unimaginable ways, but Graham and Dodd’s approach to investing remains remarkably applicable today.
价值投资是以低于价值的价格购买证券或资产——即大家所熟知的以50美分的价格购买1美元资产——的行为，在这一点上,我们所处的时代与格雷厄姆和多德所处的时代并没有区别。以折扣价格买入证券为投资提供了“安全边际”——即为犯错误、研究精度不够、坏运气以及经济和金融市场的波动提供缓冲空间。虽然有人可能错误地认为价值投资犹如一种寻找便宜货的工具，实际上，价值投资是建立在重视深入分析、长远目标、风险控制和避免从众基础之上的、综合性的投资哲学。
Value investing, today as in the era of Graham and Dodd, is the practice of purchasing securities or assets for less than they are worth—the proverbial dollar for 50 cents. Investing in bargain-priced securities provides a “margin of safety”—room for error, imprecision, bad luck, or the vicissitudes of the economy and stock market. While some might mistakenly consider value investing a mechanical tool for identifying bargains, it is actually a comprehensive investment philosophy that emphasizes the need to perform in-depth fundamental analysis, pursue long-term investment results, limit risk, and resist crowd psychology.
绝大多数人是因为想赚快钱而进入股票市场的。这种趋于投机的价值取向是建立在股价会脱离其价值不断上涨的幻觉基础之上的。投机者通常视股票为可进行快速交易的纸片，而愚蠢地忽略其背后的生意现实和估值标准。投机的方法——很少注意甚至无视下跌的风险——在牛市中特别流行。在容易让人亢奋的牛市期间，特别是当大多数放弃这些标准的人也能快速暴富时，很少有人能做到严格遵守交易纪律——保持严格的价值评估和风险规避标准。毕竟，牛市太容易让人出现收益归因错误，误把牛市带来的账面收益当成自己天才般决策所致。（有点类似我们所说的：错把运气当能力。）
Far too many people approach the stock market with a focus on making money quickly. Such an orientation involves speculation rather than investment and is based on the hope that share prices will rise irrespective of valuation. Speculators generally regard stocks as pieces of paper to be quickly traded back and forth, foolishly decoupling them from business reality and valuation criteria. Speculative approaches—which pay little or no attention to downside risk—are especially popular in rising markets. In heady times, few are sufficiently disciplined to maintain strict standards of valuation and risk aversion, especially when most of those abandoning such standards are quickly getting rich. After all, it is easy to confuse genius with a bull market.
最近几年，有些人试图拓展投资活动的范畴，欲将购买一些近期（或者很快将会）涨价资产（如艺术品、稀有邮票、葡萄酒等）的行为纳入到投资的范畴。显而易见，这些物品没有明确的基础价值、无法产生（当期的或预期的）现金流、价值实现完全依赖购买者的喜好等特点，这些买卖行为实际上属于投机而非投资。
In recent years, some people have attempted to expand the definition of an investment to include any asset that has recently—or might soon—appreciate in price: art, rare stamps, or a wine collection. Because these items have no ascertainable fundamental value, generate no present or future cash flow, and depend for their value entirely on buyer whim, they clearly constitute speculations rather than investments.
相对于一心寻求快速获利的投机者，价值投资者往往通过尽量避免损失来规避风险。在一名风险厌恶型投资者眼里，一定量的收益永远无法等同同等数量的损失。我们积累了少量的资本以后，资本增值带来的锦上添花般的喜悦将被资本减值带来的痛苦侵蚀掉。设想有人提议通过抛硬币的方式来决定你的资产是翻番或是归零时，你会如何选择？考虑到风险规避，几乎所有的人都会拒绝这种赌博。厌恶风险是人类的天性。然而当投机市场的塞壬们向他们召唤时，很多人却在不知不觉间将风险厌恶抛到脑后。
（备注：塞壬是希腊神话中住在小岛上的三美女，声音甜美、面貌姣好、善歌舞——诱惑力。她们经常用自己甜蜜的声音引诱过往船员上岸，然后将他们残害——抵御不了诱惑的严重后果。由于知道自己无法抵抗这种诱惑，所以很多聪明的船员在经过小岛时将耳朵堵上——聪明人的做法。）
In contrast to the speculator's preoccupation with rapid gain, value investors demonstrate their risk aversion by striving to avoid loss. A risk-averse investor is one for whom the perceived benefit of any gain is outweighed by the perceived cost of an equivalent loss. Once any of us has accumulated a modicum of capital, the incremental benefit of gaining more is typically eclipsed by the pain of having less. Imagine how you would respond to the proposition of a coin flip that would either double your net worth or extinguish it. Being risk averse, nearly all people would respectfully decline such a gamble. Such risk aversion is deeply ingrained in human nature. Yet many unwittingly set aside their risk aversion when the sirens of market speculation call.
价值投资者将拥有证券视为拥有生意的部分权益或对生意拥有了债权，而不是将其视为投机工具。对价值投资来说，对证券的这种看法非常重要。当一小部分生意以低廉的价格出售时，可将这种行为看作是将整个生意以低廉的价格进行出售，这种看法对评估生意非常有帮助。这种分析方法有助于价值投资者专注长期投资效果，而非短期业绩。
Value investors regard securities not as speculative instruments but as fractional ownership in, or debt claims on, the underlying businesses. This orientation is key to value investing. When a small slice of a business is offered at a bargain price, it is helpful to evaluate it as if the whole business were offered for sale there. This analytical anchor helps value investors remain focused on the pursuit of long-term results rather than the profitability of their daily trading ledger.
格雷厄姆和多德哲学的基础是：市场是机会的真正创造者。有时市场对证券的定价是正确的，有时则不然。事实上，从短期来看，市场有效性非常差，价格和内在价值之间的差异可以变得非常大。意外事件、不确定性增强和流动性变动都可以加剧市场的短期波动，让价格向任一方向（低或高）波动得非常极端。用格雷厄姆和多德的话来说，“（证券的）价格往往是一个重要因素，因此股票……在一个价格水平上可能有投资价值，但在另一个价格水平上则没有投资价值。”（第106页）正如格雷厄姆所言，那些将市场视为称重机——能精确且有效地反映价值——的人，是情绪化群体的一部分；那些将市场视为投票机——一场由情绪驱动的人气竞赛——的人，将能很好地利用市场情绪的极端演进。
At the root of Graham and Dodd’s philosophy is the principle that the financial markets are the ultimate creators of opportunity. Sometimes the markets price securities correctly, other times not. Indeed, in the short run, the market can be quite inefficient, with great deviations between price and underlying value. Unexpected developments, increased uncertainty, and capital flows can boost short-term market volatility, with prices overshooting in either direction. In the words of Graham and Dodd, “The price [of a security] is frequently an essential element, so that a stock . . . may have investment merit at one price level but not at another.” (p. 106) As Graham has instructed, those who view the market as a weighing machine—a precise and efficient assessor of value—are part of the emotionally driven herd. Those who regard the market as a voting machine—a sentiment-driven popularity contest—will be well positioned to take proper advantage of the extremes of market sentiment.
虽然看起来任何人都可以成为价值投资者，然而价值投资者所具有的特质——耐心、自律和风险厌恶——更像是与生俱来。当你第一次接触价值投资理念时，要么你马上可以产生共鸣，要么永远无法引起你的共鸣；要么你能保持忍耐和遵守纪律，要么你永远不能。就像巴菲特在他那篇著名的文章——《格雷厄姆-多德村的超级投资者》——中所讲的那样：“说起来奇怪，对于‘用40美分买一美元’这一概念，你要么一点就通，要么永远无法接受。如果在一开始时你无法接受，那你就会像对它产生免疫一样，无论在以后的日子里怎样向你灌输这一理念，乃至拿出各种交易记录给你看，你还是无法接受它。”如果《证券分析》能够引起你的共鸣——如果你能够抗拒投机操作的诱惑并且不愿参与投机活动——你可能具有价值投资的禀赋。如果不具备这种禀赋，这本书至少能帮你了解自己在投资圈中所处的位置，以及了解价值投资者们在想什么。
While it might seem that anyone can be a value investor, the essential characteristics of this type of investor—patience, discipline, and risk aversion—may well be genetically determined. When you first learn of the value approach, it either resonates with you or it doesn’t. Either you are able to remain disciplined and patient, or you aren’t. As Warren Buffett said in his famous article, “The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville,” “It is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately with people or it doesn’t take at all. It's like an inoculation. If it doesn’t grab a person right away, I find you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn’t make any difference.” If Security Analysis resonates with you—if you can resist speculating and sometimes sit on your hands—perhaps you have a predisposition toward value investing. If not, at least the book will help you understand where you fit into the investing landscape and give you an appreciation for what the value-investing community may be thinking.
也许现在也一样重要
Just as Relevant Now Perhaps
1934年首次出版，1940年修订再版的《证券分析》一书，所取得的最大成功也许是它提供了永恒的教益。一代又一代的价值投资者听从了格雷厄姆和多德的教导，并成功将这些教导应用于完全不同的市场、国家和资产类别。这将使作者们感到高兴，他们希望自己所阐述的原则能够“经得起永远神秘的、未来的考验”。
Perhaps the most exceptional achievement of Security Analysis, first published in 1934 and revised in the acclaimed 1940 edition, is that its lessons are timeless. Generations of value investors have adopted the teachings of Graham and Dodd and successfully implemented them across highly varied market environments, countries, and asset classes. This would delight the authors, who hoped to set forth principles that would “stand the test of the ever enigmatic future.” (p. xliv)
1992年，著名价值投资公司Tweedy，Browne Company LLC发表了一份综合了44项研究成果而成的长文，题名为《成功投资之道》。他们发现成功投资的方法非常简单：便宜股票（以市净率、市盈率或股息率作为衡量指标）可以轻松跑赢高价股票；以及，一段时期内表现不佳的股票（三年和五年内）随后可以跑赢最近一段时间表现良好的股票。换句话说，价值投资是有效的！据我所知：没有一个长期投资者会后悔坚持价值哲学；基本没有信奉价值投资基本原则的投资者会放弃价值投资转而采用另一种投资方式。
In 1992, Tweedy, Browne Company LLC, a well-known value investment firm, published a compilation of 44 research studies entitled, “What Has Worked in Investing.” The study found that what has worked is fairly simple: cheap stocks (measured by price-to-book values, price-to-earnings ratios, or dividend yields) reliably outperform expensive ones, and stocks that have underperformed (over three- and five-year periods) subsequently beat those that have lately performed well. In other words, value investing works! I know of no long-time practitioner who regrets adhering to a value philosophy; few investors who embrace the fundamental principles ever abandon this investment approach for another.
今天，当你读到格雷厄姆和多德在20世纪30年代的经历时，你会发现他们似乎在详细描述一个奇怪、陌生和过时的时代，经济萧条、极端风险厌恶，以及老旧过时的生意。但是仔细阅读这部著作远比表面上看起来更有价值。毕竟，任何一个新的日期都可能伴随着新奇且陌生的环境。投资者一般认为明天的市场会与今天的市场类似，在大多数时候，也确实是这样，但每隔一段时间，传统认知会被证伪，循环论证会被中断，价格回到平均水平，投机行为再次暴露无遗。当今天与昨天不一样时，大多数投资者就会陷入困境。按格雷厄姆和多德的话说，“我们一直努力教育初学者应避免过分强调那些肤浅和暂时的东西”，这种过分强调肤浅和暂时的东西的行为“既是金融界的错觉，也是金融界的宿命。”（第xliv页）往往越是在金融动荡时期，价值投资哲学越显得特别重要。
Today, when you read Graham and Dodd’s description of how they navigated through the financial markets of the 1930s, it seems as if they were detailing a strange, foreign, and antiquated era of economic depression, extreme risk aversion, and obscure and obsolete businesses. But such an exploration is considerably more valuable than it superficially appears. After all, each new day has the potential to bring with it a strange and foreign environment. Investors tend to assume that tomorrow’s markets will look very much like today’s, and, most of the time, they will. But every once in a while, conventional wisdom is turned on its head, circular reasoning is unraveled, prices revert to the mean, and speculative behavior is exposed as such. At those times, when today fails to resemble yesterday, most investors will be paralyzed. In the words of Graham and Dodd, “We have striven throughout to guard the student against overemphasis upon the superficial and the temporary,” which is “at once the delusion and the nemesis of the world of finance.” (p. xliv) It is during periods of tumult that a value-investing philosophy is particularly beneficial.
当前的价值投资
Value Investing Today
大萧条时期，股票市场和国民经济处于非常危险的境地。股价和经济活动的衰退往往在突然间发生,有时会演变为非常严重的、长期性的衰退。在这种情况下，持乐观态度的人往往备受打击。从某种意义上讲，此时不亏就是盈。投资者可以通过以大大低于其内在价值的价格购买股票而获得安全边际，并且他们也需要安全边际，因为事情有可能——也经常会——出错。
Amidst the Great Depression, the stock market and the national economy were exceedingly risky. Downward movements in share prices and business activity came suddenly and could be severe and protracted. Optimists were regularly rebuffed by circumstances. Winning, in a sense, was accomplished by not losing. Investors could achieve a margin of safety by buying shares in businesses at a large discount to their underlying value, and they needed a margin of safety because of all the things that could—and often did—go wrong.
即使在市场表现最差的时期，格雷厄姆和多德对他们的投资信条依然充满信心，其中包括他们认为经济和金融市场会时不时出现困难时期，你必须忍受这些煎熬。在那些看似毫无希望的、灰暗的日子里，他们相信经济和股票市场最终会走出低谷：“当我们正在写这本书时，我们不得不与当下盛行的、美国永远无法走出大萧条的观点作斗争。”
Even in the worst of markets, Graham and Dodd remained faithful to their principles, including their view that the economy and markets sometimes go through painful cycles, which must simply be endured. They expressed confidence, in those dark days, that the economy and stock market would eventually rebound: “While we were writing, we had to combat a widespread conviction that financial debacle was to be the permanent order.” (p. xliv)
当然，正如投资者必须面对经营业绩变坏和便宜的股票变得更便宜的下降周期一样，他们也要忍受上升周期中市场上极其缺乏便宜股票并因而导致资金大量闲置的痛苦。近年来，与历史平均水平相比,金融市场表现非常强劲，吸引了大量的、需由经理人管理的增量资金。如今，其中相当一部分资金——全球可能有数万亿美元——在运用价值投资理念进行投资，其中包括很多基于价值理念的资产管理公司和共同基金、目前大约9000家对冲基金中的一部分，以及一些规模大且非常成功的大学捐赠基金和家族基金。
Of course, just as investors must deal with down cycles when business results deteriorate and cheap stocks become cheaper, they must also endure up cycles when bargains are scarce and investment capital is plentiful. In recent years, the financial markets have performed exceedingly well by historic standards, attracting substantial fresh capital in need of managers. Today, a meaningful portion of that capital—likely totaling in the trillions of dollars globally—invests with a value approach. This includes numerous value-based asset management firms and mutual funds, a number of today's roughly 9,000 hedge funds, and some of the largest and most successful university endowments and family investment offices.
需要注意的是：并非所有的价值投资者都具有相似的投资偏好和特点。前面提到的“格雷厄姆-多德村的超级投资者”中，巴菲特提到很多成功的价值投资者，他们的投资组合中很少出现相同的股票。有些价值投资者持有不出名的“粉单股票”,而其他的却关注大市值股票。一些人的投资不限行业，而有些人仅专注于市场的某一类股票,如房地产类或能源类。一些价值投资者通过翻动电脑屏幕来寻找统计学意义上的便宜股票，其他一些人则通过评估股票的“私人市场价值”（对于一个公司来讲，业内人士愿意出的购买价）来选择股票。一些人买入股票后，积极活动，试图通过抗争以改善公司经营；一些则通过买入一些存在催化事件（如剥离，资产出售、重大股份回购计划或更换管理层）的低估公司，以期部分或全部实现价值回归。当然，与其它任何行业一样，总有一部分价值投资者比其他人更有天赋。
It is important to note that not all value investors are alike. In the aforementioned “Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville,” Buffett describes numerous successful value investors who have little portfolio overlap. Some value investors hold obscure, “pink-sheet shares” while others focus on the large-cap universe. Some have gone global, while others focus on a single market sector such as real estate or energy. Some run computer screens to identify statistically inexpensive companies, while others assess “private market value”—the value an industry buyer would pay for the entire company. Some are activists who aggressively fight for corporate change, while others seek out undervalued securities with a catalyst already in place—such as a spin-off, asset sale, major share repurchase plan, or new management team—for the partial or full realization of the underlying value. And, of course, as in any profession, some value investors are simply more talented than others.
总体上讲，价值投资者群体已经比几十年前的那个小群体大了很多。由此带来的竞争能够有效纠正市场失效和定价错误。与当前许多具有资金和技术优势的投资者相比，价值投资者的前景如何？因为以下几点原因，情况比你想象的要好。首先，即使价值投资群体不断扩大，很少具备或根本不具备价值投资取向的市场参与者仍占大多数。多数人，包括重视成长和趋势的投资者以及指数追随者，很少或根本就不关注价值的评价标准，而是全神贯注、甚至是一心一意地关注公司的盈利增长、股价趋势、或者该股票是否属于某指数的样本股票等。
In the aggregate, the value-investing community is no longer the very small group of adherents that it was several decades ago. Competition can have a powerful corrective effect on market inefficiencies and mispricings. With today's many amply capitalized and skilled investors, what are the prospects for a value practitioner? Better than you might expect, for several reasons. First, even with a growing value community, there are far more market participants with little or no value orientation. Most managers, including growth and momentum investors and market indexers, pay little or no attention to value criteria. Instead, they concentrate almost single-mindedly on the growth rate of a company's earnings, the momentum of its share price, or simply its inclusion in a market index.
其次，目前几乎所有的资金经理,包括一些不幸的、具有价值投资取向的资金经理，因为（现实的或想象中的）业绩压力而不得不采取短期投资策略，有时候短到按季度、月或更短的时间进行操作。因为实现价值回归需要时间，价值投资策略对这些缺少耐心的投资者几乎没有任何意义。
Second, nearly all money managers today, including some hapless value managers, are forced by the (real or imagined) performance pressures of the investment business to have an absurdly short investment horizon, sometimes as brief as a calendar quarter, month, or less. A value strategy is of little use to the impatient investor since it usually takes time to pay off.
最后，人的本性难移。资本市场的狂热症经常大范围爆发：80年代晚期的日本股市、1999和2000年的互联网和科技股、2006和2007年的次级债券以及近期的替代投资产品。要想抗拒它们的诱惑确实很难。在市场无情地宣布他们“错了”的信息面前，再坚定的投资者也会产生动摇。市场的压力是如此巨大，乃至许多基金经理因害怕失业而不愿游离于“羊群”之外太远。有些人因为自身的束缚（或者因来自客户的压力）使他们不敢采取价值投资策略去购买那些低价抛售的、或小盘的、或不支付股利的、或正在赔钱的股票，以及低于投资评级门槛的各类债券。许多资金管理者还使用职业技巧粉饰投资组合，比如在季报前卖掉亏损股（即使它们被低估）同时增持盈利股（即使它们已被高估）。当然，对于真正喜欢长期投资的价值投资者来说，这并不是一件坏事，因为很多潜在的竞争者被迫偏离价值导向而不再对价值投资者形成有效竞争。
Finally, human nature never changes. Capital market manias regularly occur on a grand scale: Japanese stocks in the late 1980s, Internet and technology stocks in 1999 and 2000, subprime mortgage lending in 2006 and 2007, and alternative investments currently. It is always difficult to take a contrarian approach. Even highly capable investors can wither under the relentless message from the market that they are wrong. The pressures to succumb are enormous; many investment managers fear they’ll lose business if they stand too far apart from the crowd. Some also fail to pursue value because they’ve handcuffed themselves (or been saddled by clients) with constraints preventing them from buying stocks selling at low dollar prices, small-cap stocks, stocks of companies that don’t pay dividends or are losing money, or debt instruments with below investment-grade ratings. Many also engage in career management techniques like “window dressing” their portfolios at the end of calendar quarters or selling off losers (even if they are undervalued) while buying more of the winners (even if overvalued). Of course, for those value investors who are truly long term oriented, it is a wonderful thing that many potential competitors are thrown off course by constraints that render them unable or unwilling to effectively compete.
当今，我们正处于一个投资渠道更广、更多元化的时代，这是在竞争加剧条件下，价值投资者依然繁荣的另一个原因。格雷厄姆时代仅有不多的美国公司发行股票或债券。如今，仅美国就有成千上万的上市股票在交易，其它国家还有数以万计股票以及大量的公司债券和资产抵押债券可供选择。以前的非流动资产比如银行信贷，如今也能进行交易。投资者还可以选择各类衍生产品，如，为满足任何需求或想法而设计的合同等。
Another reason that greater competition may not hinder today's value investors is the broader and more diverse investment landscape in which they operate. Graham faced a limited lineup of publicly traded U.S. equity and debt securities. Today, there are many thousands of publicly traded stocks in the United States alone, and many tens of thousands worldwide, plus thousands of corporate bonds and asset-backed debt securities. Previously illiquid assets, such as bank loans, now trade regularly. Investors may also choose from an almost limitless number of derivative instruments, including customized contracts designed to meet any need or hunch (idea).
尽管如此，在经历了罕见的、历时25年的市场繁荣后，股市已经远没有以往那么廉价了。高估值以及更加激烈的市场竞争增加了人们对价值投资者未来收益率的担忧；而且，某些以价值投资为导向的公司，其规模已经非常庞大，机构层级的增多，会导致决策速度降低；另外，小的投资机会也不再对公司业绩造成太大影响。
Nevertheless, 25 years of historically strong stock market performance have left the market far from bargain-priced. High valuations and intensified competition raise the specter of lower returns for value investors generally. Also, some value investment firms have become extremely large, and size can be the enemy of investment performance because decision making is slowed by bureaucracy and smaller opportunities cease to move the needle.
此外，因为越来越多的买方分析师和卖方分析师在他们的工作中引入先进的信息技术,所以很少有股票会因遗漏而导致被严重低估。今日的价值投资者仅仅依靠Value Line上的信息或通过翻看股票基本信息表很难再寻找到廉价股票。尽管偶尔也会出现明显的低估股票，那主要是因为偶然疏漏或有意回避。有鉴于此，价值投资者必须仔细考虑将他们研究的重点放在哪里。在2000年初，投资者对很多韩国公司的资金配置不满意,以至于很少有人认为这些韩国公司具备投资价值。结果，许多韩国公司的股价与国际上流行的估值方式得出的价值相比,存在很大的折扣：股价仅为现金流的两到三倍或不到其内在价值的一半；在某些个例中，股价甚至低于资产负债表中的净现金。后来，这些便宜的股票，如Posco公司和SK电信公司的股票，引起了价值投资者的注意。据报道，巴菲特就从一些韩国股票上获利颇丰。
In addition, because growing numbers of competent buy-side and sell-side analysts are plying their trade with the assistance of sophisticated information technology, far fewer securities seem likely to fall through the cracks to become extremely undervalued. Today's value investors are unlikely to find opportunity armed only with a Value Line guide or by thumbing through stock tables. While bargains still occasionally hide in plain sight, securities today are most likely to become mispriced when they are either accidentally overlooked or deliberately avoided. Consequently, value investors have had to become thoughtful about where to focus their analysis. In the early 2000s, for example, investors became so disillusioned with the capital allocation procedures of many South Korean companies that few considered them candidates for worthwhile investment. As a result, the shares of numerous South Korean companies traded at great discounts from prevailing international valuations: at two or three times the cash flow, less than half the underlying business value, and, in several cases, less than the cash (net of debt) held on their balance sheets. Bargain issues, such as Posco and SK Telecom, ultimately attracted many value seekers; Warren Buffett reportedly profited handsomely from a number of South Korean holdings.
目前,价值投资者也在那些因为长期诉讼、丑闻、报表作假以及财务困难而被华尔街抛弃的公司中寻找机会。这类公司的股票有时会很廉价，对那些面对坏消息能够保持定力的投资者而言,这些公司都会成为好的投资目标。比如，Enron公司的债券，在2001年爆出导致公司破产的会计丑闻后，几乎成了世界上最不受欢迎的债券，1美元面值的债券跌到10美分,而最终追讨回来的款项是这个价格的6倍。与之相似，因为总是受到赔偿诉讼及由此带来的财务风险的困扰，近几年,做烟草生意的公司，或生意与石棉有关联的公司，每隔一段时间，其股票就会遭到抛售。更常见的例子是那些业绩低于投资者预期、或公司管理层突然变动、或存在财务问题以及被降低评级的公司，与一贯表现抢眼的公司相比，这些公司可能会带来更好的投资机会。
Today's value investors also find opportunity in the stocks and bonds of companies stigmatized on Wall Street because of involvement in protracted litigation, scandal, accounting fraud, or financial distress. The securities of such companies sometimes trade down to bargain levels, where they become good investments for those who are able to remain stalwart in the face of bad news. For example, the debt of Enron, perhaps the world's most stigmatized company after an accounting scandal forced it into bankruptcy in 2001, traded as low as 10 cents on the dollar of claim; ultimate recoveries are expected to be six times that amount. Similarly, companies with tobacco or asbestos exposure have in recent years periodically come under severe selling pressure due to the uncertainties surrounding litigation and the resultant risk of corporate financial distress. More generally, companies that disappoint or surprise investors with lower-than-expected results, sudden management changes, accounting problems, or ratings downgrades are more likely than consistently strong performers to be sources of opportunity.
当市场上缺乏廉价股票时，价值投资者必须耐心等待。放宽投资标准犹如立于滑向灾难的光面斜坡。即便我们不知道在何时，于何地，但机会一定会出现。当缺乏极具吸引力的投资机会时，明智的做法是在投资组合中保持相应比例的现金等价物（如短期美国国债）以备将来使用。最近，巴菲特表示他持有的现金超过了他拥有的、好投资的市值。就像所有价值投资者经常要做的那样，巴菲特也在耐心等待机会的出现。
When bargains are scarce, value investors must be patient; compromising standards is a slippery slope to disaster. New opportunities will emerge, even if we don’t know when or where. In the absence of compelling opportunity, holding at least a portion of one's portfolio in cash equivalents (for example, U.S. Treasury bills) awaiting future deployment will sometimes be the most sensible option. Recently, Warren Buffett stated that he has more cash to invest than he has good investments. As all value investors must do from time to time, Buffett is waiting patiently.
一直以来，价值投资者都属于自下而上型的分析师，善于依据基本面进行个股分析。他们并不需要分析整个市场是否廉价，而只用对20或25个（股票个数足以分散风险）、彼此不相干的个股进行分析。即使在市场被高估时，价值投资者也一定要保持对证券的分析和对企业的评估，以便积累知识和经验，为今后的投资打基础。价值投资者不应预测市场或猜测短期涨跌，而应该在不受市场现状及其趋势和经济现状及其趋势影响下，以自下而上分析法为基础，筛选出被市场低估的股票并买进。只有当他们无法找到便宜货时，才会重新选择持有现金。
Still, value investors are bottom-up analysts, good at assessing securities one at a time based on the fundamentals. They don’t need the entire market to be bargain priced, just 20 or 25 unrelated securities—a number sufficient for diversification of risk. Even in an expensive market, value investors must keep analyzing securities and assessing businesses, gaining knowledge and experience that will be useful in the future. Value investors, therefore, should not try to time the market or guess whether it will rise or fall in the near term. Rather, they should rely on a bottom-up approach, sifting the financial markets for bargains and then buying them, regardless of the level or recent direction of the market or economy. Only when they cannot find bargains should they default to holding cash.