BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
我和我的长期合作伙伴查理·芒格的工作是管理大量个人的储蓄。我们感谢他们持久的信任，这种关系通常跨越他们大部分成年生活。当我写这封信时，我心中最先想到的是那些专注储蓄的人。
A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.
Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.
The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.
Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours?
普遍的观点是，人们在年轻时选择储蓄，以期退休后能维持其生活水平。据此理论，死后留下的任何资产通常都会留给他们的家人或者可能会留给朋友和慈善事业。
我们的经验与此不同。我们认为伯克希尔的个人持有人主要是“一次储蓄，永远储蓄”的类型。尽管这些人生活得很好，但他们最终会将大部分资金用于慈善组织。这些组织进而通过支出来改善许多与最初的受益人无关的人的生活。有时，结果非常惊人。
金钱的支配揭示了人类的本质。查理和我高兴地看到伯克希尔创造的巨额资金流向公共需求，以及我们的股东极少选择炫耀性资产和王朝建设。
有谁不喜欢为像我们的股东工作呢？
What We Do
Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership.
First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.
In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we
passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.
Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of
businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”
我们的业务
我和查理在伯克希尔的资金配置中，将您的储蓄分配到两种相关的所有权形式中。首先，我们投资于我们控制的企业，通常购买每个企业的100％。伯克希尔指导这些子公司的资本配置，并选择每天做出运营决策的CEO。当管理大企业时，信任和规则都是必不可少的。伯克希尔在信任方面强调前者到了不同寻常的程度，有些人会说是极端的程度。失望是不可避免的。我们可以理解商业上的错误，但对于个人不当行为，我们的容忍度为零。
在我们的第二种所有权类别中，我们通过购买公开交易的股票来间接拥有企业的一部分。持有这些投资，我们对管理没有发言权。
我们在两种所有权形式中的目标是，在具有长期有利经济特征和值得信赖的管理者的企业中进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们购买公开交易的股票是基于我们对它们长期业务表现的预期，而不是将它们视为巧妙购买和销售的工具。这一点至关重要：我和查理不是挑选股票的人，我们是挑选企业的人。
多年来，我犯了许多错误。因此，我们广泛收集的企业目前包括一些拥有真正非凡经济特征的企业，许多享有非常好的经济特征，以及大量处于边缘地带的企业。在此过程中，我投资的其他企业已经倒闭，它们的产品不受公众欢迎。资本主义有两面：该系统创造了一个不断增长的输家堆，同时提供了一个改善商品和服务的源泉。熊彼特称这种现象为“创造性破坏”。
One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy piecesof wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.
Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management,
most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)
Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.
我们公开交易部门的一个优势是，偶尔可以以非常优惠的价格购买到优秀企业的一部分。关键是要明白，股票往往以非常愚蠢的价格进行买卖，无论是高还是低。“有效”的市场只存在于教科书中。事实上，可交易的股票和债券是令人困惑的，它们的行为通常只能事后理解。
控制的企业则是不同的。它们有时会以不合理的高价售出，但几乎从不以低价出售。除非处于压力之下，否则控制企业的所有者不会考虑以恐慌类型的估值出售。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
此时，我需要给大家一个报告卡：在 58 年的伯克希尔管理中，我大部分的资本配置决策并不比较好。在一些情况下，我的错误决策仅仅是因为我非常幸运而得以挽救。（还记得我们在美国航空公司和所罗门兄弟公司险些破产的逃生吗？我当然记得。）
我们令人满意的结果是一打真正好的决策的产物，大约每五年就有一个好决策，还有一个常常被遗忘的优势，有利于伯克希尔这样的长期投资者。让我们来看一下幕后的情况。
The Secret Sauce
In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400
million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.
The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.
秘密酱汁
在1994年8月，伯克希尔完成了其长达七年的可口可乐股份购买计划，现在我们持有4亿股。当时，这笔交易的总成本是13亿美元，在伯克希尔来说是一个非常重要的金额。
1994年，我们从可口可乐获得的现金股息是7500万美元。到2022年，股息已经增加到7.04亿美元。增长每年都发生，就像生日一样确定。查理和我所需做的就是兑现可口可乐的季度股息支票。我们预计这些支票极有可能增长。
American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.
These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.
Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.
The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance as the flowers bloom.Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.
美国运通公司的故事也差不多。伯克希尔对美国运通的购买基本在1995年完成，同样花费了13亿美元。这项投资的年度股息从4100万美元增长到了3.02亿美元。这些支票看起来也很可能会增加。
尽管这些股息收益令人高兴，但它们带来的股票价格上涨才是最重要的。截至年底，我们在可口可乐的投资价值为250亿美元，而在美国运通的价值为220亿美元。每个持股现在大约占伯克希尔的净值的5%，与很久以前的权重相当。
假设我在1990年代犯了一个同样规模的投资错误，这个错误保持了其13亿美元的价值，并在2022年保持不变。（一个例子是高级别的30年期债券。）这项令人失望的投资现在将代表伯克希尔净值的微不足道的0.3%，并将为我们提供约8000万美元的年收入。
投资者应得到的教训：杂草会随着鲜花的盛开而凋零。随着时间的推移，只需要几个赢家就足以创造奇迹。是的，早点开始并活到90多岁肯定会有所帮助。
The Past Year in Brief
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for
income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure,absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:
Earnings in $ billions
2022 Quarter
“Operating Earnings”
GAAP Earnings We
are Required to Report
1
7.0
5.5
2
9.3
(43.8)
3
7.8
(2.7)
4
6.7
18.2
The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
2022年是伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的好年份。公司的运营收益——我们使用的是“普遍公认会计原则（GAAP）”计算的收入，不包括来自股权持有的资本收益或损失——创下了308亿美元的纪录。查理和我专注于这个运营数字，并敦促你也这样做。GAAP数字，在我们的调整之外，每个报告日期都会狂跳不已，完全是误导性的。请注意它在2022年的变化，这并不罕见：
收益/亿美元
2022 季度
“运营收益”
我们需要报告的GAAP收益
1
7.0
5.5
2
9.3
(43.8)
3
7.8
(2.7)
4
6.7
18.2
当季度甚至年度查看GAAP收益时，它们是100%具有误导性的。资本收益，毫无疑问，在过去几十年对伯克希尔哈撒韦公司非常重要，我们预计它们在未来几十年也会有意义的正向影响。但是，它们每季度的摆动，经常被媒体无意识地大肆宣扬，完全误导了投资者。
A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany
Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
去年对伯克希尔而言的第二个积极发展是我们购买了阿勒格尼公司，这是一家由乔·布兰登领导的财产保险公司。我曾与乔合作过，他了解伯克希尔和保险业。阿勒格尼为我们带来了特殊的价值，因为伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使其保险子公司能够采取宝贵而持久的投资策略，这对几乎所有竞争对手都不可用。
在阿勒格尼的帮助下，我们的保险浮动资金在2022年增加了从1470亿美元到1640亿美元。通过纪律性的承保，这些资金有很大的机会随着时间的推移而免费。自从1967年购买我们的第一家财产保险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮动资金通过收购、运营和创新已经增长了8000倍。尽管在我们的财务报表中没有得到认可，但这个浮动资金对伯克希尔来说是一笔非凡的财富。新股东可以通过阅读我们每年更新的关于浮动资金的解释（见A-2页）来了解其价值。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?
When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
2022年，伯克希尔股份回购了部分股份，同时苹果和美国运通等我们的重要投资公司也进行了类似的操作，这些都稍微提高了每股内在价值。我们直接回购了公司已发行股份的1.2％，从而增加了你们对我们独特的企业集合的持股比例。在苹果和美国运通方面，回购股份可以在不花费我们任何费用的情况下略微提高伯克希尔的持股比例。
数学并不复杂：当股份总数减少时，你们对我们许多企业的持股比例就会提高。如果回购价格具有增值作用，即使是微不足道的回购也有所帮助。当公司为回购付出过高代价时，股东将受到损失，唯一获益的是出售股份的股东和昂贵的投资银行家。
应强调的是，增值回购带来的收益在各方面都使所有股东受益。想象一下，如果有三个充分了解当地汽车经销商的股东，其中一个管理该企业。进一步想象，其中一位被动股东希望以有利于另外两位持股股东的价格将他的股份卖回给公司。当交易完成后，这项交易是否对任何人造成了损害？经理是否比继续持有股份的被动股东受到了偏爱？公众是否受到了伤害？
当有人告诉你所有回购都对股东或国家有害，或者对CEO特别有益时，你听到的是一个经济文盲或一个能说会道的蛊惑者（这两种角色不是互斥的）。
Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.
And that is a promise we can make.
伯克希尔2022年的运营细节几乎可以在K-33至K-66页找到。查理和我与许多伯克希尔股东一样，喜欢仔细研究这部分的许多事实和数据。然而，这些页面并非必读之物。许多伯克希尔百万富翁，甚至是亿万富翁，从未研究过我们的财务数据。他们只是知道查理和我，以及我们的家人和亲密朋友，继续在伯克希尔拥有非常重要的投资，并且他们信任我们像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。
这是我们可以做出的承诺。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.
That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
最后，一个重要的警告：即使我们喜欢的运营盈利数字也很容易被希望这样做的经理人操纵。这种篡改通常被首席执行官、董事和他们的顾问视为高级技巧。记者和分析师也认同其存在。打败“预期”被誉为管理上的胜利。
这种活动是令人厌恶的。操纵数字不需要任何才能：只需要一种深刻的欺骗欲望。正如一位CEO曾经向我描述他的欺骗行为一样，“大胆而富有想象力的会计处理”已成为资本主义的耻辱之一。
58 Years – and a Few Figures
In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New
England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.
And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.
58年和一些数字
1965年，伯克希尔是一家只有一个招数的公司，拥有一家古老但注定要破产的新英格兰纺织品业务。随着这个业务在走向死亡之路，伯克希尔需要一个立即的新起点。回顾过去，我意识到它的问题的严重性很慢。
然后来了一次好运：1967年，国家保险公司可用，我们把资源转向了保险和其他非纺织业务。
Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous
savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.
从此开始了我们到2023年的旅程，这是一条崎岖的道路，涉及业主持续储蓄（即通过保留盈利来实现），复利的力量，我们避免重大错误的能力，以及最重要的——美国的顺风。没有伯克希尔，美国也会过得不错。反之则不然。
Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.
现在，伯克希尔在一个无与伦比的巨大和多元化的企业集合中拥有重要的所有权。让我们首先看一下在纳斯达克、纽交所和相关场所每日交易的大约5000家上市公司。这个群体中包含了标普500指数的成员，这是一个由大型知名美国公司组成的精英集合。
In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.
在2021年，这500家公司共赚取了1.8万亿美元。我还没有2022年的最终结果。因此，使用2021年的数据，只有128家公司（包括伯克希尔本身）赚取了30亿美元或更多。实际上，23家公司亏损了。
At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American
Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.
到2022年年底，伯克希尔成为了这些巨头中最大的股东：美国运通、美国银行、雪佛龙、可口可乐、惠普公司、穆迪公司、西方石油和派拉蒙环球。
In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH
Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500. All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company. (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.
除了这八家投资公司外，伯克希尔还拥有BNSF的100％股权和BH Energy的92％股权，它们的盈利均超过上述30亿美元的标准（BNSF为59亿美元，BHE为43亿美元）。如果这些公司是公开上市的，它们将代替目前S&P 500指数的两个成员。总之，我们控制和非控制的十家巨头使伯克希尔更广泛地与美国经济未来保持一致，这在美国其他任何公司中都不是这样。（此计算不考虑“受托人”运营，如养老金基金和投资公司。）此外，伯克希尔的保险业务虽然通过许多单独管理的子公司进行，但其价值与BNSF或BHE相当。
As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills
along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire hares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.
至于未来，伯克希尔将始终持有大量的现金和美国国债，以及各种各样的企业。我们还将避免任何可能导致在不便之时需要不适应的现金需求的行为，包括金融恐慌和空前的保险损失。我们的首席执行官将始终是首席风险官-这是一项不负责任的任务。此外，我们未来的首席执行官将用自己的资金购买伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票，其净资产中的一部分将被用于购买。是的，我们的股东将继续通过留存盈利来节约和繁荣。
At Berkshire, there will be no finish line.
在伯克希尔，没有终点线。
Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes
During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.
关于联邦税收的一些惊人事实
在截至2021年的十年间，美国财政部收到了约32.3万亿美元的税收，而支出则达到了43.9万亿美元。
Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the
consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.
虽然经济学家、政治家和许多公众对这种巨大的不平衡有着自己的观点，但查理和我对此一无所知，并坚信近期经济和市场预测比无用更糟。我们的工作是以能够在长期内实现可接受的结果并在金融恐慌或全球性严重经济衰退时保持公司无与伦比的持久力为目标，管理伯克希尔的运营和财务。伯克希尔还能提供一定程度的通胀保护，但这个特性远非完美。巨大而根深蒂固的财政赤字有其后果。
The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (341⁄2%), corporate income tax payments (81⁄2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.
32万亿美元的财政收入来自个人所得税（48%）、社会保障及相关收入（34.5%）、公司所得税（8.5%）以及各种次要税费。在这个十年中，伯克希尔通过公司所得税缴纳了320亿美元，几乎正好占财政部所征集的所有资金的千分之一。
And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S.
matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.
这意味着 - 准备好了吗 - 如果在美国大约有1,000个纳税人的纳税额与伯克希尔的纳税额相匹配，那么其他任何企业或该国1.31亿户家庭都不需要向联邦政府支付任何税款。一个钱也不用交。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost
impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:
• If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.
• Perform the same exercise with $1 billion– this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3/4 of a mile into the sky.
• Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.
When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”
百万、十亿、万亿——我们都知道这些词汇，但是涉及到的数字几乎无法理解。让我们用实际尺寸来表示这些数字：
如果你把100美元的新钞票换成1百万美元，你会有一堆钞票，高度达到你的胸部。
对于10亿美元——这变得令人兴奋！——这个钞票堆的高度将达到大约3/4英里。
最后，想象一下把320亿美元堆起来，这是伯克希尔在2012-21年期间向联邦政府缴纳的总联邦所得税。现在这个钞票堆的高度超过21英里，大约是商业飞机通常巡航的高度的三倍。
当涉及到联邦税收时，拥有伯克希尔股份的个人可以明确地表示“我在公司缴税了。”
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.
在伯克希尔公司，我们希望并预计在未来十年内支付更多的税款。我们欠国家这个责任：美国的活力对于伯克希尔的任何成功都做出了巨大贡献，这种贡献伯克希尔将永远需要。我们依靠着美国的顺风顺水，尽管有时会受到阻碍，但它的推动力量总会回归。
I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.
我已经投资了80年，这超过了我们国家寿命的三分之一。尽管我们国民倾向于自我批评和自我怀疑，我从未见过一个时候是明智的，长期押注反对美国。我非常怀疑此信件的任何读者在未来会有不同的体验。
Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner
Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.
没有什么比拥有一个优秀的伙伴更重要
查理和我几乎想法一致，但我需要一页纸的篇幅来解释，他则可以用一句话概括。此外，他的版本总是更清晰合理，也更加巧妙，甚至有些直言不讳。
Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:
• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one hing for a long time is a huge advantage.
• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term
investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.
• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”
And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.
以下是他的一些想法，其中许多摘自最近的播客：
• 世界上充满了愚蠢的赌徒，他们不会像有耐心的投资者那样做得那么好。
• 如果你看不清世界的本来面目，那就像透过畸变的镜头来评判某些事情。
• 我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里。以及一个相关的想法：早点写下你想要的讣告——然后相应地行事。
• 如果你不在乎自己是否理性，你就不会努力去理性化思考。那么你就会保持不理性并得到糟糕的结果。
• 耐心可以学习。拥有长时间的注意力和专注于一件事情的能力是巨大的优势。
• 你可以从已故的人身上学到很多东西。阅读你欣赏和厌恶的死者。
• 如果你可以游到一个安全的船上，不要在一个正在下沉的船上逃跑。
• 一家伟大的公司在你离开后仍然在运作；一家平庸的公司则做不到。
• 沃伦和我不关注市场的泡沫。我们寻找好的长期投资并顽固地持有它们。
• 本·格雷厄姆说过，“短期来看，股市是一个投票机；长期来看，它是一个称重机。”如果你一直在让某个东西更有价值，那么一些明智的人会注意到并开始购买。
• 在投资中，不存在百分之百的确保。因此，使用杠杆是危险的。一连串的美好数字乘以零始终等于零。不要指望两次致富。
• 然而，你不需要拥有很多东西才能变得富有。
• 如果你想成为一个伟大的投资者，你必须不断学习。当世界改变时，你必须改变。
• 沃伦和我几十年来一直不喜欢铁路股，但世界变化了，最终美国经济有了四家对其至关重要的大型铁路公司。我们很慢才认识到这种变化，但迟到总比不到好。
• 如果你觉得自己可以预测未来，那么你就可以赚很多钱，但这是不可能的。
• 给孩子正确的价值观比给他们钱更重要。
• 最好的伴侣是那些不需要花时间在人际关系上的人，而是能够在一起看待问题。
• 在人生中，如果你做了一些你不应该做的事情，那么你最终会变成你所做的事情的样子。
• 那些为你赚钱的人，应该比那些拥有财富的人获得更多的尊重和回报。
• 如果你想成为一名成功的投资者，你需要拥有一种“不需要管别人在干什么”的心态。
• 做出艰难的决定需要承担风险，而风险又是赚钱的关键。
• 如果你不想被贪婪和恐惧所驱使，那么你需要制定一份长期的投资计划并坚守不移。
这些都是查理.芒格的经验和智慧，他是一个非常出色的投资者和商人，也是巴菲特最重要的合作伙伴之一。他的想法和决策方法已经帮助了许多人在金融领域获得成功。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.
我要加上一条自己的规则，与查理的规则相似：找一个非常聪明的高水平的合作伙伴——最好比你年长一些——然后非常仔细地听他说什么。
A Family Gathering in OmahaCharlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.
From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk
sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?
奥马哈的家庭聚会
查理和我没有羞耻心。去年，在三年来的第一次股东聚会上，我们向你们问候，并进行了我们惯常的商业推销。
从开盘开始，我们直接针对你的钱包。很快，我们的西兹糖果摊销售了11吨滋补的花生脆糖和巧克力。在我们的P.T.巴纳姆推销中，我们向你们承诺长寿。毕竟，除了来自西兹的糖果，还有什么可以解释我们俩活到99岁和92岁呢？
I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.
On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up
2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 61/2 of the 91/2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.
Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time
(racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.
我知道你们迫不及待地想听去年推销的具体情况。
周五，营业时间从中午一直开到下午5点，我们的糖果柜台销售了2690个单品。周六，尽管我们的电影和问答环节限制了商业交通，但喜诗糖果在早上7点到下午4点30分之间又进行了3931次交易。
算一下：在其主要运营时间内，喜诗糖果每分钟大约完成10笔交易（在两天内总销售额达到了400,309美元），所有商品均在101年内未经实质性改变的单一地点销售。在亨利·福特的T型车时代为西兹奠定了基础，现在同样有效。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on
May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.
February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
查理、我和整个伯克希尔集团都期待着在5月5日至6日的奥马哈见到你们。我们会玩得很开心，你们也会的。
2023年2月25日
沃伦·巴菲特
董事会主席