从各季度#博枫基建股东信# 中摘抄一些时效性不高的文字。使用有道机器翻译。$Brookfield基础设施(BIP)$
【Full Cycle Investment Strategy 全周期投资策略】
When we look at funding our organic growth and new investment opportunities, capital recycling has always been a key part of our funding strategy. The cycle begins with acquiring high-quality core infrastructure assets for value. We do this by focusing on situations where we can leverage our competitive advantages of scale, local presence and operating expertise to source and execute on proprietary transactions.
当我们考虑为我们的有机增长和新的投资机会提供资金时，资本循环一直是我们融资战略的关键部分。这个周期始于对高质量核心基础设施资产的价值收购。为此，我们专注于那些可以利用我们在规模、本地业务和运营专业知识方面的竞争优势来寻找和执行独家交易的情况。
Next, we implement an operations-oriented approach to de-risk the business and enhance cash flows. Finally, once the business reaches maturity, we seek to opportunistically exit at strong valuations in order to redeploy capital into higher returning investments.
接下来，我们实施面向运营的方法来降低业务风险并提高现金流。最后，一旦业务达到成熟期，我们寻求在高估值时机会主义地退出，以便将资本重新配置到回报更高的投资中。
With the recent sale of Transelec, our Chilean electricity transmission business, we thought we would summarize that investment as an example of our full cycle investment strategy.
随着我们最近出售了智利输电业务Transelec，我们认为我们可以将这笔投资总结为我们全周期投资战略的一个例子。
In 2006, a Brookfield-led consortium acquired Transelec, the largest electricity transmission company in Chile, for $2.7 billion ($1.3 billion of equity). At that time, Chile was generally viewed as an emerging market economy and capital from foreign investors was relatively scarce. Assets in the country were discounted by investors relative to those in North America or Europe, which were valued at premiums given the abundance of capital in those regions seeking utility assets.
2006年，$Brookfield资管(BAM)$ 领导的财团以27亿美元(13亿美元的权益)收购了智利最大的输电公司Transelec。
当时，智利被普遍视为一个新兴市场经济体，来自外国投资者的资本相对稀缺。投资者对该国资产的估值低于北美或欧洲资产；在后者地区寻求公用事业资产的资本充裕，因而资产估值存在溢价。
In that environment, we were disciplined and contrarian, and when the opportunity to acquire Transelec presented itself, we acquired it with a view that: i) Chile would emerge as an excellent country in which to invest, ii) the fundamental need for the country to grow its electricity infrastructure would drive attractive opportunities over time, and iii) employing our operating capabilities, we could improve asset performance, margins and reduce the cost of capital over time.
在这种环境下，我们是自律的、逆势而为的。当收购Transelec的机会出现时，我们收购它的观点是:
i) 智利将成为一个优秀的投资国家，
ii) 该国发展其电力基础设施的基本需求将随着时间的推移带来有吸引力的机会，
iii) 利用我们的运营能力，随着时间的推移，我们可以改善资产性能、利润率和降低资本成本。
During our period of ownership, Chile achieved both sovereign debt ratings upgrades and admission as an OECD member country. As demand for electricity and improved reliability increased, we worked closely with management to ensure that we were well positioned to bid on and execute highly attractive growth projects. We were able to grow the business from 8,000 to over 10,000 km of lines and increased the number of substations by approximately 20%, growing our rate base from approximately $1.6 billion in 2006 to approximately $3.5 billion by 2017. In addition, we added value by implementing a risk-based maintenance program that resulted in lower line losses. Furthermore, we put in place non-recourse project financing on a selective basis and extended debt maturities opportunistically to reduce our cost of capital. At the time of our sale, the nearest debt maturity in the business was 2023.
在我们控制Transelec期间，智利实现了主权债务评级的升级，并被接纳为经合组织成员国。随着电力需求的增加和可靠性的提高，我们与管理层密切合作，以确保我们在投标和执行极具吸引力的增长项目方面处于有利地位。我们能够将业务从8000公里扩展到超过10000公里的线路，并增加了约20%的变电站数量，将我们的规管资产基础从2006年的约16亿美元增长到2017年的约35亿美元。此外，通过实施基于风险的维护计划，我们增加了价值，降低了线路损耗。此外，我们有选择地实施无追索权项目融资，并投机地延长债务期限，以降低我们的资金成本。在我们出售的时候，最近的债务到期时间是2023年。
So, what prompted us to sell this asset? First, as an OECD country with an investment grade credit rating, foreign investment has grown dramatically and the market has continued to mature since our acquisition of Transelec. Today, Chile is viewed very favorably by foreign investors and return expectations are comparable to the U.S. and Western Europe, given the country’s solid institutions and respect for private capital. Second, Transelec is a high-quality asset in the mature phase of the life-cycle. It has revenues based on a regulated return on its asset base and a stable capital expenditure program that supports consistent and predictable growth. Consequently, we were confident that we could achieve a strong valuation for this mature, de-risked asset with regulated revenues.
那么，是什么促使我们出售这笔资产的呢?
首先，作为一个具有投资级信用评级的经合组织国家，自我们收购Transelec以来，外国投资急剧增长，市场继续成熟。如今，智利受到外国投资者的青睐，投资回报预期与美国和西欧相当，原因是该国制度健全，对私人资本也很尊重。
其次，Transelec是一项处于生命周期成熟期的优质资产。它的收入基于其资产基础的受监管的回报，以及支持持续和可预测增长的稳定的资本支出计划。因此，我们有信心，我们可以为这一成熟的、去风险并拥有规管收入的资产实现一个强劲的估值。
We recently closed on the sale of our 28% interest in the company in March for $1.3 billion ($1.1 billion net of tax), achieving a compound internal rate of return of approximately 18% over 11 years, and a multiple of capital of three times. The sale was opportunistic in that we were able to realize an attractive valuation, which took into account future growth expectations. Transelec provided us with strong and predictable cash flows, however, we see opportunities to reinvest the net proceeds from the sale into investments that have the ability to generate significantly higher returns.
我们最近在3月份完成了以13亿美元(含税11亿美元)出售公司28%股权的交易，在11年的时间里实现了约18%的内部复合回报率，是资本的3倍。这次出售是机会主义的，因为我们能够实现一个有吸引力的估值，这考虑到了未来的增长预期。Transelec为我们提供了强劲且可预测的现金流，然而，我们看到了将出售净收入重新投资于能够产生显著更高回报的投资的机会。
【North American Energy 北美能源】
We are seeing pockets of potential value arising from market dislocation in select sectors and geographies. In particular, there has been a stock market sell-off in listed North American energy infrastructure companies and sentiment is negative. We have monitored this space for many years and observed that competition to deploy capital by both financial and strategic investors had driven asset returns to levels we viewed as unattractive. Moreover, the amount of leverage underlying many of the historical acquisitions seemed to leave little margin for error.
我们看到，部分行业和地区的市场混乱正在产生潜在价值。特别是，北美能源基础设施上市公司的股票市场出现抛售，市场情绪低迷。我们对这一领域进行了多年的监测，发现金融和战略投资者在配置资本方面的竞争，曾将资产回报率推至我们认为不具吸引力的水平。此外，许多历史上的收购背后的杠杆量似乎几乎没有留下任何出错的余地。
As the U.S. transitions to become a net exporter of energy, there is also a significant need for capital to invest in infrastructure to extract, transport and process energy resources. Therefore, our opportunity set includes potential asset carve-outs, take-privates and partnership arrangements with owners of energy infrastructure assets. We are in various stages of discussions with large midstream energy companies and are encouraged by the number of interesting opportunities in front of us. The recent market environment has presented us with a greater set of acquisition and partnership opportunities from industry players and we are hopeful we can assist some of the companies. We believe that we are well-positioned given our solid balance sheet, proven operational track record and ability to act as a single counterparty for large transactions.
随着美国向能源净出口国的转变，也迫切需要资本投资于提取、运输和加工能源资源的基础设施。因此，我们的机会包括潜在的资产分拆、私有化以及与能源基础设施资产所有者的合作安排。我们正在与大型中游能源公司进行不同阶段的讨论，我们对摆在我们面前的许多有趣的机会感到鼓舞。
最近的市场环境为我们提供了更多来自行业参与者的收购和合作机会，我们希望能够帮助其中一些公司。鉴于我们稳健的资产负债表、可靠的运营记录和作为大型交易单一对手方的能力，我们相信我们处于有利地位。