03~08年后视镜总结成中国进入wto,ok,09~17年后视镜总结成运力过剩市场高估,无法预测的全球贸易几乎0增长,ok,17~22年后视镜总结成运力供需恢复叠加疫情影响,ok。反正按这个逻辑看每一段时期都是异常,这就是分析师的逻辑。要我看远洋货运市场和全球贸易的常态就是过去80年的走势,走走停停,持续上升,过去1000年都是这个样子。然后现在到分析师心里就在那揣测,嗯,集运未来常态是啥样子?然后给出一个理性的结论:“未来常态啥样子,咱也不懂也不敢说,反正不能把异常的过去当常态”
(Chart: FreightWaves based on data from NRF) (图表:基于NRF数据的FreightWaves)
HMM posted net income of $213 million for Q1 2023. In Q1 2019, pre-COVID, it suffered a $149 million loss. Evergreen booked net income of $164 million in the first quarter of this year, nine times its net income in Q1 2019. Maersk’s average freight rate, including the positive effect of legacy contracts was 51% higher in Q1 2023 than Q1 2019. Hapag-Lloyd’s was 85% higher.HMM公布2023年第一季度净收入为2.13亿美元。2019年第一季度,在covid之前,它遭受了1.49亿美元的损失。长荣今年第一季度的净收入为1.64亿美元,是2019年第一季度净收入的9倍。包括遗留合同的积极影响在内,马士基2023年第一季度的平均运费比2019年第一季度高出51%。赫伯罗特则高出85%。
The Harpex charter-rate index is up 17% from the low hit in March. It’s now just over double its level in mid-May 2019. Harpex租船费率指数较3月份的低点上涨了17%。现在是2019年5月中旬的两倍多一点。
Even spot rates — which have fallen much faster than charter rates, liner earnings and port volumes — are still up on a global basis versus pre-COVID. The Drewry World Container Index global composite is down 77% y/y but 23% higher than the 2019 average. 即使是现货运价——其下降速度远快于租船运价、班轮收益和港口吞吐量——在全球范围内也比新冠疫情前有所上升。德鲁里世界集装箱指数全球综合指数同比下降77%,但比2019年的平均水平高出23%。
Average spot rate in USD/FEU. (Chart: FreightWaves SONAR) 美元/FEU的平均即期运费。(图表:FreightWaves声纳)
Container lines and cargo shippers had never seen anything like the 2021-2022 rate spike. But the violent market swing was very familiar to commodity shipping veterans who amassed fortunes from 2003 to 2008. 集装箱航运公司和货运公司从未见过2021-2022年费率如此飙升的情况。但对于2003年至2008年积累了大量财富的大宗商品航运资深人士来说,剧烈的市场波动是非常熟悉的。
Values for 5-year old Capesize (dry bulk vessels with capacity of around 180,000 deadweight tons or DWT) quintupled, from $30 million in 2003 to over $150 million in 2008. Then they went off a cliff and sank back to $40 million by 2009. Values for 5-year-old Panamaxes (65,000-90,000 DWT) rose six-fold from $15 million to $90 million, then suddenly crashed to $30 million. 5年船龄好望角型(容量约为180,000载重吨的干散货船)的价值翻了五倍,从2003年的3,000万美元增至2008年的1.5亿美元以上。然后,他们跌入了悬崖,到2009年又跌回了4000万美元。5年船龄的巴拿马型船(65000 - 90000载重吨)的价值从1500万美元涨到9000万美元,涨了6倍,然后突然暴跌至3000万美元。
Values of 5-year-old very large crude carriers (tankers that carry 2 million barrels) jumped from $60 million to $165 million. Then they sank back to $80 million. Values of 5-year-old Suezmaxes (tankers that carry 1 million barrels) soared from $40 million to $105 million, then fell to $60 million. 拥有5年历史的超大型油轮(装载200万桶原油的油轮)的价值从6000万美元跃升至1.65亿美元。然后又跌回了8000万美元。拥有5年历史的Suezmaxes(装载100万桶的油轮)的价值从4000万美元飙升至1.05亿美元,然后又降至6000万美元。
A new wave of large investors entered shipping after the global financial crisis, betting on the “reversion to the mean” thesis. They looked at the 10-year average of rates and asset values and assumed they would revert to the mean. The fatal flaw in this thinking: The prior 10 years included a one-off boom that skewed the mean too high to revert to. 全球金融危机之后,新一波大型投资者进入航运业,押注于“回归均值”理论。他们研究了利率和资产价值的10年平均值,并假设它们会回归均值。这种思维的致命缺陷是:在此之前的10年里,出现了一次一次性的繁荣,导致均值过高,无法恢复。
“I don’t think their analysis was all that complicated,” said AMA Capital Partners CEO Paul Leand during a Marine Money conference in 2013. “我不认为他们的分析有那么复杂,”AMA Capital Partners首席执行官保罗•利德(Paul Leand)在2013年的一次海洋货币会议上表示。
“I think they looked at rates and values in 2008, they looked at where they are today and they looked at the 10-year average including 2007 and 2008 and they said: ‘It’s going up. It’s a great opportunity. We’ve got $20 billion to invest. Let’s throw $500 million into shipping.’” “我认为他们看了2008年的利率和价值,看了今天的水平,看了包括2007年和2008年在内的10年平均水平,然后说:‘它在上涨。这是一个很好的机会。我们有200亿美元可以投资。让我们在航运业投入5亿美元。’”
At the same conference, Herman Hildan, then a shipping analyst at RS Platou, advised a different approach: Use a 20-year rate average that excludes the peak earning years of 2007 and 2008 to curb the boom years’ bias. 在同一次会议上,时任RS Platou航运分析师的赫尔曼•希尔丹(Herman Hildan)提出了一种不同的方法:使用不包括2007年和2008年收入高峰年份的20年平均费率,以抑制对繁荣年份的偏见。
A decade after that debate, the same question of how to gauge the market in the aftermath of a one-off boom — and how much to focus on the outlier years — has arisen yet again, this time in container shipping. 在那场辩论过去十年后,如何在一次性繁荣过后评估市场——以及应该在多大程度上关注异常年份——同样的问题再次出现,这次是在集装箱航运领域。
$中远海控(SH601919)$ $东方海外国际(00316)$ $中远海控(01919)$
03~08年后视镜总结成中国进入wto,ok,09~17年后视镜总结成运力过剩市场高估,无法预测的全球贸易几乎0增长,ok,17~22年后视镜总结成运力供需恢复叠加疫情影响,ok。反正按这个逻辑看每一段时期都是异常,这就是分析师的逻辑。要我看远洋货运市场和全球贸易的常态就是过去80年的走势,走走停停,持续上升,过去1000年都是这个样子。然后现在到分析师心里就在那揣测,嗯,集运未来常态是啥样子?然后给出一个理性的结论:“未来常态啥样子,咱也不懂也不敢说,反正不能把异常的过去当常态”
一直很好奇,雪球大v都能看明白的周期,船公司为啥看不明白?
看这个几家情况,一季度美线真的是很多公司的盈亏线了,控制不好的就亏钱了。
黄兄,请教个问题。海控租船成本占公司总成本比例有多少百分比呀?