七地·真名志翻译
译者注：这是价值投资学派非常重要的一篇演讲，可以说这篇演讲把价值投资的核心说尽：以价值为导向，只关注价值与价格两个参数。我阅读了包括邮电出版社2016年出版的《聪明的投资者》及网上翻译的几个版本后，又自行阅读了英文原文，发现常见的翻译有些地方没有遵循直译的原则，因此可能会造成一些误解。
本人曾经翻译过一本1500余页的百万字级别专著，出于更好的让大家学习这篇重要演讲的目的，我花了5天的空闲时间、以信、达、雅的原则重新翻译，突出“信”这一直译原则，供大家参考阅读。
文中未标色的带括号内容，很大一部分是我为了方便理解在英文原文之外添加的语句，遵循直译的原则不应该看括号里的内容，还有一部分是我自己引申出去的一些内容；至于标色的内容，则是我翻译的版本与常见译文差异非常大的译句，或是特别提醒注意阅读英文原文的。
由于翻译得很长，雪球长文不允许超过20000字，在这里只贴出部分内容，如果想阅读完整版的，请访问下面链接：网页链接
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is an edited transcript of a talk given at Columbia University in 1984 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Security Analysis , written by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd. This specialized volume first introduced the ideas later popularized in The Intelligent Investor . Buffett's essay offers a fascinating study of how Graham's disciples have used Graham's value investing approach to realize phenomenal success in the stock market.
编辑者注：这篇文章是哥伦比亚大学１９８４年为纪念格雷罕姆与多德合著的《证券分析》出版５０周年的庆典上（巴菲特———格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学的投资课上唯一给了“A＋”的最优秀的学生）演讲的整理稿。《证券分析》首先提出了这一理念（以价值为导向的投资理念），之后随着《聪明的投资者》出版而流遍知于世。巴菲特这篇短论，为我们提供了一个关于格雷厄姆的追随者们如何运用他的价值投资策略，在证券市场取得非凡成功的迷人案例，。
Is the Graham and Dodd "look for values with a significant margin of safety relative to prices" approach to security analysis out of date? Many of the professors who write textbooks today say yes.
They argue that the stock market is efficient; that is, that stock prices reflect everything that is known about a company's prospects and about the state of the economy. There are no undervalued stocks, these theorists argue, because there are smart security analysts who utilize all available information to ensure unfailingly appropriate prices. Investors who seem to beat the market year after year are just lucky. "If prices fully reflect available information, this sort of investment adeptness is ruled out," writes one of today's textbook authors.
格雷厄姆和多德的“寻找相对于价格具有显著安全边际的价值”（注意这里我按英文原意直译过来，这很重要，和一般说的寻找具有安全边际的价格不同，原文强调的是寻找相对于价格具有安全边际的价值，追寻的是价值，而非价格，这提示了价值投资理论的核心理念是，买好的，虽然说买好的离不开买得好（便宜），但是首先，我们应当着眼于买好的！这也是为什么我不采用常用的翻译：寻求具有安全边际的价值与价格差异，英文原文的表述要准确得多）的证券分析法过时了吗?如今，许多编著教科书的教授认为确实如此。他们认为，股票市场是有效市场；也就是说，股票价格已经反映了包括公司前景及社会经济状况在内的所有因素。这些理论家声称，市场上没有低估的股票，因为市场充斥着聪明的证券分析师，他们运用所有可用信息以确保股价充分（可靠地）合适。那些看起来能年复一年地战胜市场的投资者，纯粹出于幸运（也仅仅是看起来能战胜市场）。一位目前正使用的教科书的作者如此写道：“如果价格完全反映了可得资讯，则此类投资技巧将不复有效。”。
Well, maybe. But I want to present to you a group of investors who have, year in and year out, beaten the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index. The hypothesis that they do this by pure chance is at least worth examining. Crucial to this examination is the fact that these winners were all well known to me and pre-identified as superior investors, the most recent identification occurring over fifteen years ago. Absent this condition - that is, if I had just recently searched among thousands of records to select a few names for you this morning -- I would advise you to stop reading right here. I should add that all of these records have been audited. And I should further add that I have known many of those who have invested with these managers, and the checks received by those participants over the years have matched the stated records.
好吧，也许如此。但是，我将向你们展示一批投资者，多年来，他们一直战胜标普500指数。这些投资者的业绩真的是完全出于幸运吗，这值得研究一番。考察的关键事实在于，这些战胜市场的赢家们都是我所熟知且预先判定为卓越投资者的，他们中我最晚认识的一位也已经是十五年前了。假设以上事实不成立——换言之，我只是最近才从成千上万的记录中挑选出若干名单（看起来成功的），以便于在今早的演讲中向在座诸位展示——我建议各位立即停止阅读本文。我要再说一句，所有的这些记录都经过稽核。我还要再说一句，我认识许多委托上述经理人进行投资的客户，他们多年以来因参与（相应）投资而获得的支票与这些经理人定期公布的业绩记录吻合。
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By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on "How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning." Worse yet, they'll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, " If it can't be done, why are there 215 of us?"
此时，剩下的赢家将真正丧失理智。他们可能开始著书立说：“我怎么在20天内，只在早晨工作30秒，就将1美元变成100万美元。”更糟的是，他们也许会飞往全国各地，参加有效赌正反的培训研讨会，同时用以下言论来反驳持怀疑态度的教授：“如果这（有效地赌正反）是不可能的事，我们这215人（的成功）是怎么回事?”
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The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist's concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks -- I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn't make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.
这些投资者身上共同的来自“格雷厄姆一多德维尔”的聪明的理论是：他们追求某项生意（某个企业）的价值与这一生意要市场中价格之间的差异。他们关心的是这一本质差异（价格与价值之间的差异），而非有效市场理论学家所关心的诸如是在星期一还是星期四买进，或在一月份还是七月份买进。顺带一提，企业家收购某家企业时——这正是格雷厄姆一多德式投资者通过购买有价证券来完成的事——我怀疑有多少人会执着于收购交易必须在某个星期或某个月的哪一天完成。假如收购整个企业的行为发生在周一或周五并不会导致任何不同，那么我就无法理解为什么学院派会投入大量时间与精力，来研究购买同一企业的股票的交易发生在哪天究竟会（导致）有什么不同。当然，我们这些格雷厄姆一多德式投资者并不探讨bate系数、资本资产定价模型或证券投资回报协方差。他们对此毫无兴趣。事实上，他们中大部分难以理解上述学术名词。他们仅仅关注两个变量：价格和价值。
I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them. It isn't necessarily because such studies have any utility; it's simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
我总是惊讶于图形分析师们对量价关系做了如此之多的研究。你能想象自己仅因上周、上上周某家公司在市场中的出售价格大大上涨就收购这家企业吗？当然，这个电脑信息时代拥有着无穷无尽的量价关系数据，是人们大量研究成交量与价格这两个变量间的影响的一个诱因。这项研究可能有些作用，并不意味着这项研究就是必须的；研究它们（看起来是必要的）仅仅是因为数据存在，且学者们已经花费了大量精力去学习处理这些数据的数学技巧。—旦（有人）已经掌握了这些技巧，却不去运用它们，似乎就会（给某些人）带来负罪感（他们觉得对不起自己曾经付出的努力），即使运用这些技巧（的研究）并没有任何作用甚至会带来反作用。正像朋友们常说的：拿着铁锤的人，看什么东西都像钉子。
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There's no hindsight involved here. Bill was the only person I recommended to my partners, and I said at the time that if he achieved a four-point-per-annum advantage over the Standard & Poor's, that would be solid performance. Bill has achieved well over that, working with progressively larger sums of money. That makes things much more difficult. Size is the anchor of performance. There is no question about it. It doesn't mean you can't do better than average when you get larger, but the margin shrinks. And if you ever get so you're managing two trillion dollars, and that happens to be the amount of the total equity valuation in the economy, don't think that you'll do better than average!
以上事实（我给合伙人推荐比尔管理他们的资金）并不是马后炮。我仅给当时的合伙股东推荐了一个人，那就是比尔，我当时就表示，保守地说，可以设想他的业绩每年比标普500指数高四个百分点（这句常译为：如果他能取得超出标普照指数4个百分点的业绩，就中心稳定其投资人了；联系上下文，我觉得应该是巴菲特当时在推荐比尔时保守的评估了他觉得比尔可能取得的业绩）。比尔的绩效远好于上述预期，他所管理的资金规模也日益增大。这使得取得良好业绩愈来愈难。毫无疑问，资金规模对绩效来说像一个锚（它会拖着绩效使它难以向上）。并不是说资金规模扩大后你的水准就不能超过平均水平，只是（一般而言）超越（平均业绩）的幅度会缩小。如果你所管理着2万亿美元，那你的业绩必然无法超越平均水准，因为你的资金规模正是股票市场的总市值。
I should add that in the records we've looked at so far, throughout this whole period there was practically no duplication in these portfolios. These are men who select securities based on discrepancies between price and value, but they make their selections very differently. Walter's largest holdings have been such stalwarts as Hudson Pulp & Paper and Jeddo Highland Coal and New York Trap Rock Company and all those other names that come instantly to mind to even a casual reader of the business pages. Tweedy Browne's selections have sunk even well below that level in terms of name recognition. On the other hand, Bill has worked with big companies. The overlap among these portfolios has been very, very low. These records do not reflect one guy calling the flip and fifty people yelling out the same thing after him.
我要补充说明一下，对于以上我们查看的投资记录来说，在考察期间中他们的投资组合实际上没有雷同。他们都是根据价格、价值间的差异来选股，但他们选择标的截然不同。沃尔特重仓的都是一些，如哈德森纸业公司、Jeddo高地煤炭公司和纽约Trap Rock公司的稳健公司，还有其它一些即使是偶尔阅读经济版面新闻的人也耳熟能详的企业（常见翻译的是不知名企业）。特威迪·布朗尼公司所选择的标的在知名度方面相对下降。另一方面，比尔的选择标的则是大型企业。他们的投资组合重合率非常非常低。他们投资记录并不是那种一个人猜、剩下50个人跟的模式。
Table 5 is the record of a friend of mine who is a Harvard Law graduate, who set up a major law firm. I ran into him in about 1960 and told him that law was fine as a hobby but he could do better. He set up a partnership quite the opposite of Walter's. His portfolio was concentrated in very few securities and therefore his record was much more volatile but it was based on the same discount-from-value approach. He was willing to accept greater peaks and valleys of performance, and he happens to be a fellow whose whole psyche goes toward concentration, with the results shown. Incidentally, this record belongs to Charlie Munger, my partner for a long time in the operation of Berkshire Hathaway. When he ran his partnership, however, his portfolio holdings were almost completely different from mine and the other fellows mentioned earlier.
表5的投资业绩是于我的—位毕业于哈佛法学院的朋友的，他成立了一家大型律师公司。我与他相识于1960年左右，并告诉他，将法律作为业余爱好，他（在投资领域将）可以做得更好（常见翻译为：法律是一种很好的业余爱好，但他还可以做得更好；我认为这种翻译是不对的，彼时查理正是全心做法律，将投资当爱好，巴菲特怎么会和他说法律是一种很好的爱好，而且还说他可以在法律上做得更好呢？再结合下文，巴菲特劝说芒格后，芒格劝说了格林，就可知此处正是巴菲特在劝说芒格全心做投资）。于是，他成立了一家与沃尔特截然相反的合伙人公司：他将资金集中在少数几种证券中，因此业绩较不稳定，但他也是依据价值折扣原则选股的。他愿意接受绩效的上下震荡，而且正如他的投资业绩显示的那样，他恰巧是一位精神极度集中的人。他的名字是查理·芒格，我在伯克希尔哈撒韦的长期合伙人。然而，在他自己经营合伙人公司的时候，他的投资组合与我或之前提到的各位都几乎完全不同。
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So these are nine records of "coin-flippers" from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven't selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It's not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners -- people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament. It's very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock . A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses. Far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.
以上9项投资业绩记录都来自于“格雷厄姆一多德维尔”流派的“赌硬币者”。我并没有在事后从数千投资者中挑选出他们。这与我（根据中奖纪录）列举出一堆彩票中奖者不同——他们中奖前我从未听过他们的名字。我在多年前就根据他们的投资决策体系选择了上述投资者。我了解他们受过什么教育，此外，我对他们的智商、性格、秉性有着我个人的认知。理解这一点很重要:（我多年前选中这些投资者作为研究对象时）假设以上人员的投资风险远低于市场水平（常见翻译为：他们的风险控制能力远远高于一般水平，这和英文原文表达的意思相去甚远，一为因，一为果）；注意看看大市萧条期间他们的业绩记录！尽管他们的投资风格大相径庭，但这些投资者总是专注于购买生意（企业）而非购买股票。他们中有些人偶尔会收购整个企业。更常见的情况是他们仅购买企业的一小部分（股票）。不论购买的是企业的所有或极少数股票，他们所秉持的态度完全相同。他们中有些人持有数十支股票；另一些人集中持有少数几支股票。在投资组合，有些人持有几十种的股票；有些人则集中少数几支股票。但他们都是在利用企业的市价与内在价值之间的差异（获利）。
I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a "herd" on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.
我确信市场经常是无效的（关于这点，格雷厄姆在《像格雷厄姆一样读财报》中的说法是，市场总是会放大对企业不利或有利的因素，正是因为这样，市价经常会大幅偏离企业的内在价值）。这些“格雷厄姆一多德维尔”式投资者成功利用了价格与价值的差距（，取得了他们骄人的业绩）。由于华尔街的“兽群”（翻译成“兽群”则可以理解为被非理性人冲动定价，如果翻译成“放牧人”则可以理解股价能被个别人人为操纵，两种翻译都有道理，一般译为“羊群”，与我上面提到的两种理解相比，都显得不那么贴切，相对来说，用兽群，可能更能体现冲动对极限价格的影响）可以用下面的方式影响股价：即最极限的价格是由最情绪化（冲动）的人、或最贪婪的人或最沮丧的人决定的（常见的翻译没有体现出价格的极限这个字眼，at the margin，这三个单词非常重要，极限价格是极度非理性的，也是格老说的，市价能够“大幅”偏离内在价值的原因所在，从逻辑上讲，正是最冲动的人，即愿意给出最高估值的人，他的买价就是最高价，最沮丧的人，他的卖价，是可能出现的最低价。市场价格的极值受非理性影响很严重，这一逻辑，目前我查阅的包括正式出版的《聪明的投资者（2016版）》附录在内的5种翻译是完全没有体现上述精神的，可见外文翻译时，注重直译的重要性！），因此，很难辩称市场价格总是理性的。事实上，市场经常荒诞不经。
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In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis , yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I've practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It's likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.
最后，你们中一些比较具有商业意识的人可能会猜测我撰写这篇文章的动机。让更多投资者转向价值（导向）投资行列必然会缩小价格与价值的差距。我只能够告诉各位：自从本杰明·格雷厄姆与大卫·多德共著《证券分析》至今，这一秘密已公诸于世50年了，但是在我奉行这项投资理论的35年中，我没看出价值投资法的流行趋势。人类似乎存在一种喜欢把简单问题复杂化的反常天性。最近30年真有什么流行趋势的话，可能是学术界教导学生们的理论与价值投资理论背道而驰（常见的翻译是：过去30年里，学术界的所作所为实际上是与价值投资的教导背道而驰的；我并没有从英文里读出这层意思，也不懂什么是学术界的作法与价值投资背道而驰，学术是搞教育的，价值投资是搞投资的，我无法理解二者是怎么背道而驰的。，从英文原文来看，应当说的是学术界走向了一条与价值投资教育相反的路，即目下学院派往往教授诸如有效市场理论、随机漫步理论这样的与价值投资背道而驰的知识，这是目前的真实情况，应当也是巴菲特所要表达的，你可能会注意到，巴菲特不止一次在演讲中说到那些投资者的成功，正是由于他们没有商科背景）。这种情况很可能持续下去。船只环绕地球而行（航行的事实表明地球是圆的）的同时，平面地球协会依然兴盛于世。市场中价格与价值之间的巨大差距（亦）将继续存在，而奉行格雷厄姆与多德理论的人将继续取得成功。
翻译至此结束，下面是个人的一些话：
顺便推荐大家看看段永平的投资问答，里面的核心思想我也总结一下：
1、价值投资的理念其实很简单：认同只做对的，然后想办法做得对。
2、价值投资只关心两个参数：价值和价格。主要关心的是价值，其次关心的是价格。买好的，更重要的是买的好，但是首先必须是买好的。价值投资的英文原文是以价值为导向的投资。以上内容就是段永平说的做对的。
3、段永平很认可巴菲特挂在嘴边的一句话：买股票就是买生意。上面的演讲中提到了这点。你不会因为一棵树的市价连续上涨就买它，因为你不需要，也不会因为大米价格一直下跌就卖它，因为你需要（对于你来说，是有价值的），所以为什么我们投资（其实甚至于生活中）会关注那些无关的参数（人或事）？只需要关注（对自己有）价值就行了。一个好的公司，首先要看他的生意模式是不是好，对于巴菲特来说，好公司有三个标准：好的商业模式，好的企业文化和好的价格。所以理解一个企业的生意模式非常重要。
4、段永平说，价值投资不外乎两件事，首先是做对的，其次是怎么做得对。做对的很简单，做得对很难。但是段永平和巴菲特都说过，格雷厄姆其实更适合资金量小的投资者，格雷厄姆本人有一套量化的投资标准，包括对安全边际的分析和定时的投资行为，从这个尺度来说，做得对又不难，所以建议大家阅读格雷厄姆的几本著作，最少应该读一读《聪明的投资者》（邮电出版社2016版添加了一些名家的评论，但是角注内容不少是缺失的；2011版无评论，但是角注内容是完整的，建议结合起来看）；但是对于资金量大的投资者，他们选择的公司，往往比较大，怎么选择这些又大又好的公司，段永平认为，定性分析往往比定量分析更重要。
5、回到怎么做的对这件事上，对的，标准非常复杂，甚至可以说永远不会有一个标准，我们找出的只是错误概率小的条件，这也是需要预留安全边际的原因（关于这一点，在上面的演讲倒数第二段已经说明了）。因此，段永平提到了一个芒格坚持使用的方法，怎么做得对很难，但是避免做错很简单。（芒格的座右铭是：反过来想，总是反过来想。）错的标准比对的标准要简单的多，只要不做错的事，剩下的就是对的事。在投资领域，错的标准就是：一跌你就恐慌（你对这个企业没有信心，觉得他会跌到深渊）；一张你就急于兑现（你对这个企业没有信心，觉得他已经涨到头）。如果在跌的时候，你急于加仓，或者在涨的时候，你依旧信心满满，这个公司（生意模式）可能就是你懂的。
6、价值投资和打高尔夫一样，难的不是出奇制胜，而是避免犯错。巴菲特多年投资胜负比例大概在100:1。我们要做的是在长长的坡上滚雪球。
7、不懂不做，不投资股票，你的投资收益就已经超过了80%的股民！你问别人好不好，就是不懂（这其实就是知行为一，行才是知，不敢行，就是不知）。
8、文中提到了两本书，做管理，特别是企业管理的人我个人建议都应该看一看：《基业长青》、《从优秀到卓越》。
最后，愿大家在投资的路上，一帆风顺