美国遏制中国的原因与展望（32）
汪思波 2023-10-02
美国遏制中国与美国遏制前苏联和俄罗斯是很不一样的。
美国与前苏联是敌对关系，可以随时爆发战争。美国和前苏联在世界各地搞尖锐的地缘政治对抗，其中最有名的就是越南战争。
美国与前苏联从二战的盟友到二战结束后的分裂，到后来尖锐的地缘政治对抗，很重要的原因之一是美国坚信其社会制度（liberal democracy和free market economy）有显著的优越性，可以打败社会主义的东方阵营（communist regime）。
更重要的是，美国认为liberal democracy和free market economy具有普世价值，这是美国深度介入越南战争的原因。越南战争美国打了二十年，越打越被动。这让美国意识到，liberal democracy和free market economy没有它相信的有那么大的优越性和普世价值。
基于这种认知，美国决定结束越南战争，与中国改善关系并且与前苏联缓和关系。美国具体做这个工作的就是伟大的基辛格博士。基辛格是美国结束越战的秘密谈判代表。
美苏两国的尖锐地缘政治对抗，双方都很受伤，也是最后导致前苏联崩溃的重要原因之一。
前苏联崩溃，冷战结束，美国被打鸡血，又相信liberal democracy和free market economy具有显著的优越性和普世价值，仍然对俄罗斯和中国采取遏制政策。
面对美国的遏制政策，俄罗斯以牙还牙，继续与美国搞地缘政治对抗。
中国则采取了与俄罗斯不一样的对美政策，死皮赖脸地对美国友好。这个政策的高大上名词叫韬光养晦。
中国韬光养晦的国际政策，最重要的表现是不急于收回ww，与俄罗斯出手打克里米亚的态度完全不同。
因此，ww问题是中国下一盘大棋的最关键一手，关系到中国人类命运共同体国际政治主张的国际信誉度。
中国不急于收回ww，提出人类命运共同体的国际政治主张，最根本的原因在于深信社会主义市场经济制度的优越性，深信中国社会制度比美国社会制度更优越。
关于社会制度的优劣，领导与普通民众是信息完全不对称的，领导知道的情况要多很多。中国领导深信中国社会制度有显著的优越性，肯定有其道理。
我花十多年时间搞了经济理论学术研究，构建了社会主义市场经济理论基础数学模型，结论是社会主义市场经济制度比free market economy有显著的优越性。我论文揭示的社会主义市场经济制度的三个核心要点是：1，政府投资。2，人民经济和共同富裕。3，把私人部门财富关于祖国这个大笼子里。
我论文揭示的国家强大包括如下五个方面：1，科学与技术学术研究。2，高新技术产业的世界份额。3，军事力量。4，人均GDP。5，民众生活（物质丰富和精神多彩）。
领导世界的基础是国家综合实力。我论文的模型预测，到2033年（十年内），中国综合实力将显著超越美国。
届时中国将成为世界的实质性领导者，领导世界各国走向和平与繁荣，即人类命运共同体（global community with shared future）。
（from the grand chessboard）
The Far Eastern Anchor
AN EFFECTIVE AMERICAN POLICY for Eurasia has to have a Far Eastern anchor . That need will not be met if America is ex - cluded or excludes itself from the Asian mainland . A close relationship with maritime Japan is essential for America ' s global policy , but a cooperative relationship with mainland China is imperative for America ' s Eurasian geostrategy . The implications of that reality need to be faced , for the ongoing interaction in the Far East between three major powers - America , China , and Japan - creates a potentially dangerous regional conundrum and is almost certain to generate geopolitically tectonic shifts .
For China , America across the Pacific should be a natural ally since America has no designs on the Asian mainland and has historically opposed both Japanese and Russian encroachments on a weaker China . To the Chinese , Japan has been the principal enemy over the last century ; Russia ," the hungry land " in Chinese , has long been distrusted ; and India , too , now looms as a potential rival . The principle " my neighbor ' s neighbor is my ally " thus fits the geopolitical and historical relationship between China and America .
However , America is no longer Japan ' s adversary across the ocean but is now closely allied with Japan . America also has strong ties with Taiwan and with several of the Southeast Asian nations . The Chinese are also sensitive to America ' s doctrinal reservations regarding the internal character of the current Chinese regime . Thus , America is also seen as the principal obstacle in China ' s quest not only to become globally preeminent but even just regionally predominant . Is a collision between America and China , therefore , inevitable ?
For Japan , America has been the umbrella under which the country could safely recover from a devastating defeat , regain its economic momentum , and on that basis progressively attain a position as one of the world ' s prime powers . But the very fact of that umbrella imposes a limit on Japan ' s freedom of action , creating the paradoxical situation of a world - class power being simultaneously a protectorate .
For Japan , America continues to be the vital partner in Japan ' s emergence as an international leader . But Americais also the main reason for Japan ' s continued lack of national self - re liance in the security area . How long can this situation endure ?
In other words , in the foreseeable future two centrally important - and very directly interacting - geopolitical issues will define America ' s role in Eurasia ' s Far East :
1. What is the practical definition and - from America ' s point of view - the acceptable scope of China ' s potential emergence as the dominant regional power and of its growing aspirations for the status of a global power ?
2. As Japan seeks to define a global role for itself , how should America manage the regional consequences of the inevitable reduction in the degree of Japan ' s acquiescence in its status as an American protectorate ?
The East Asian geopolitical scene is currently characterized by metastable power relations . Metastability involves a condition of external rigidity but of relatively little flexibility , in that regard more reminiscent of iron than steel . It is vulnerable to a destructive chain reaction generated by a powerful jarring blow . Today ' s Far East is experiencing extraordinary economic dynamism alongside growing political uncertainty . Asian economic growth may in fact even contribute to that uncertainty , because prosperity obscures the region ' s political vulnerabilities even as it intensifies national ambitions and expands social expectations .
That Asia is an economic success without parallel in human development goes without saying . Just a few basic statistics dramati - cally highlight that reality . Less than four decades ago , East Asia ( including Japan ) accounted for a mere 4 percent or so of the world ' s total GNP , while North America led with approximately 35-40 percent ; by the mid -1990s, the two regions were roughly equal ( in the neighborhood of 25 percent ). Moreover , Asia ' s pace of growth has been historically unprecedented . Economists have noted that in the takeoff stage of industrialization , Great Britain took more than fifty years and America just somewhat less than fifty years to double their respective outputs per head , whereas both China and South Korea accomplished the same gain in ap - proximately ten years . Barring some massive regional disruption , within a quarter of a century , Asia is likely to outstrip both North America and Europe in total GNP .
However , in addition to becoming the world ' s center of economic gravity , Asia is also its potential political volcano . Although surpassing Europe in economic development , Asia is singularly deficient in regional political development . It lacks the cooperative multilateral structures that so dominate the European political landscape and that dilute , absorb , and contain Europe ' s more traditional territorial , ethnic , and national conflicts . There is nothing comparable in Asia to either the European Union or NATO . None of the three regional associations - ASEAN ( Association of Southeast Asian Nations ), ARF ( Asian Regional Forum , ASEAN ' s platform for a political security dialogue ), and APEC ( Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation Group )- even remotely approximates the web of multi - lateral and regional cooperative ties that bind Europe together .
On the contrary , Asia is today the seat of the world ' s greatest Concentration of rising and recently awakened mass nationalisms , fueled by sudden access to mass communications , hyperactivated by expanding social expectations generated by growing economic
prosperity.