回复@DeepSleeper11: 1991年股东信巴菲特直接拿曾经确定性最强的报纸和电视举例，取10%为折现率取6%为永续成长得出25倍市盈率，而普通周期股（巴菲特一点都不排斥不成长的公司，无论是持股还是全资收购）用的一样是10%折现率没有成长得出10倍市盈率，再加上价格和实际非永续成长的安全边际，能下手的特许经营PE远低于25倍（永续每低一个点现值就大幅下降，事实也证明报纸和电视的永续成长也失败了），这也呼应了巴菲特为什么很少买入15倍PE以上的公司，原文：A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper, television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment of additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings, which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year. Say, next, that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay a whopping $25 million for a property with current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax multiplier of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.) Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million represents “normal earning power” and that earnings will bob around this figure cyclically. A “bob-around” pattern is indeed the lot of most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of retained earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of earnings, discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation. Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property’s valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times pre-tax earnings).//@DeepSleeper11:回复@太原:再想想 巴菲特为什么追求极致的确定性