观众：早上好，巴菲特先生，芒格先生。我叫杰瑞-麦克劳克林。我来自加利福尼亚州的圣马特奥。首先，我想感谢你们为年度报告、信件和这些谈话所付出的努力。我学到了很多东西，它们非常棒，所以我才远道而来(掌声）你曾说过，伟大的公司都拥有经济护城河，我理解这句话的意思是可持续的竞争优势。企业是一开始就拥有可持续的竞争优势，还是必须经过很长时间才能发展起来？然后，您认为企业成功发展可持续竞争优势的根本基础是什么？在这些基础中，你认为哪些最持久，哪些最不持久？
沃伦-巴菲特：有时候，它们可以很快发展起来。我是说，就操作系统而言，微软的发展相对较快。但那是一个爆炸性增长的行业，变化非常快。另一方面，如果你回顾1921 年成立的 See's Candy 公司，你知道，你不可能在短短几十年的时间内建立起可持续的竞争优势，至少是可识别的竞争优势。我的意思是，你一次只开一家店，最初没有人听说过你，后来有几个人听说过你。而盒装巧克力，你知道，人们可能一年买一两次，用于节日或其他场合。所以，你不可能在一两年或五年内，仅仅因为你生产出一盒出色的巧克力，就在加州人心中留下深刻印象。因此，这取决于行业本身的发展方式。沃尔玛在很短的时间内就完成了一项了不起的工作。
但即使是他们，你知道，他们也是在小镇上发展起来的，他们不断进步，不断改进他们的技术。但我想说的是，新行业中也可能有这样的事情。我想说的是，通过 NetJets，我们拥有了可持续的竞争优势。1986 年，当里奇-山图利（Rich Santulli）有了这个想法时，这个行业才刚刚起步，在那之后的很多年里，这个行业一直处于起步阶段，我是说完全处于起步阶段。但他已经建立、正在建立和巩固的，就是这种可持续的竞争优势。但这在很大程度上取决于你所处的行业。我的意思是，1886 年的可口可乐、佐治亚州亚特兰大的雅各布斯药房，你知道，约翰-潘伯顿发明了一种产品。那天他有持续的竞争优势吗？如果有，他也搞砸了，因为他以2000美元的价格把药店卖给了阿萨-坎德勒（Asa Candler）。他做到了，而且花了几十年的时间，在那段时间里有成千上万的竞争者，你知道，但他们一次只粉刷一个谷仓，一次只设计一个《星期六晚邮报》广告，等等。
还有，在第二次世界大战中， 艾森豪威尔将军去找伍德拉夫先生， 他说，"我希望每个美国军人都能喝到可乐" 他说，"我要让他们想起家乡" 。于是他在世界各地建了很多可乐装瓶厂， 这是一个巨大的推动力。但那是在产品发明 60 年后的事了， 因此，某些产品需要很长时间，但我可以看到世界上某些地区在很短的时间内就能建立起巨大的竞争优势。比如说，在长篇动画电影方面，华特-迪斯尼就做到了这一点。在《白雪公主》和其他几部动画片之后，他花了一段时间才将其变现，但在相当长的一段时间内，迪斯尼在这一领域独领风骚，而且速度相当快。查理？
查理-芒格：是的，有很多不同的模式可以创造可持续的竞争优势。也有一些模式会让你很快失去竞争优势。问问安达信就知道了。不久前，安达信在美国还有好名声。我认为，失去箭牌口香糖的好名声比失去安达信的好名声更难。我认为，随着时间的推移，人们已经获得了一些非常显著的竞争优势。而投资过程中最大的问题是，这些优势太明显了，以至于股票卖得很高。
沃伦-巴菲特：士力架成为第一大糖果棒已经有三四十年了
是的，还有--
那么
查理-芒格：在俄罗斯，大家都喜欢士力架。
沃伦-巴菲特：那么--你真的怎么把他们打倒呢？你知道，我的意思是，我们做糖果，我们很想取代士力架，但很难想出办法把他们从第一的位置上拉下来。我的意思是，我的猜测是，10 年后他们还会是糖果棒的第一名，而且这个领域的榜单不会有太大的变化，因为--如果你想想你是如何选择糖果的--如果你 5 年前嚼的是薄荷口香糖，而你今天买了一包口香糖，它很可能是薄荷的。我的意思是，有些东西你会反复尝试，而有些东西一旦你满意了，你就不会再去尝试别的了。如果你观察自己和周围人的习惯，你就会明白这一点。但还有其他一些东西--通常情况下，如果某些东西能很快获得竞争优势，你也要担心它们会很快失去竞争优势。
我的意思是，当一个行业处于变化之中时，有很多人都认为自己是幸存者，或者是将会兴旺发达的人，但事实证明并非如此。
观众：我得出的结论是，伟大的投资者是后天培养出来的，而不是天生的。您和芒格先生同意这个结论吗？如果同意，为什么？如果不同意，为什么？如果您同意，那么如果有人想成为伟大的投资者，您会建议他做哪些事情？另外，如果一个人想成为伟大的投资者，你认为他应该具备哪些心理素质？非常感谢。
沃伦-巴菲特：是的，我基本上同意你所说的。我想说的是--我不知道在多大程度上--比如说，一种从人群中脱颖而出的能力--我不知道在多大程度上这是与生俱来的，在多大程度上这是后天习得的--但这是你需要的一种素质。我完全同意你的观点，即不需要很高的智商。我的意思是，你根本不需要非常聪明才能做好投资者。我想说的是，你说得百分之百正确，我首先从格雷厄姆那里学到了非常非常多的东西，另外我还从菲尔-费雪那里学到了一些东西，我还从查理那里学到了很多东西。我的记录就是最好的证明。从 11 岁到 19 岁，我一直在读加菲尔德-德鲁、爱德华兹和马吉的书，还有各种各样的书--我是说，我读了所有的书--杰拉尔德-M-勒布--我是说，我读了所有关于投资的书，但我做得一点也不好。我没有真正的投资哲学。我尝试了很多东西，获得了很多乐趣。
我没有赚到钱。1949年，我在内布拉斯加大学读本的书，那本书改变了我对投资的看法。从根本上说，这本书告诉我，要把股票看作是企业的一部分。现在看来，这是显而易见的。你可以说，为什么要把它当作罗塞塔石碑？但从某种意义上说，它就是罗塞塔石碑。一旦你把它植入你的大脑，你就不会再去看那些在图表上上下晃动的东西，也不会再去看别人给你发的小短信，你知道，说买这个是因为它下周要涨了，或者它要拆分了，或者股息要增加了，或者别的什么，而是你要买的是一个企业。你现在已经为继续理性思考投资打下了基础。没有理由需要高智商才能做到这一点。没有理由非得天生如此。
我确实认为有一些气质问题可能是与生俱来的，也可能是后天习得的，可能会随着你的人生阅历而不断强化，部分是与生俱来的，但随着你的人生阅历而不断强化，但这一点非常重要。我的意思是，你必须现实一点。你必须准确界定自己的能力范围。你必须知道你不知道什么，而不是被它所诱惑。你不能--我认为，你必须对金钱感兴趣，否则你不会擅长投资。但我认为，如果你非常贪婪，那将是一场灾难，因为这会战胜理性。但我认为，我读过的这些书确实塑造了我对商业和投资的看法。我认为它们现在依然有效。我的意思是，在过去的 25 年里，我读过--我浏览过--大部分的书，我没有看到任何新东西。
在投资的基本方法上，我没有看到任何比格雷厄姆和费雪更高明的地方，那就是把股票看作企业，然后思考怎样才能成为一家好企业。实际上，这就是投资的全部内容，还有本谈到的安全边际等等。这个过程并不复杂，但绝对需要一种纪律。它需要让自己不受大众舆论的影响。你就是不能--你不能对它有任何关注。它没有任何意义。所以你不能--听很多人告诉你事情的想法，这只是浪费时间，你知道的。你最好还是坐下来想一想。我的意思是，没有关于定制框架制造商的分析报告，你知道的。反正也不会有什么好报告。你只需要思考，但你必须从他们的业务特点和资本运作收益等方面去思考。
我会读格雷厄姆和菲尔-费雪的书。然后阅读大量的年度报告，思考企业，并尝试思考哪些企业你了解，哪些你不了解。你不必全部了解。不懂的就忘了吧。查理？
查理-芒格：是的，我有一个更深层次的概括。如果你对了解事情发生的原因有浓厚的兴趣，你总是试图从为什么会这样或为什么不会这样的角度去弄清这个世界，这种心态长期保持下去，就会逐渐提高你应对现实的能力。如果你没有这种思维方式，我想你注定会失败，即使你有很高的智商。
沃伦-巴菲特：我想说的是，我们看到投资结果与智商之间的相关性相对较小。我的意思是，并不是说有一大堆智商 80 的人都能把球打得 "啪啪 "作响，但也有各种智商很高的人却一事无成。然而，从某种意义上说，研究智商高的人为什么不成功，然后剔除这些因素，看看你是否能在自己身上剔除这些因素，并留下成功的其他因素，这可能更有意思。就像查理常说的："我只想知道我会死在哪里，这样我就永远不去那里。" (笑声）如果你研究那些智商高却在财务上失败的人，然后问为什么他们会失败，你知道，你会发现在大多数情况下，他们都有某些压倒性的特征。
你只需确保自己不具备这些特征，或者如果你具备这些特征，你可以摆脱它们或以某种方式控制它们。
How long does it take to dig a moat?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Jerry McLaughlin. I’m from San Mateo, California. First, I just want to thank you for all the effort you put into the annual reports, the letters, and these conversations. I’ve learned a lot, and they’re terrific, which is why I’m here from half a country away. (Applause) You know, you’ve said that great companies are those that have an economic moat, and I understand that phrase to mean a sustainable competitive advantage. Do businesses begin their lives with sustainable competitive advantages, or must that be developed over a very long time? And then, what are the fundamental bases upon which you’ve seen companies successfully develop sustainable competitive advantages? Of those, which do you think is the most enduring and which is the least?
WARREN BUFFETT: Well, sometimes they can develop it very quickly. I mean, I would say that Microsoft, in terms of the operating system, you know, that was a relatively quick development. But that was an industry that was exploding, and things were changing very fast. On the other hand, if you go back to See’s Candy, which started in 1921, you know, there was no way you could build a sustainable competitive advantage, at least that would be recognizable, in times measured shorter than decades. I mean, you opened up one shop at a time, and nobody’d heard of you originally, and then a few people did. And boxed chocolates were something that, you know, people may have bought once or twice a year for a holiday occasion or whatever. So, you weren’t going to embed yourself in the minds of Californians in one or two or five years just because you were turning out, you know, outstanding box of chocolates. So it depends on the way the industry itself is developing. Walmart has done a fabulous job in a — an incredible job — in quite a short period of time.
But even they, you know, they took it in the small towns, and they progressed along, and refined their techniques as they went. But I would say that there could be things in new industries. I would say with NetJets, we have a sustainable competitive advantage. And that’s an industry that was only originated in 1986 when Rich Santulli got the idea, and it was in its infancy — I mean total infancy — for a good many years after that. But what he has built, and is building and fortifying, is that sustainable competitive advantage. But it depends very much on the industry you’re in. And I mean, Coca-Cola, 1886, Jacobs Pharmacy, Atlanta, Georgia, you know, John Pemberton came up with a product. And did he have a sustainable competitive advantage that day? If he did, he blew it because he sold the place for 2,000 bucks to Asa Candler. He did — and it took decades, thousands of competitors over that time, and — you know, but they were painting one barn at a time and designing one Saturday Evening Post ad at a time, and all of that.
And — and pebbles — you know, around the world in World War II, General Eisenhower went to Mr. Woodruff and he said, “I want a Coke within the arm’s length of every American serviceman.” He said, “I want something to remind them of home.” And so he built a lot of bottling plants for Coke around the world. And that was a huge impetus. But that was, what, 60 years or so after the product was invented. So it takes — it takes a long time in certain kinds of products, but I could see certain areas of the world where a huge competitive advantage is built in a very short period of time. I would say that probably, in terms of animated feature-length films, for example, Walt Disney did that. And after “Snow White” and a few more, it took him a while until he could cash in on it, but he — it became Disney and nobody else in that field for quite a while, and fairly quickly. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, there are a lot of different models that create a sustainable competitive advantage. And there are also some models of where you can lose it very fast. Just ask Arthur Andersen. That was a very good name in America not very long ago. And I think it would be harder to lose the good name of Wrigley’s gum than the good name of Arthur Andersen. I think there’s some perfectly remarkable competitive advantages that people have gotten over time. And the great trouble with the investment process is that they’re so damned obvious that the stocks sell at very high prices.
WARREN BUFFETT: Snickers has been the number one candy bar for probably 30 or 40 years now.
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, and —
WARREN BUFFETT: Well —
CHARLIE MUNGER: — in Russia, it turns out that everybody likes Snickers.
WARREN BUFFETT: What — how do you really knock it off? You know, I mean, we make candy, we would love to displace Snickers, but it’s hard to think of ways to knock them from the number one spot. I mean, my guess is that they’ll be number one in, you know, 10 years from now in candy bars, and the list doesn’t change much in that field because — if you think about the nature of how you make that choice as to what candy bar — If you were chewing Spearmint chewing gum five years ago, and you buy a pack of some chewing gum today, it’s likely to be Spearmint. I mean, there’s just things that you experiment a lot with, and there’re things that you don’t fool around with once you’re happy. And, you know, you can understand that if you observe your own habits and people’s habits around you. But there’s other — usually if something can gain competitive advantage very quickly, you have to worry about them losing it quickly, too.
I mean, when an industry is in flux, there are a lot of people that think they’re the survivors, or the ones that are going to prosper, where it turns out otherwise.
AUDIENCE MEMBER:I’ve come to the conclusion that great investors are made, not born. Do you and Mr. Munger agree with this conclusion? If so, why? If not, why not? And if you do agree, what things would you recommend that someone do if they wanted to become a great investor? Also, what mental attributes do you think a person should have if they want to try to become a great investor? Thank you very much.
WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I’d largely agree with what you said. I would say that there — I don’t know to what extent — an ability to detach yourself from the crowd, for example — I don’t know to what extent that’s innate or to what extent that’s learned — but that’s a quality you need. I would agree totally with you that a great IQ is not needed. I mean, you do not have to be terrifically smart to do well as an investor, at all. I would say you’re 100 percent right that I learned from Graham first in a very, very big way, and I learned something additionally from Bill Fisher, and I learned a lot from Charlie. And the proof is in my record, actually. From 11 to 19, I was reading Garfield Drew, and Edwards and Magee, and all kinds of — I mean, I read every book — Gerald M. Loeb — I mean, I read every book there was on investments, and I didn’t do well at all. And I had no real investment philosophy. I had a lot of things I tried. I was having a lot of fun.
I wasn’t making any money. And I read Ben’s book in 1949 when I was at University of Nebraska, and that actually just changed my whole view of investing. And it really did, basically, told me to think about a stock as a part of a business. Now, that seems so obvious. You can say, you know, that why should you regard that as the Rosetta Stone? But it is a Rosetta Stone, in a sense. Once you crank into your mental apparatus that you’re not looking at things that wiggle up and down on charts, or that people send you little missives on, you know, saying buy this because it’s going up next week, or it’s going to split, or the dividend’s going to get increased, or whatever, but instead you’re buying a business. You’ve now set a foundation for going on and thinking rationally about investing. And there’s no reason why you need a high IQ to do that. There’s no reason why you have to be born in some way.
I do think there’s certain matters of temperament that may be innate, they may be learned, they may be intensified by experience as you go on, partially innate, but then reinforced in various ways by your experience as you go through life, but that’s enormously important. I mean, you have to be realistic. You have to just define your circle of competence accurately. You have to know what you don’t know and not get enticed by it. You can’t be — you’ve got to have an interest in money, I think, or you won’t be good in investing. But I think if you’re very greedy, it’ll be a disaster, because that will overcome rationality. But I think the same books I read had really molded what I — how I — thought about businesses and investing. I think that they’re just as valid now. I mean, I haven’t seen anything in the last 25 years, and I read — I glance through — most of the books.
I’ve seen nothing to improve on Graham and Fisher in terms of the basic approach of going about investing, which is to think about stocks as businesses, and then think about what makes a good business. And really, that’s all there is to investing, and having a margin of safety, which Ben talks about, and so on. It’s not a complicated process, but it definitely requires a discipline. It requires insulating yourself from popular opinion. You just simply cannot — you can’t pay any attention to it. It doesn’t mean anything. So you can’t — the idea of listening to lots of people tell you things, it’s just a waste of time, you know. You’d be better off just sitting and thinking a little bit. I mean, there were no analyst reports on custom frame makers, you know. It just doesn’t — and they wouldn’t have been any good anyway. You just have to think, but you have to think about them in terms of their business characteristics and what they can earn on capital employed, and that sort of thing.
I would just read the, you know, I would read the Graham and the Phil Fisher books. And then read lots of annual reports, think about businesses, and try and think about which businesses you understand and which you don’t understand. And you don’t have to understand them all. Just forget about the ones that you don’t understand. Charlie?
CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I have a deeper level of generality. If you have a passionate interest in knowing why things are happening, you always are trying to figure out the world in terms of why is this happening or why is this not happening, that cast of mind, kept over long periods, gradually improves your ability to cope with reality. And if you don’t have that cast of mind, I think you’re destined, probably, for failure, even if you’ve got a pretty high IQ.
WARREN BUFFETT: I would say we’ve seen relatively little correlation between investment results and IQ. I mean, not that there are a whole bunch of people out there with 80 IQs that are knocking, you know, the cover off the ball, but there are all kinds of people with high IQs that get no place. And, yet, it’s probably, in a sense, it’s more interesting to look at why people with high IQs don’t succeed, and then sort of cast out those factors, see if you can cast them out in yourself, and leave a residual that will work. Because it’s like Charlie always says, “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” (Laughter) If you study the people who die financially, you know, with high IQs and say why do they die, you know, you’ll see certain overwhelming characteristics that are present in most of the cases.
And you’ve just got to make sure that either you don’t possess them, or if you do possess them, that you can get rid of them or control them in some manner.