在过去的报告中，我们曾告诉过大家，我们的保险子公司有时会参与套利活动，以替代持有短期现金等价物。当然，我们更愿意做出重大的长期承诺，但我们的现金往往多于好主意。 在这种情况下，套利有时会带来比国库券高得多的回报，而且同样重要的是，套利可以减少我们放松长期投资标准的诱惑。 (在我们谈完套利承诺后，查理通常会说：“好吧，至少它能让你远离酒吧”）。
1988 年，我们从套利中获得了异常丰厚的利润，无论是从绝对金额还是收益率来看都是如此。 我们的税前收益约为 7800 万美元，平均投资资金约为 1.47 亿美元。
这种活动水平使得我们有必要对套利和我们的套利方法进行一些详细的讨论。 曾经，套利一词只适用于在两个不同市场同时买卖证券或外汇。 目的是利用可能存在的微小价差，例如，荷兰皇家股票在阿姆斯特丹以荷兰盾、在伦敦以英镑、在纽约以美元交易。 有些人可能会称其为 “剥头皮”，但从业者选择法文术语 “套利 ”并不会让你感到惊讶。
自第一次世界大战以来，套利--或 “风险套利”--的定义不断扩大，包括从公司出售、合并、资本结构调整、重组、清算、自我招标等已宣布的公司事件中获取利润。 在大多数情况下，套利者期望无论股票市场如何变化都能获利。 相反，他通常面临的主要风险是所宣布的事件不会发生。
套利领域偶尔也会出现一些不寻常的机会。 我 24 岁时在纽约为格雷厄姆-纽曼公司（Graham-Newman Corp. 洛克伍德公司（Rockwood & Co.）是一家位于布鲁克林的巧克力产品公司，盈利能力有限，1941 年采用了后进先出的存货估值法，当时可可的售价为每磅 5 美分。 1954 年，可可的暂时短缺导致价格飙升至 60 美分以上。 因此，Rockwood 希望在价格下跌之前尽快卸下其宝贵的库存。 但是，如果只是简单地将可可出售，公司将需要为收益缴纳近 50%的税款。
1954 年的《税法》拯救了公司。 它包含了一条神秘的规定，即如果将存货作为缩小公司业务范围计划的一部分分配给股东，则可以免除后进先出利润的税款。 罗克伍德公司决定终止其中一项业务，即可可脂的销售，并称其 1,300 万磅可可豆存货可归因于该业务。 因此，公司提出回购股票，以换取不再需要的可可豆，每股支付 80 磅可可豆。
几周来，我忙着买股票、卖可可豆，并定期去施罗德信托公司用股票换仓单。 利润不错，我唯一的开支就是地铁代币。
洛克伍德公司重组的设计师是一位名不见经传但才华横溢的芝加哥人，杰伊-普利兹克，时年 32 岁。 如果你熟悉杰伊后来的记录，你就不会对洛克伍德的持续股东也能享受到这一行动的好处感到惊讶。 从招标前不久到招标后不久，洛克伍德的股票从 15 美元升值到了 100 美元，尽管公司当时正在经历巨额经营亏损。 有时，股票估价不仅仅是市盈率的问题。
近年来，大多数套利操作都涉及友好或不友好的收购。 随着收购热的肆虐，反垄断挑战几乎不存在，出价也经常不断提高，套利者们获得了巨大的收益。 他们不需要特殊的才能就能做得很好；他们的诀窍，就像电影中的彼得-塞勒斯（Peter Sellers）一样，仅仅是 “置身其中”。在华尔街，一句古老的谚语被改写了："授人以鱼，不如授人以渔。 教会他如何套利，就能养活他一辈子。(不过，如果他在伊万-布斯基套利学校学习过，那么供应他三餐的可能是国家机构）。
要评估套利情况，你必须回答四个问题：(1) 承诺的事件发生的可能性有多大？(2) 你的资金会被占用多长时间？(3) 有多大机会发生更好的事情--比如竞争性收购出价？(4) 如果由于反垄断行动、融资故障等原因，事件没有发生，会发生什么？
阿卡塔公司（Arcata Corp.）是我们比较偶然的套利经历之一，它说明了业务的曲折性。 1981 年 9 月 28 日，阿卡塔公司的董事原则上同意将公司出售给 Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR)，KKR 是当时也是现在的一家大型杠杆收购公司。 阿卡塔公司从事印刷和林产品业务，它还有一个优势：1978 年，美国政府获得了阿卡塔公司 10,700 英亩木材的所有权，主要是古老的红木，用于扩建红木国家公园。 政府分几次支付了 9790 万美元，但阿卡塔认为这笔钱远远不够。 双方还对从财产被征用到最终付款这段时间的利率产生了争议。 授权法律规定单利为 6%，而阿卡塔公司则主张采用更高的复利利率。
购买一家有高投机性、大额诉讼请求的公司会产生一个谈判问题，无论该诉讼请求是代表公司提出的还是针对公司提出的。 为了解决这个问题，KKR 提出每股 Arcata 股份 37 美元，外加政府为红杉林地支付的任何额外款项的三分之二。
在评估这一套利机会时，我们不得不问自己 KKR 是否会完成交易，因为除其他事项外，KKR 的报价还取决于其是否能获得 “令人满意的融资”。这种条款对卖方来说总是很危险：它为在求婚和结婚之间热情消退的求婚者提供了一个轻松退出的机会。 不过，我们并不特别担心这种可能性，因为 KKR 过去的成交记录一直很好。
我们还必须问自己，如果 KKR 的交易失败了，会发生什么情况？在这方面，我们也感到相当放心：Arcata 的管理层和董事已经对公司进行了一段时间的考察，显然他们决心出售公司。 如果 KKR 退出，Arcata 很可能会找到另一个买家，当然，价格可能会更低。
最后，我们不得不问自己，红木资产到底值多少钱。 你们的主席连榆树和橡树都分不清楚，但在这个问题上却毫不费力：他冷静地评估了这块地的价值，介于零和一大笔钱之间。
我们从 9 月 30 日开始购买阿卡塔股票，当时的价格约为 33.50 美元，在八周内购买了约 40 万股，占公司股份的 5%。 最初的公告称，37.00 美元将于 1982 年 1 月支付。 因此，如果一切进展顺利，我们的年收益率将达到 40% 左右，这还不算红木索赔，因为红木索赔只是冰山一角。
但一切都不尽如人意。 12 月，公司宣布关闭时间将推迟一些。 尽管如此，1 月 4 日还是签署了最终协议。受此鼓舞，我们提高了持股比例，以每股 38.00 美元左右的价格买入，持股增至 655,000 股，占公司 7% 以上的股份。 尽管交易推迟了，但我们还是愿意掏钱，这反映出我们倾向于 “一掷千金”，而不是 “一毛不拔”。
随后，2 月 25 日，贷款方表示，“鉴于房地产业的严重萧条及其对阿卡塔前景的影响”，他们正在对融资条款进行 “重新审视”。股东大会再次推迟到 4 月份。 阿卡塔发言人说，他 “并不认为收购本身的命运会受到威胁”。当套利者听到这样的保证时，他们的脑海中会闪过一句老话： “他就像财政部长在货币贬值前夕撒谎一样”。
3 月 12 日，KKR 表示之前的交易不会成功，先是将报价下调至 33.50 美元，两天后又上调至 35.00 美元。然而，3 月 15 日，董事们拒绝了这一出价，并接受了另一家集团提出的 37.50 美元外加红木回收的二分之一的出价。 股东们同意了这笔交易，并于 6 月 4 日支付了 37.50 美元。
我们收到了 2,460 万美元，而成本为 2,290 万美元；我们的平均持有期接近六个月。 考虑到这次交易遇到的麻烦，我们 15%的年收益率（不包括红木索赔的任何价值）还是比较令人满意的。
但最好的结果还在后面。 初审法官任命了两个委员会，一个负责研究木材的价值，另一个负责考虑利率问题。 1987 年 1 月，第一个委员会称红木价值 2.757 亿美元，第二个委员会建议的复合混合回报率约为 14%。
1987 年 8 月，法官维持了这些结论，这意味着阿卡塔将获得约 6 亿美元的净收益。 政府随后提出上诉。 1988 年，在上诉审理之前，该索赔案以 5.19 亿美元达成和解。因此，我们每股额外获得 29.48 美元，约合 1930 万美元。 1989 年，我们还将获得 80 万美元左右。
伯克希尔的套利活动与许多套利者不同。 首先，我们每年只参与几笔交易，而且通常是非常大的交易。 而大多数套利者每年都要参与大量交易，也许 50 笔或更多。 面对如此多的交易，他们必须把大部分时间花在监控交易进展和相关股票的市场走势上。 这不是查理和我想要的生活方式。(整天盯着股票行情表发财有什么意义呢？）
由于我们分散投资的程度很低，一笔特别盈利或不盈利的交易对我们每年套利结果的影响远远大于一般的套利操作。 迄今为止，伯克希尔公司还没有过真正糟糕的经历。 但我们会的，一旦发生，我们会向您报告血淋淋的细节。
我们与某些套利业务的另一个不同之处在于，我们只参与已公开宣布的交易。 我们不根据传言进行交易，也不猜测收购候选人。 我们只是阅读报纸，思考一些大的命题，然后根据我们自己的概率判断进行交易。
截至年底，我们唯一的主要套利头寸是 334.2 万股 RJR 纳贝斯克股票，成本为 2.818 亿美元，市值为 3.045 亿美元。 1 月份，我们增持了大约 400 万股，2 月份又取消了持仓。 在我们向收购 RJR 的 KKR 公司提交持股申请时，约有 300 万股被接受，而退回的股票也迅速在市场上售出。 我们的税前利润为 6400 万美元，好于预期。
早些时候，另一个熟悉的面孔出现在 RJR 的竞购中： 杰伊-普利兹克（Jay Pritzker），他是第一波士顿集团的一员，该集团提出了以税收为导向的报价。 引用尤吉-贝拉的一句话：“似曾相识”。
在我们通常会成为 RJR 买家的大部分时间里，由于所罗门参与了竞购集团，我们的股票交易活动受到了限制。 按照惯例，查理和我虽然是所罗门公司的董事，但却被隔绝在有关其并购工作的信息之外。 我们要求这样做： 这些信息对我们没有任何好处，事实上，偶尔还会妨碍伯克希尔的套利活动。
然而，所罗门公司在 RJR 交易中拟做出的异常巨大的承诺，要求所有董事充分知情并参与其中。 因此，伯克希尔对 RJR 的收购只在两个时间段进行：一是在管理层宣布收购计划后的几天内，当时所罗门尚未介入；二是在 RJR 董事会做出有利于 KKR 的决定之后。 由于我们不能在其他时间买入，我们的董事职位让伯克希尔损失惨重。
考虑到伯克希尔公司在 1988 年的良好业绩，你可能会期望我们在 1989 年期间大举套利。 相反，我们希望保持观望。
一个令人愉快的原因是，我们持有的现金减少了--因为我们预计将长期持有的股票仓位大幅上升。 本报告的老读者都知道，我们的新承诺并非基于对股市短期前景的判断。 相反，它们反映了我们对特定公司长期业务前景的看法。 对于一年后的股市、利率或商业活动，我们现在没有、过去没有、将来也不会有任何看法。
即使我们有大量现金，我们在 1989 年可能也不会做什么套利活动。 在收购领域出现了一些非同寻常的过度行为。 正如多萝西所说："托托，我感觉我们已经不在堪萨斯了。
我们不知道这种过激行为会持续多久，也不知道政府、贷款人和买方的态度会发生什么变化，从而助长这种过激行为。 但我们知道，别人越是不谨慎地处理事务，我们就越应该谨慎地处理自己的事务。 我们无意在交易中套利，因为这些交易反映了买方和贷方肆无忌惮的乐观情绪，在我们看来，这种乐观情绪往往是毫无根据的。 在我们的活动中，我们将遵循赫伯-斯坦因的智慧：“如果一件事不能永远持续下去，它就会结束”。
英语原文：
In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie’s sign off after we’ve talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: “Okay, at least it will keep you out of bars.”)
During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about $147 million.
This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to
exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won’t surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.
Since World War I the definition of arbitrage - or “risk arbitrage,” as it is now sometimes called - has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won’t happen.
Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 5¢ per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60¢. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory - quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.
The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation’s business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.
For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.
The architect of Rockwood’s restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you’re familiar with Jay’s subsequent record, you won’t be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood’s continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.
In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been “Being There.” In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.” (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)
To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions:(1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire - a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?
Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR),then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.
Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands.
Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller:It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.
We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable:Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.
Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.
We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares, or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the $37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40% - not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.
All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been postponed - reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.
Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”
On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to $35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the $37.50 was paid on June 4.
We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim - was more than satisfactory.
But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.
In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata. The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.
Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)
Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will - and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.
The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.
At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.
Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”
During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.
However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.
Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.
One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down - because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.
Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”
We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”
免责声明：以上仅作为投资记录，不构成任何投资建议。