本文摘自巴菲特致股东的信1985，英文原文在最后。本文主要讨论了纺织品企业的失败以及应该汲取的教训。
在这一点上，我们通常会转而讨论我们的一些主要业务部门。不过，在此之前，我们应该先看看我们的一家小型企业的失败案例。 我们的副董事长查理-芒格（Charlie Munger）一直强调，无论是在商业还是生活的其他方面，都要研究错误而不是成功。 他这样做的精神正如他所说的："我只想知道我将死在哪里，这样我就永远不会去那里"。你马上就会明白为什么我们是一个很好的团队： 查理喜欢研究错误，而我则为他提供了大量素材，尤其是在我们的纺织品和保险业务方面。
关闭纺织业务
7 月份，我们决定关闭纺织业务，到年底时，这项令人不快的工作已基本完成。 这项业务的历史很有启发性。
21 年前，当我作为普通合伙人的投资合伙企业巴菲特合伙有限公司买下伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的控制权时，该公司的会计净资产为 2200 万美元，全部用于纺织业务。 然而，该公司的内在商业价值要低得多，因为纺织资产无法获得与其会计价值相称的回报。 事实上，在前九年（伯克希尔和哈撒韦作为合并公司运营期间），5.3 亿美元的总销售额产生了 1 000 万美元的总亏损。 利润时有报告，但净效果总是前进一步，后退两步。
在我们进行收购时，南方的纺织厂—主要是非工会的—被认为具有重要的竞争优势。 北方的大多数纺织厂都已关闭，许多人认为我们的业务也会随之清算。
但我们认为，由一名长期员工来管理公司会更好，我们立即选择了他—肯-切斯（Ken Chace）—担任总裁。 在这一点上，我们的判断是百分之百正确的：肯和他最近的继任者加里-莫里森都是出色的管理者，完全不亚于我们盈利能力更强的企业的管理者。
1967 年初，纺织业务产生的现金被用来资助我们通过收购国家赔偿公司进入保险业。 这些资金一部分来自收益，一部分来自纺织品库存、应收账款和固定资产投资的减少。 事实证明，这种回撤是明智的：虽然在肯的管理下，纺织品业务有了很大的改善，但它从未成为一个赚钱的好项目，即使在周期性上升时也是如此。
随后，伯克希尔公司的业务进一步多元化，随着纺织业务在公司中的比重逐渐减少，纺织业务对我们整体收益的抑制作用也逐渐减弱。 我们继续保留纺织业务的原因，我在 1978 年的年度报告中已经说过（在其他时候也总结过）："（1）我们的纺织业务是所在社区非常重要的雇主；（2）管理层在报告问题时直言不讳，在解决问题时充满活力；（3）劳工在面对我们共同的问题时给予合作和理解；（4）相对于投资而言，该业务的平均现金回报率应该不高。我还说："只要这些条件还存在，我们就打算继续支持我们的纺织业务，尽管资本还有其他更有吸引力的用途。
事实证明，我对（4）的判断大错特错。 虽然 1979 年的利润尚可，但此后的业务消耗了大量现金。到了 1985 年年中，连我自己都清楚，这种情况几乎肯定会持续下去。 如果我们能找到一个愿意继续经营的买家，我肯定会选择出售企业而不是清算，即使这意味着我们的收益会降低一些。 但是，对我来说最终显而易见的经济效益对其他人来说也是显而易见的，因此他们对此毫无兴趣。
我不会仅仅为了给我们公司的回报率增加一个零点几而关闭盈利能力低于正常水平的企业。 不过，我也认为，即使是一家盈利能力极强的公司，一旦它的亏损前景似乎没有尽头，就不宜再为其经营提供资金。 亚当-斯密不会同意我的第一个主张，卡尔-马克思也不会同意我的第二个主张。
我要再次强调的是，肯和加里一直足智多谋、精力充沛、富有想象力地努力使我们的纺织业务取得成功。 为了实现可持续盈利，他们重新调整了产品线、机器配置和分销安排。 我们还进行了一项重大收购—Waumbec Mills，期望能产生重要的协同效应（这是一个在商业中广泛使用的术语，用来解释没有任何意义的收购）。 但最终什么也没做成，我应该为没有早点辞职而感到自责。
《商业周刊》最近的一篇文章称，自 1980 年以来，已有 250 家纺织厂关闭。 这些纺织厂的老板们并不了解任何我不知道的信息，他们只是更客观地处理了这些信息。 我忽略了孔德的忠告—"理智应该是心灵的仆人，而不是它的奴隶"—而相信了我更愿意相信的东西。
国内纺织业经营的是商品生意，在世界市场上竞争，而在这个市场上存在着大量的过剩产能。 我们遇到的许多困难都可直接或间接地归因于来自外国的竞争，而这些国家的工人的工资仅为美国最低工资的一小部分。 但这绝不意味着我们的劳动力应该为我们的倒闭承担任何责任。 事实上，与美国工业的一般雇员相比，我们的工人工资很低，整个纺织业都是如此。 在合同谈判中，工会领导人和成员对我们在成本方面的不利地位十分敏感，并没有推动不切实际的工资增长或非生产性的工作方式。 相反，他们和我们一样努力保持我们的竞争力。 即使在我们的清算期，他们也表现出色。(具有讽刺意味的是，如果几年前我们的工会表现得不合理，我们的财务状况会更好；那时我们就会认识到我们面临的不可能的未来，及时关闭，避免未来的重大损失）。
多年来，我们曾选择在纺织业务上进行大规模的资本支出，从而在一定程度上降低可变成本。 每一个这样做的建议看起来都是立竿见影的。 事实上，按照标准的投资回报测试来衡量，这些建议所带来的经济效益通常比我们利润丰厚的糖果和报纸业务的同类支出所带来的经济效益更大。
但是，这些纺织品投资所承诺的收益是虚幻的。 我们的许多竞争对手，无论是国内的还是国外的，都在加紧进行同样的支出，一旦有足够多的公司这样做了，它们降低的成本就成了全行业降价的基准。 单个来看，每家公司的资本投资决策似乎都具有成本效益，而且是理性的；但从整体来看，这些决策相互抵消，是非理性的（就像观看游行的每个人都认为如果踮起脚尖就能看得更清楚一样）。 在每一轮投资之后，所有参与者都在游戏中获得了更多的资金，而收益却依然微不足道。
因此，我们面临着一个悲惨的选择：巨额资本投资本可以帮助我们维持纺织业务，但却会使我们不断增长的资本获得糟糕的回报。 此外，在投资之后，外国竞争者在劳动力成本方面仍将保持巨大的持续优势。 然而，拒绝投资会使我们越来越没有竞争力，甚至与国内纺织品制造商相比也是如此。 我一直认为自己处于伍迪-艾伦（Woody Allen）在其一部电影中描述的境地："人类比历史上任何其他时期都更面临十字路口。 一条路通向绝望和彻底无望，另一条路通向彻底灭亡。 让我们祈祷我们拥有正确选择的智慧"。
要了解投资与不投资的两难选择在商品企业中是如何体现的，看看伯灵顿工业公司（Burlington Industries）是很有启发的，该公司在 21 年前和现在都是迄今为止美国最大的纺织公司。 1964 年，伯灵顿的销售额为 12 亿美元，而我们只有 5000 万美元。 它在分销和生产方面的实力是我们望尘莫及的，当然，它的盈利记录也远远超过了我们。 1964 年底，它的股价是 60 美元，而我们的股价是 13 美元。
伯灵顿决定坚持纺织品业务，1985 年的销售额约为 28 亿美元。 在 1964-85 年期间，该公司的资本支出约为 30 亿美元，远远超过美国其他纺织公司，60 美元的股票每股支出超过 200 美元。 我确信，其中很大一部分支出是用于改善成本和扩张。 鉴于伯灵顿公司坚持纺织业的基本承诺，我也推测该公司的资本决策是相当理性的。
尽管如此，伯灵顿公司的实际销售额还是有所下降，销售回报率和股本回报率也远远低于 20 年前。 1965 年 2 拆 1，现在的股票售价为 34 美元，按调整后的价格计算，仅略高于 1964 年的 60 美元。 与此同时，消费物价指数增长了两倍多。 因此，每股股票的购买力只有 1964 年底的三分之一。 虽然定期分红，但购买力也大幅缩水。
对股东来说，这一毁灭性的结果表明，当大量的脑力和精力被用于一个错误的前提时，可能会发生什么。 这种情况就像塞缪尔-约翰逊笔下的马："一匹能数到十的马是一匹杰出的马，而不是杰出的数学家"。同样，在行业内出色地分配资本的纺织公司是一家杰出的纺织公司，但不是一家杰出的企业。
我从自己的经验和对其他企业的大量观察中得出的结论是，一个好的管理记录（以经济回报来衡量）更多地取决于你进入了哪条商业之舟，而不是你划船的效率（当然，在任何企业中，无论好坏，智慧和努力都有很大帮助）。 几年前，我曾写道："当一个以才华横溢著称的管理层去处理一个以基本经济效益不佳著称的企业时，企业的声誉才会完好无损"。从那以后，我对此事的看法没有任何改变。 如果你发现自己身处一艘长期漏水的船上，花在换船上的精力很可能比花在补漏上的精力更有成效。
* * *
在我们的纺织传奇中，还有一个投资后记。 一些投资者在购买股票时非常看重账面价值（我早年也是如此）。 一些经济学家和学者认为，重置价值对于计算整个股票市场的适当价格水平相当重要。 这两种观点的人都会在我们 1986 年初举行的纺织机械拍卖会上受到教育。
所出售的设备（包括拍卖前几个月处理掉的一些设备）占新贝德福德工厂约 75 万平方英尺的面积，而且完全可以使用。 这些设备最初花费了大约 1300 万美元，其中包括 1980-84 年花费的 200 万美元，目前的账面价值为 86.6 万美元（加速折旧后）。 尽管任何理智的管理者都不会进行这笔投资，但这些设备本可以用 3,000 万至 5,000 万美元的价格重新购置。
我们出售这些设备的总收入为 163 122 美元。 考虑到必要的售前和售后成本，我们的净收入还不到零。 1981 年，我们以每台 5,000 美元的价格买下了相对现代的织布机，但 50 美元的价格却无人问津。 最后，我们以每台 26 美元的价格把它们卖给了废品收购站，这笔钱还不到拆除费用。
请想一想：水牛城的两条造纸线路或一家 See's 糖果店的经济商誉，大大超过了我们从这一大批有形资产中获得的收益，而在不久前，在不同的竞争条件下，这些有形资产还能雇用 1000 多人。
原文：
At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses. Our Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said:“All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” You’ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.
Shutdown of Textile Business
In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.
When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of $22 million, all devoted to the textile business. The company’s intrinsic business value, however, was considerably less because the textile assets were unable to earn returns commensurate with their accounting value. Indeed, during the previous nine years (the period in which Berkshire and Hathaway operated as a merged company) aggregate sales of $530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.
At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.
We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. we immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.
In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise:although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.
Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”
It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.
I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.
I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.
The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.
Thus, we faced a miserable choice:huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of $1.2 billion against our $50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.
Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about $2.8 billion. During the 1964-85 period, the company made capital expenditures of about $3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than $200-per-share on that $60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 -- on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse:“A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the
reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
* * *
There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.
The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about $13 million, including $2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of $866,000 (after accelerated depreciation). Though no sane management would have made the investment, the equipment could have been replaced new for perhaps $30-$50 million.
Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to $163,122. Allowing for necessary pre- and post-sale costs, our net was less than zero. Relatively modern looms that we bought for $5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at $50. We finally sold them for scrap at $26 each, a sum less than removal costs.
Ponder this:the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.