王冠亚

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我生活在武汉，平时去北京、上海、深圳、南京等地出差的话，我首选的交通工具是高铁。武汉地处中国中部，无论是北上、南下还是东进，高铁基本上就是3~4个小时。如果是乘坐航班，加上安检和候机的时长，并不比高铁更有效率。
美国没有中国这么完善的高铁运输体系，所以美国城市与城市之间，乘坐...

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樊登老师讲得挺好的。可能是出于职业原因，我平时都是侧重于从投资和经营的角度讲；樊登老师深入浅出，通俗易懂，从巴菲特出发，最后的落脚点一定是在自己身上，也就是我们能从巴菲特那里学到什么

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day314：
原文：We also own a large investment portfolio whose market value could fall dramatically and quickly under certain conditions (as happened on October 19, 1987). Whatever occurs, though, Berkshire will have the net worth, the earnings stre...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day313：
原文：Moreover, there are people who have been permanently injured to whom we owe insurance payments that stretch out for fifty years or more. To these and other constituencies we have promised total security, whatever comes: financial pan...

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回复@susansan: 哈哈哈是的，感谢樊登老师和齐俊杰老师扩散，让更多人受益//@susansan:回复@王冠亚:樊登讲书4月6日讲了《超越巴菲特的伯克希尔》、老齐读书圈正在讲《超越巴菲特的伯克希尔》。在不同的地方看到冠亚老师翻译的的书被传播，感觉很亲切。

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day312：
原文：And that’s about it. We are not interested in incurring any significant debt at Berkshire for acquisitions or operating purposes. Conventional business wisdom, of course, would argue that we are being too conservative and that there...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day311：
原文：From a risk standpoint, it is far safer to have earnings from ten diverse and uncorrelated utility operations that cover interest charges by, say, a 2:1 ratio than it is to have far greater coverage provided by a single utility. A ca...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day310：
原文：H. Life，Debt and Swoons
Except for token amounts, we shun debt, turning to it for only three purposes:（1）We occasionally use repos as a part of certain short-term investing strategies that incorporate ownership of U.S. governm...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day309：
原文：We wouldn’t have liked those 99:1 odds—and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in ...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day308：
原文：Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have pro...

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回复@拾贝蜗牛: 蜗牛捞得好，其实我写的时候，想到了这一段，不过内容比较长，就没有发上来//@拾贝蜗牛:回复@王冠亚:这个话题，我捞一段【我读巴芒第7期】的内容
巴菲特说：“我所犯过的最糟糕的错误，是公众所未见的。这些错误是，我明明知道一些价值所在的股票和企业，我却错过...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day307：
原文：Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn’t make. It’s no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one’s area of competence. But I have pass...

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奥马哈，五月见！

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day306：
原文：After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won’t pro...

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人物专访：从价值投资到价值人生。感谢母校厚爱！

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day305：
原文：Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manag...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day304：
原文：For example: (1) As if governed by Newton’s First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day303：
原文：My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call “the institutional imperative.” In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative’s existence and I did not intuit...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day302：
原文：A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the ex...

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巴菲特致股东的信原文精读Day301：
原文：That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire’s textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employe...