To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2016 was $27.5 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%. Over the last 52 years (that is, since present management took over), per-share book value has grown from $19 to $172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.*
伯克希尔2016年净利润为275亿美元，这将A股和B股的每股账面价值提升了10.7%。过去52年（自从现在的管理层接手后），每股账面价值已经从19美元增加到172,108美元，年化复合增长率为19%。
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”
这52年的头半部分，伯克希尔的净值和真实的数据（业务的内在价值）是基本一致的。这两个数据之前近似是因为我们的资源大部分投入在可交易证券，其一般按照市场报价进行了重新计价，且减去了预计其出售时可能产生的企业所得税。用华尔街的术语来讲，我们的资产负债表，在很大程度上是按照市值定价的。
By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards.
但是，从20实际90年代初开始，我们的重心开始转向对公司的完全持股，这种转变极大地消弭了资产负债表数据的相关性。这种非相关性的产生是因为应用于控股子公司的会计准则（通常称作“美国通用会计准则”）与应用于可交易证券的准则存在重大差异。具体来讲，我们控股的子公司适用的准则要求出现减值迹象的时候对“失败者”的价值进行减值，而对于“胜利者”，则不能向上重新估值。
We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased – a few of the winners very big – but have not written those up by a penny.
这带来了两个结果：和婚姻类似，业务收购经常会在“我愿意”的承诺之后带来意想不到的事情。我做过一些很傻的收购，为此支付了过高的商誉溢价。这导致了后续的商誉减值和伯克希尔账面价值的减损。我们收购的公司中也有一些胜利者 - 有些胜利者体量巨大 - 但是从未将其价值往上多评一分。
We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.
我们对这些非对称的会计准则并无抱怨。但是随着时间的流逝，其必然会扩大伯克希尔内在价值和账面价值的差异。今天，我们那些胜利者公司所具有的巨大的 - 还在增长中的 - 未记录的收益给伯克希尔股票带来了远超过其账面价值的内在价值。这个溢价部分在我们的财产/意外险业务中尤为明显，在很多其他业务里面也很重大。
Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That’s what has happened at Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company’s 52-year market-price gain – shown on the facing page – materially exceeds its book-value gain.
随着时间的逝去，股票价格和内在价值会趋同。这在伯克希尔得到了印证：公司52年的股票价格收益 - 如首页所示 - 超过其账面价值体现的收益很多。
* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A.
本报告中所有有关每股的数据都是指伯克希尔的A股。有关B股的数据是A股数据的1/1500。