Icahn Enterprises: The Corporate Raider Throwing Stones From His Own Glass House
伊坎企业：企业袭击者从他自己的玻璃屋里扔石头
Published on May 2, 2023 发表于 2023 年 5 月 2 日
Icahn Enterprises (IEP) is an ~$18 billion market cap holding company run by corporate raider and activist investor Carl Icahn, who, along with his son Brett, own approximately 85% of the company.
Icahn Enterprises (IEP) 是一家市值约 180 亿美元的控股公司，由企业掠夺者和激进投资者 Carl Icahn 经营，他和他的儿子 Brett 拥有该公司约 85% 的股份。
Our research has found that IEP units are inflated by 75%+ due to 3 key reasons: (1) IEP trades at a 218% premium to its last reported net asset value (NAV), vastly higher than all comparables (2) we’ve uncovered clear evidence of inflated valuation marks for IEP’s less liquid and private assets (3) the company has suffered additional performance losses year to date following its last disclosure.
我们的研究发现，由于 3 个主要原因，IEP 单位被夸大了 75% 以上：(1) IEP 的交易价格比其最后报告的资产净值 (NAV) 溢价 218%，远高于所有可比对象 (2) 我们'我们发现了 IEP 流动性较低的私人资产估值过高的明确证据 (3) 自上次披露以来，该公司今年迄今遭受了额外的业绩损失。
Most closed-end holding companies trade around or at a discount to their NAVs. For comparison, vehicles run by other star managers, like Dan Loeb’s Third Point and Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square, trade at discounts of 14% and 35% to NAV, respectively.
大多数封闭式控股公司围绕或低于其资产净值进行交易。相比之下，丹勒布的 Third Point 和比尔阿克曼的 Pershing Square 等其他明星经理运营的车辆分别以资产净值折让 14% 和 35% 的价格进行交易。
We further compared IEP to all 526 U.S.-based closed end funds (CEFs) in Bloomberg’s database. Icahn Enterprises’ premium to NAV was higher than all of them and more than double the next highest we found.
我们进一步将 IEP 与彭博数据库中所有 526 只美国封闭式基金 (CEF) 进行了比较。 Icahn Enterprises 对 NAV 的溢价高于所有这些，是我们发现的下一个最高点的两倍多。
A reason for IEP’s extreme premium to NAV, based on a review of retail investor-oriented media, is that average investors are attracted to (a) IEP’s large dividend yield and (b) the prospect of investing alongside Wall Street legend Carl Icahn. Institutional investors have virtually no ownership in IEP.
根据对面向散户投资者的媒体的评论，IEP 对 NAV 极端溢价的一个原因是普通投资者被 (a) IEP 的高股息收益率和 (b) 与华尔街传奇人物 Carl Icahn 一起投资的前景所吸引。机构投资者几乎没有 IEP 的所有权。
Icahn Enterprises’ current dividend yield is ~15.8%, making it the highest dividend yield of any U.S. large cap company by far, with the next closest at ~9.9%.
Icahn Enterprises 目前的股息收益率约为 15.8%，是迄今为止所有美国大型公司中股息收益率最高的，其次接近于 9.9%。
As a result of the company’s elevated unit price, its annual dividend rate equates to an absurd 50.5% of last reported indicative net asset value.
由于公司单价上涨，其年度股息率相当于上次报告的指示性资产净值的荒谬 50.5%。
The company’s outlier dividend is made possible (for now) because Carl Icahn owns roughly 85% of IEP and has been largely taking dividends in units (instead of cash), reducing the overall cash outlay required to meet the dividend payment for remaining unitholders.
该公司的异常股息（目前）成为可能，因为卡尔伊坎拥有 IEP 大约 85% 的股份，并且一直以单位形式（而不是现金）分红，从而减少了为剩余单位持有人支付股息所需的总现金支出。
The dividend is entirely unsupported by IEP’s cash flow and investment performance, which has been negative for years. IEP’s investment portfolio has lost ~53% since 2014. The company’s free cash flow figures show IEP has cumulatively burned ~$4.9 billion over the same period.
股息完全不受 IEP 多年来一直为负的现金流和投资业绩的支持。自 2014 年以来，IEP 的投资组合损失了约 53%。该公司的自由现金流数据显示，IEP 同期累计损失约 49 亿美元。
Despite its negative financial performance, IEP has raised its dividend 3 times since 2014. IEP’s most recent dividend increase came in 2019, when it raised quarterly distributions from $1.75 to $2.00 per unit. IEP’s free cash flow was negative $1.7 billion in the same year.
尽管财务业绩不佳，但 IEP 自 2014 年以来已 3 次提高股息。IEP 最近一次提高股息是在 2019 年，当时它将季度分配从每单位 1.75 美元提高到 2.00 美元。同年，IEP 的自由现金流为负 17 亿美元。
Given that the investment and operating performance of IEP has burned billions in capital, the company has been forced to support its dividend using regular open market sales of IEP units through at-the-market (ATM) offerings, totaling $1.7 billion since 2019.
鉴于 IEP 的投资和经营业绩已经烧掉了数十亿美元的资本，该公司被迫通过在市场 (ATM) 产品中定期公开市场销售 IEP 单位来支持其股息，自 2019 年以来总额为 17 亿美元。
In brief, Icahn has been using money taken in from new investors to pay out dividends to old investors. Such ponzi-like economic structures are sustainable only to the extent that new money is willing to risk being the last one “holding the bag”.
简而言之，伊坎一直在使用从新投资者那里获得的资金向老投资者支付股息。这种类似庞氏骗局的经济结构只有在新资金愿意冒着成为最后一个“拿着包”的风险的情况下才能持续下去。
Supporting this structure is Jefferies, the only large investment bank with research coverage on IEP. It has continuously placed a “buy” rating on IEP units. In one of the worst cases of sell-side research malpractice we’ve seen, Jefferies’ research assumes in all cases, even in its bear case, that IEP’s dividend will be safe “into perpetuity”, despite providing no support for that assumption.
支持这一结构的是 Jefferies，它是唯一一家对 IEP 进行研究的大型投资银行。它一直对 IEP 单位给予“买入”评级。在我们所见过的最严重的卖方研究失当案例之一中，Jefferies 的研究假设在所有情况下，即使是在熊市情况下，IEP 的股息“永远”都是安全的，尽管没有为该假设提供任何支持。
Since 2019, one bank has run all of IEP’s $1.7 billion in ATM offerings: Jefferies. In essence, Jefferies is luring in retail investors through its research arm under the guise of IEP’s ‘safe’ dividend, while also selling billions in IEP units through its investment banking arm to support the very same dividend.
自 2019 年以来，一家银行经营着 IEP 的全部 17 亿美元 ATM 产品：Jefferies。从本质上讲，杰富瑞以 IEP 的“安全”股息为幌子，通过其研究部门吸引散户投资者，同时还通过其投资银行部门出售数十亿美元的 IEP 单位，以支持同样的股息。
Adding to evidence of IEP’s unsustainability, we estimate that IEP’s last reported indicative year-end NAV of $5.6 billion is inflated by at least 22%, due to a combination of overly aggressive marks on IEP’s less liquid/private investments and continued year to date underperformance.
除了 IEP 不可持续的证据外，我们估计 IEP 上次报告的指示性年终资产净值 56 亿美元被夸大了至少 22%，这是由于 IEP 流动性较低/私人投资的过于激进的标记以及年初至今表现不佳的结合.
In one example, IEP owns 90% of a publicly traded meat packaging business that it valued at $243 million at year-end. The company had a market value of only $89 million at the time. In other words, IEP marked the value of its public company equity holdings 204% above the prevailing public market price.
在一个例子中，IEP 拥有一家上市肉类包装企业 90% 的股份，该公司年底估值为 2.43 亿美元。该公司当时的市值仅为 8900 万美元。换句话说，IEP 将其持有的上市公司股权的价值标记为比现行公开市场价格高出 204%。
The mark is even more irregular given that IEP bought over a million shares of the company in December before immediately writing up the value of those shares by ~194% in the same month.
考虑到 IEP 在 12 月购买了该公司超过 100 万股股票，然后在同月立即将这些股票的价值增记了约 194%，这个标记就更加不规则了。
In another instance, IEP marked its “Automotive Parts” division at $381 million in December 2022. Its key subsidiary declared bankruptcy a month later.
在另一个例子中，IEP 在 2022 年 12 月将其“汽车零部件”部门标为 3.81 亿美元。一个月后，其主要子公司宣布破产。
IEP reported $455 million in “real estate holdings” in its most recent quarter. The reported values in this segment have been remarkably stable for years despite declining net income and despite including (i) the Trump Plaza in Atlantic City, which was razed to the ground in 2021; (ii) a country club that became nearly insolvent in 2020 before ownership reverted to its members in 2021; and (iii) a lack of transparency on other assets and valuations.
IEP 在最近一个季度报告了 4.55 亿美元的“房地产资产”。尽管净收入下降，并且包括 (i) 大西洋城的特朗普广场，它在 2021 年被夷为平地； (ii) 一个乡村俱乐部在 2020 年几乎资不抵债，然后所有权在 2021 年归还给其成员； (iii) 其他资产和估值缺乏透明度。
The irregular valuation marks fit a pattern: In January of 2020, UBS dropped coverage of IEP citing a “lack of transparency” following its research showing marks that were “divergent from their public market values”, among other issues.
不规则的估值标记符合一种模式：2020 年 1 月，瑞银在其研究显示标记“与其公开市场价值不同”等问题后，以“缺乏透明度”为由放弃了对 IEP 的覆盖。
Beyond aggressive marks, Icahn’s liquid portfolio has continued to generate losses. Our analysis of Icahn’s latest December 2022 13-F filing indicates that IEP’s long holdings have lost ~$471 million in value year to date, despite the S&P gaining ~9.2% in the same time frame.
除了激进的标记外，伊坎的流动性投资组合还在继续产生亏损。我们对伊坎 2022 年 12 月最新提交的 13-F 文件的分析表明，尽管标准普尔同期上涨约 9.2%，但 IEP 的多头持股今年迄今已损失约 4.71 亿美元的价值。
IEP disclosed that its investment fund had a 47% notional short bet in its December 2022 filings. Given the positive market performance, we estimate this short bet has contributed at least a further $272 million in year-to-date losses.
IEP 在其 2022 年 12 月的文件中披露，其投资基金有 47% 的名义空头押注。鉴于积极的市场表现，我们估计这一空头押注导致今年迄今至少进一步亏损 2.72 亿美元。
Overall, we estimate IEP’s current NAV as being closer to $4.4 billion, or 22% lower than its disclosed year-end indicative NAV of $5.6 billion. The analysis suggests that units currently trade at a 310% premium to NAV, with an annual dividend rate of 64% of NAV.
总体而言，我们估计 IEP 当前的资产净值接近 44 亿美元，比其披露的年末指示性资产净值 56 亿美元低 22%。分析表明，单位目前的交易价格较资产净值溢价 310%，年股息率为资产净值的 64%。
Tightening matters further, IEP is highly levered, with $5.3 billion in Holdco debt and maturities of $1.1 billion, $1.36 billion, and $1.35 billion due in 2024, 2025, and 2026, respectively.
进一步紧缩的是，IEP 的杠杆率很高，Holdco 债务为 53 亿美元，2024 年、2025 年和 2026 年到期的分别为 11 亿美元、13.6 亿美元和 13.5 亿美元。
IEP’s debt covenants limit the company’s financial flexibility: IEP is not permitted to incur additional indebtedness and is only allowed to refinance old debt. With interest rates having increased, IEP will need to pay significantly higher interest expenses on future refinancings.
IEP 的债务契约限制了公司的财务灵活性：IEP 不得承担额外的债务，只能为旧债务再融资。随着利率上升，IEP 将需要为未来的再融资支付更高的利息费用。
Carl Icahn’s ownership in IEP comprises about 85% of his overall net worth, according to Forbes, giving him limited room to maneuver with his own outside capital. We have assessed that Icahn has little ability or reason to bail out IEP with a capital injection, particularly at such elevated unit prices.
据《福布斯》报道，卡尔·伊坎 (Carl Icahn) 在 IEP 的所有权约占其总净资产的 85%，这让他利用自己的外部资本的空间有限。我们评估认为，伊坎几乎没有能力或理由通过注资来拯救 IEP，尤其是在单价如此高的情况下。
Further underscoring Icahn’s limited financial flexibility, he has pledged 181.4 million units, ~60% of his IEP holdings, for personal margin loans. Margin loans are a risky form of debt often reliant on high share (or unit) prices.
进一步强调伊坎有限的财务灵活性，他已承诺将 1.814 亿个单位（约占其 IEP 持有量的 60%）用于个人保证金贷款。保证金贷款是一种有风险的债务形式，通常依赖于高股价（或单价）。
Icahn has not disclosed basic metrics around his margin loans like loan to value (LTV), maintenance thresholds, principal amount, or interest rates. We think unitholders deserve this information in order to understand the risk of margin calls should IEP unit prices revert toward NAV, a reality we see as inevitable.
伊坎没有透露有关他的保证金贷款的基本指标，如贷款价值比 (LTV)、维持门槛、本金金额或利率。我们认为单位持有人应该得到这些信息，以便了解如果 IEP 单位价格向资产净值回归时追加保证金的风险，我们认为这是不可避免的现实。
Given limited financial flexibility and worsening liquidity, we expect Icahn Enterprises will eventually cut or eliminate its dividend entirely, barring a miracle turnaround in investment performance.
鉴于有限的财务灵活性和不断恶化的流动性，我们预计 Icahn Enterprises 最终将削减或完全取消其股息，除非投资业绩出现奇迹般的好转。
Overall, we think Icahn, a legend of Wall Street, has made a classic mistake of taking on too much leverage in the face of sustained losses: a combination that rarely ends well.
总的来说，我们认为华尔街的传奇人物伊坎犯了一个典型的错误，即在持续亏损的情况下过度杠杆化：这种组合很少有好结果。
Initial Disclosure: After extensive research, we have taken a short position in units of Icahn Enterprises L.P. (NASDAQ:IEP). This report represents our opinion, and we encourage every reader to do their own due diligence. Please see our full disclaimer at the bottom of the report. Figures current as of market close on April 28, 2023.
初步披露：经过广泛研究，我们持有 Icahn Enterprises L.P.（纳斯达克股票代码：IEP）的空头头寸。本报告代表我们的意见，我们鼓励每一位读者进行自己的尽职调查。请参阅报告底部的完整免责声明。当前数据截至 2023 年 4 月 28 日市场收盘。
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