第十章赢得主动管理的游戏 如果投资者想投资于主动管理的共同基金，管理者的特质至关重要。投资者最重要的考察两点： 一是管理者沉迷于投资，不为金钱而管理资金。Great investment managers pursue the business with a passion bordering on obsession. The most successful practitioners sometimes marvel (in private moments) that they are paid to practice such an intellectual stimulating profession. 二是管理者和投资人的利益一致，通常通过共同投资（side-by-side investment, co-investment）绑定双方的利益。 当然，最好的办法还是自我激励，即找到具有非同寻常人格魅力的管理者。The shareholders’ best bet for alignment of interests lies in identifying managers with an unusual set of personal aspiration。 作者认为Southeastern Asset Management公司符合优秀主动管理者的特质，包括： 主人翁意识 Principal orientation 战略清晰 Clear strategy 追求长期目标 Long-term focus 集中持股 Portfolio concentration 客户基础稳固 Stable client base 收费合理 Fair fee arrangements 管理人投入金额较大 Substantial co-investment 限制资产规模 Limits on asset under management 与股东良好的沟通 Shareholder communication
如果没有坚定的持股耐性，即使选到优秀的基金也枉然。 Identifying a winning fund proves helpful only if the investor demonstrates sufficient staying power to reach the finish line.
经纪商损客户肥私的手段包括：收取高额交易费用、对低频交易者提供较差的执行服务、收取账户管理费、鼓励过度交易。 Charging high fees for trades, providing poor execution for infrequent traders, imposing assessments for account maintenance, and encouraging excessive trading represent four means that brokers employ to line their pockets as their clients’ expense. 然而，随着时间的流逝，ETF市场也出现了一些对投资者不利的情形，包括：出现了越来越多主动管理的ETF，以及越来越多非核心资产的ETF，它们越来越像传统的共同基金，具备作者在第八、九章中鞭挞的缺陷。 Unfortunately, the ETF market appears to be moving down the same investor-hostile path previously trod by the mutual-fund industry. The class acts of the ETF industry cheapen their image by introducing superfluous products for which they impose unjustifiable charges. The bit performers confirm their mediocrity by offering second-rate products for which they assess ludicrous fees. As the ETF market matures, investors face an increasingly unappealing set of alternatives. (P337)
后记 第十二章赢利性基金的失败 赢利性基金失败的根源： 一是利益冲突，基金管理人在追求自身利益的过程中，难免要以投资者损失为代价。 非赢利性基金并不多见，其中比较著名的是先锋（Vanguard）和教师保险年金协会（TIAA，Teachers Insurance Annuity Association）设立的大学退休教师股权基金（CREF，College Retirement Equity Fund）。 如果基金管理公司从属于一个金融集团，那就存在利益输送的可能性。作者举的例子是德意志银行，它下属的德意志资产管理公司本来对HP合并康柏的计划投了否决票，但在HP的管理层向德意银行的投资银行部提出要求后，德意志资产管理公司又同意了该合并计划。美国SEC最终处罚了德意银行75万美元，但理由不是德意志资产管理公司违反了信托义务，而是它没有披露该交易中存在的利益冲突。 二是个人投资者在能力、信息方面明显处于劣势。 当一个精明的金融服务提供者与一个天真的消费者角力时，其结果就像一个重量 级冠军与一个98镑的文弱人士格斗一样显而易见。个人投资者未战已败。 When a sophisticated provider of financial services stands toe to toe with a naïve consumer, the all-too-predictable conclusion resembles the results of a fight between a heavyweight champion and a nighty-eight pound weakling. The individual investor loses in a first-round knockout. 三是监管者和立法者无所作为，甚至为虎作伥。 对投资者不幸的是，监管改革鲜有效果。在大多数情形下，监管避重就轻，对复杂、深层次问题退避三舍，只处理一些最基本、众所周知的问题。监管当局通常是在出现丑闻后才做出反应。当监管机构禁止了一项诡计，共同基金总会变出新花样，从而抵消监管机构的管控不良行为的努力。最后，监管机构有时会制定出一些造孽的规定，为共同基金管理公司提供新的机制或安全港，使他们借此可以满足公司淘金的欲望。 Unfortunately for investors, regulatory reform rarely proves effective. In most cases, regulators miss a host of complex, off-the-radar-screen problems, and address only the most basic, well-publicized issues. Invariably, authorities react after the fact of the scandal. When regulators confront mutual-fund chicanery, the mutual-fund consistently identifies variations on a prohibited-profit-producing scheme, neutering regulatory efforts to control bad behavior. Finally, the oversight process occasionally produces perverse rules and regulations that provide new mechanisms or safe harbors for mutual-fund management companies to employ in their quest to fill the corporate coffers. 在投资共同基金时，要奉行“少即是多”的原则。The rigid calculus of index-fund investing dominates the ornate complexity of active fund management.